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I – Instruments 
1.  The Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009. Since then, the 
numbering of the articles has changed. For antitrust, Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC have 
respectively become Articles 101, 102 and 106 TFEU. The provisions are in 
substance identical. However, throughout this document, references to the old 
numbering have been maintained when they relate to proceedings taken before 1 
December 2009. Similarly, old references to EC Treaty articles in the field of State 
aid (Articles 87 to 89 EC) have been maintained when the procedural steps referred 
to occurred before the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
2.  Also, since 1 December 2009, the Court of First Instance (CFI) is named the General 
Court. However, the term CFI has been maintained in the present Communication for 
those judgments taken before that date. 
A – STATE AID CONTROL 
1. SHAPING AND APPLYING THE RULES 
3.  Since the onset of the financial crisis, the Commission has adopted four major 
guidance documents specifically for State aid to financial institutions. The Banking 
and Recapitalisation communications
1 adopted in 2008 allowed to preserve financial 
stability and to prevent a credit crunch whilst keeping distortions of competition to a 
minimum. The Recapitalisation Communication in particular proved to be essential 
for providing systemic banks with a sufficient capital base in line with State aid rules 
so that they could continue to fulfil the role as a lender to the real economy. The 
level of remuneration for State capital, in combination with step-up mechanisms in 
schemes and individual measures, ensures that this capital is paid back as early as 
economic circumstances permit.  
4.  Between October 2008 and 31 December 2009, the Commission approved guarantee 
schemes for 12 Member States
2. Seven Member States implemented pure 
recapitalisation schemes
3, whilst seven Member States designed mixed/holistic 
schemes with both instruments
4.Spain, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, Hungary and 
Germany also implemented other forms of support schemes. 
                                                 
1  Communication from the Commission - The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation 
to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis. (OJ C 270, 25.10.2008, p. 8); 
Commission Communication - Recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: 
limitation of the aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition. 
(OJ C 10, 15.1.2009, p. 2). 
2  Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. 
3  Denmark, Finland, France, Italy Poland, Portugal and Sweden. 
4  Germany, United Kingdom, Greece, Austria , Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. EN  9     EN 
5.  In terms of aid to individual entities, in 2009 the Commission approved 
recapitalisation and other support measures to 29 entities
5. 
6.  The 2008 communications were complemented in 2009 by the Communication on 
the Treatment of Impaired Assets in the Community banking sector ("Impaired 
Assets Communication")
6 and by the Communication on the return to viability and 
the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis 
under the State aid rules (Restructuring Communication")
7. 
7.  The Impaired Assets Communication responded to a growing consensus on the need 
to tackle the root causes of the crisis in the form of toxic assets on banks' balance 
sheets. Thus, on 25 February 2009, the Commission set out in this communication 
how it would assess under State aid rules asset relief measures for financial 
institutions. The communication is based on the principles of transparency and 
disclosure, adequate burden-sharing between the State and the beneficiary, and 
prudent valuation of assets based on their real economic value. Given the complexity 
surrounding the appropriate valuation of the assets, the Commission decided to call 
upon technical experts to undertake the valuation in an independent manner. Such 
experts were chosen under a framework contract following a tender procedure. 
8.  The Restructuring Communication, issued on 14 August 2009 and dealing with 
banks which are under obligation to restructure, reflects the Commission's thinking 
for a future beyond the current crisis. It contains rules for those beneficiaries that 
were not only in need of short-term rescue aid, but required aid to implement 
structural changes to their business models. The Communication retains the main 
principles of the Community Guidelines on rescue and restructuring aid to companies 
in financial difficulties, but has been adapted to the extraordinary economic 
circumstances of the financial crisis. The main conditions that need to be complied 
with are the following: First, banks that are obliged to restructure need to 
demonstrate their capacity to return to long-term viability without State support. 
Second, they have to contribute to the restructuring costs (burden-sharing) and they 
thirdly have to adopt measures to limit competition distortions.  
9.  The above principles contribute to addressing the issue of moral hazard. In order not 
to reward the risky behaviour that occurred in the past, the communications require 
appropriate remuneration of the aid, and impose temporary restrictions on coupon 
and dividend payments to bond- and shareholders. Tailor-made, case-specific 
measures to limit the distortions of competitions resulting from the aid, which are 
predominately determined by the relative/absolute size of the aid and the position of 
the beneficiary on the relevant markets, are also necessary for the aid to be 
compatible with the Treaty.  
                                                 
5  ING, KBC, Parex Banka, Anglo Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland, Allied Irish Bank, Fortis, Dexia, Nord LB, IKB, 
Kaupthing Bank Finland, Ethias, SdB, Banco Privado Portugues, Hypo Real Estate, WestLB, Fionia, HSH 
Nordbank, Hypo Tirol, LBBW, Kaupthing Luxemburg, Caisse d'Epargne/Banque Populaire, Mortgage Bank of 
Latvia, Northern Rock, Commerzbank, Lloyds Banking Group, BAWAG, Hypo Group Alpe Adria and RBS. 
6  Communication from the Commission on the Treatment of Impaired Assets in the Community Banking 
sector (OJ C 72, 26.3.2009, p. 1). 
7  Communication from the Commission "The return to viability and the assessment of restructuring 
measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules" (OJ C 195, 19.8.2009, 
p. 9). EN  10     EN 
10.  Between October 2008 and 31 December 2009, the Commission had adopted 73 
decisions in relation to 33 schemes and 68 decisions on individual measures to 38 
banks. These 141 decisions encompass 21 Member States. Because of the urgency, 
some of those decisions were taken overnight, to avoid a domino effect and the major 
collapse of the EU's financial system. 
11.  To further limit negative spill-over effects of the financial crisis to the real economy, 
the Commission also amended the Temporary Framework
8 to provide Member States 
with additional possibilities to tackle the effects of the credit squeeze on the real 
economy. The amended Framework
9 takes into account different levels of 
collateralisation (in particular for low rating categories) when calculating the 
permissible guarantee premiums. Furthermore, rules were clarified for guarantees 
with underlying loans exceeding a maturity of 2 years. In October, the Commission 
adopted another amendment to the Framework, in order to allow for a separate 
compatible limited amount of aid of EUR 15.000 for farmers
10. A technical 
modification of the Framework was introduced in December to further facilitate 
access to finance especially in Member States with low labour costs by allowing to 
determine the maximum amount of an investment loan covered by a guarantee either 
on the basis of the total annual wage bill of the beneficiary or on the basis of the 
EU27 average labour costs
11. 
12.  By 31 December 2009, the Commission had approved 79 measures in 25 Member 
States aimed at stabilising companies and jobs in the real economy
12. Out of these 
measures, 18 related to guarantees, 11 to short-term export credit measures, nine to 
reduced interest rate loans, six to risk capital measures and five to reduced interest 
rate loans for green products. A large number of the measures approved (30) related 
to the granting of up to EUR 500 000 per undertaking. 
13.  According to the Temporary Framework, Member States had to provide a report to 
the Commission by 31 October, to give feedback on the implementation of the 
Framework and on its effectiveness in the reactivation of the bank lending and in 
supporting companies
13. To this end, the Commission prepared a questionnaire 
which was also published on DG Competition's webpage, so as to also obtain 
comments from interested parties. 
14.  The Commission prolonged the validity of the current Community Guidelines on 
State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Difficulty, which would have 
                                                 
8  Communication from the Commission – Temporary Community framework for State aid measures to 
support access to finance in the current financial and economic crisis (OJ C 16, 21.1.2009, p. 1). 
9  Communication from the Commission - Temporary framework for State aid measures to support access 
to finance in the current financial and economic crisis (consolidated version) (OJ C 83, 7.4.2009, p. 1). 
10  Communication from the Commission amending the Temporary Community Framework for State aid 
measures to support access to finance in the current financial and economic crisis (OJ C 261, 
31.10.2009, p. 2). 
11  Communication from the Commission amending the Temporary Community Framework for State aid 
measures to support access to finance in the current financial and economic crisis (OJ C 303, 
15.12.2009, p. 6). 
12  Excluding temporary measures in the agricultural sector. 
13  See point 6 of the Communication from the Commission – Temporary Community framework for State 
aid measures to support access to finance in the current financial and economic crisis (OJ C 16, 
21.1.2009, p. 1). EN  11     EN 
expired in October
14. Since their adoption in 2004, the Commission has applied these 
guidelines in numerous cases. Experience has shown that the guidelines provide a 
sound basis for the control of this type of State aid. The economic crisis has created a 
difficult and unstable economic situation. To ensure continuity and legal certainty in 
the treatment of State aid to enterprises in financial difficulty, the Commission 
extended the validity of the existing guidelines until October 2012. 
15.  In 2009 the Commission authorized, under the Community Guidelines on State aid 
for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty
15, State aid granted and planned by 
Poland to Gdansk Shipyard for its restructuring
16. The Commission found compatible 
the aid already received by the yard since 2004 in the amount of EUR 94 million as 
well as the planned aid of EUR 35 million. In addition, the Commission approved 
production guarantees for the yard for a total amount of EUR 122 million. By this 
decision the Commission finalized an in-depth investigation launched in June 2005
17 
following a notification of aid to the yard dating from October 2004, soon after the 
Polish accession to the EU.  
16.  In its decision the Commission concluded that the restructuring plan by new private 
owner of the yard, ISD Polska, proposed a sustainable business strategy based on 
diversification of the yard's activities and synergies with other companies in the 
Group of ISD Polska. This restructuring plan allayed the Commission's doubts on the 
ability of the yard to restore long-term viability. The plan also envisaged a significant 
private contribution to finance the cost of the restructuring, ensuring that the State 
support would be limited to the necessary minimum. 
17.  Finally, the Commission took into account that without the prolonged State support, 
the yard would long have become insolvent and bankrupt. By keeping the inefficient 
Gdansk Shipyard afloat, the aid crowded out more efficient competitors, which could 
have benefited, in terms of increased market shares, from the yard's exit from the 
market. It was thus important to ensure that far-reaching and meaningful measures 
limiting the distortion of competition created by the aid were implemented. In its 
decision the Commission concluded that the planned reductions of the yard's 
production capacity combined with the committed production cap comply with these 
requirements without jeopardizing the yard's viability. 
18.  The Commission completed the implementation of the State Aid Action Plan 
(SAAP)
18 by adopting guidance papers on training aid
19 and aid to disabled and 
disadvantaged workers
20. The General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER)
21 
                                                 
14  Prolongation of Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty 
(OJ C 156, 9.7.2009, p. 3). 
15  OJ C 244, 1.10.2004, p. 2. 
16 Case  C18/2005. 
17  OJ C 220, 8.9.2005, p. 7. 
18  State Aid Action Plan – Less and better targeted State aid: a roadmap for State aid reform 2005-2009 
(COM(2005)107 final, 7.6.2005).  
19  Communication from the Commission - Criteria for the compatibility analysis of training State aid 
cases subject to individual notification (OJ C 188, 11.8.2009, p. 1). 
20  Communication from the Commission - Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility of State aid for the 
employment of disadvantaged and disabled workers subject to individual notification (OJ C 188, 11.8.2009, 
p. 6).  EN  12     EN 
enables Member States to grant a large number of aid measures, including training 
aid and aid for the employment of disabled or disadvantaged workers, without prior 
notification to the Commission. However, as individual aid measures involving large 
aid amounts can entail a higher risk of distorting competition, notification remains 
necessary for such measures. The guidance papers on training aid and employment 
aid set out the criteria for the Commission's assessment of the compatibility of such 
individually notified aid measures. Guidance is provided on the information required 
and on the assessment methodology. The criteria are based on the principles of the 
Commission's SAAP, in particular the balancing test that weighs the positive effects 
brought about by the aid against the negative impact a potential distortion of 
competition might entail. 
19.  The European Commission also adopted a guidance paper setting out criteria for the 
in-depth assessment of regional aid to large investment projects
22. The Regional Aid 
Guidelines 2007-2013
23 foresee that large investment projects above certain 
thresholds need to be individually notified to the Commission. For such projects 
where the aid beneficiary has a market share of more than 25  % or where the 
production capacity created by the project exceeds 5 % of the market (if the market 
concerned is considered as underperforming), the Commission has to open a formal 
investigation. Regional aid to such large investment projects may carry a greater risk 
of distorting competition and thus requires a detailed compatibility assessment. The 
criteria for the in-depth assessment of regional aid to large investment projects, 
which are based on the principles of the SAAP, and in particular the balancing test, 
detail how the Commission shall evaluate the positive and negative effects of such 
aid. Member States have to provide information on the project’s contribution to 
regional development as well as the appropriateness, proportionality and incentive 
effect of the aid. Negative effects include the crowding-out of private investment or 
effects on trade such as displacement of investments. The Dell Poland case 
(C  46/2008) was the first case where the Commission conducted the type of 
assessment detailed in the guidance paper. The Commission concluded that the 
investment project by Dell to set up a manufacturing plant in Łódź would 
significantly contribute to regional development and that these benefits outweighed 
any potential negative effects on competition and loss of jobs elsewhere.  
20.  A public consultation was launched on "Common principles for an Economic 
Assessment of the Compatibility of State aid under Article 87(3) EC". The document 
sets out the general framework underlying the economic analysis of State aid. It aims 
at providing coherence in the application of State aid rules. It clarifies the overall 
principles of State aid compatibility analysis which are (and have already been) 
translated into more specific rules for particular kinds of aid. 
21.  In the field of Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI), the Commission 
responded to 16 questions by citizens, stakeholders and public administrations in the 
                                                                                                                                                         
21  Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid 
compatible with the common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 EC (General block exemption 
Regulation) (OJ L 214, 9.8.2008, p. 3). 
22  Communication from the Commission concerning the criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional aid 
to large investment projects (OJ C 223, 16.9.2009, p. 3). 
23  Guidelines on national regional aid for 2007-2013 (OJ C 54, 4.3.2006, p. 13). EN  13     EN 
framework of the Interactive Information Service
24. These answers further clarified 
several aspects of the application of the SGEI Package, including the notion and the 
content of the act of entrustment, the margin of discretion Member States have in the 
organisation of SGEI, but also the general conditions of application of State aid rules 
and the notion of SGEI itself. 
22.  The autumn 2009 State aid Scoreboard
25 shows that the overall aid volume rose in 
2008 from around 0.5% of GDP to 2.2% of GDP or EUR 279.6 billion due to the 
financial and economic crisis. Crisis-related aid represented roughly 1.7% or EUR 
212.2 billion and related to aid to financial institutions only
26. Aid to the real 
economy under the Temporary Framework started to be implemented by Member 
States only in 2009. Crisis measures aside, total aid amounted in 2008 to 0.5% of 
GDP or EUR 67.4 billion, a level similar to 2007 and the years before. Aid was 
mainly directed towards horizontal objectives of common interest (on average 88%), 
of which regional aid, research and development and environmental aid represented 
around two-thirds whereas rescue and restructuring aid fell. Although figures for 
2009 are not yet available, we do not expect the volume and share of non-financial 
aid to dramatically change in 2009. 
23.  Reform introduced by the SAAP continued to bear fruit. Aid granted through block 
exemption, in particular the GBER, rose significantly in terms of the aid volume and 
represented EUR 10 billion or 19% of total aid in 2008, compared to 2007 (EUR 6.3 
billion or 13%) and 2006 (EUR 3 billion or 6% of total aid). Another 76% of total 
aid was granted through schemes and only 5% represent individual aid. 
24.  In the field of State aid in the electronic communications sector, the Commission 
encourages State aid measures that are aimed at providing equitable broadband 
coverage at affordable prices for European citizens. In 2009, the Commission 
continued to address in its decisions two major trends of public intervention on the 
broadband market: support for affordable basic broadband services in areas where 
such services do not exist and public intervention in support of very high speed 
broadband networks ("next generation" networks). 
25.  On the basis of its decisional practice, in September the Commission adopted 
Guidelines on the application of State aid rules to public funding for the rapid 
deployment of broadband networks, which also addressed  public funding to the 
deployment of so-called next generation access broadband networks
27. In 45 
decisions the Commission had clarified the conditions under which such support 
would be compatible with the State aid provisions (inter alia, detailed mapping 
showing the need for broadband coverage, transparent tendering process, technology 
neutrality of the aid, open wholesale access). These conditions are incorporated in 
the Guidelines and will equally apply to next generation access support. 
                                                 
24 http://ec.europa.eu/services_general_interest/registration/form_en.html 
25  COM(2009) 661 final, 7.12.2009. 
26  The maximum volume of Commission approved measures set up by Member States in 2008 to stabilise 
the financial markets amounted to € 3361 billion. According to the annual reports submitted by Member 
States, Member States implemented measures amounting to a nominal value of € 958 billion. According 
to first estimates, the aid element of the support measures put in place in 2008 – as proxy for the 
benefits passed by the State to the benefitting financial institutions – amounted to € 212.2 billion. 
27  Community Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to rapid deployment of 
broadband networks, OJ C 235, 30.9.2009, p. 7. EN  14     EN 
26.  In the media sector, the Commission adopted on 2 July a revised Broadcasting 
Communication which aims at showing the specific mechanisms on which the 
Commission's assessment of publicly funded new media services
28 is based (see 
section II.E.2.4). The new framework provides more flexibility for the financing of 
public service broadcasters and at the same time clarifies the requirements for an 
effective control of the public service mission at the national level. It adapts the 
framework to the fast changing market environment while maintaining the core 
principles of the Commission's policy based on the Amsterdam Protocol (see section 
II.E.2.4) and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice
29. A center piece of 
the new Communication is the prior evaluation of new audiovisual services at 
national level. Publicly funded audiovisual services must perform their remits in an 
economically neutral way, i.e. satisfy the social, democratic and cultural needs of a 
society without distorting cross border trade and competition contrary to the common 
interest.  
27.  In January, the Commission decided to extend the validity of the State aid 
assessment criteria of the 2001 Cinema Communication
30 until 31 December 2012
31. 
Under the current criteria, State support for film production can be exempted under 
certain conditions, in particular where that support concerns cultural films, while 
respecting certain thresholds regarding territorial requirements and aid intensity. A 
number of different trends have emerged since the 2001 Cinema Communication 
which will require some refinement of these criteria and a possible extension of the 
scope of application in due course. These trends include support for aspects other 
than film and TV production (such as film distribution and digital projection), as well 
as competition among some Member States to use State aid to attract inward 
investment from large-scale, mainly US, film production companies.  
1.1.  State aid control – the Simplification Package 
28.  Following the SAAP, the Commission adopted a Simplification Package to 
modernise and simplify State aid procedures. This Package (in force since 1 
September 2009) comprises a Best Practice Code
32 and a Notice on a Simplified 
Procedure
33, both of which aim at improving the effectiveness, transparency and 
predictability of State aid procedures, within the existing legal context of the 
Procedural Regulation
34. 
29.  The Simplified Procedure aims at improving the Commission's treatment of 
straightforward cases, such as those clearly in line with existing Guidelines or 
                                                 
28  Communication on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting of 2 July 2009, 
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30  Communication on certain legal aspects relating to cinematographic and other audiovisual works, 
OJ C 43, 16.2.2002, p. 6. 
31  Communication concerning the State aid assessment criteria of the Commission communication on 
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of 26 September 2001, OJ C 31, 7.2.2009, p. 1. 
32  Code of Best Practice for the conduct of State aid control procedures (OJ C 136, 16.6.2009, pp. 13-20). 
33  Notice from the Commission on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain types of State aid 
(OJ C 136, 16.6.2009, pp. 3-12). 
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established Commission decision-making practice. The Commission wants to ensure 
that clearly compatible aid measures are approved within one month from a complete 
notification by a Member State. This procedure requires important adaptations to the 
Commission's and Member States' working methods. Arrangements to this effect 
(templates, standard decisions etc.) have been put in place. A transparency provision 
also ensures that third parties can provide input. 
30.  The Best Practices Code details how all other State aid procedures should be carried 
out in practice. It includes a certain number of voluntary arrangements between the 
Commission and Member States to achieve more streamlined and predictable 
procedures at each step of a State aid investigation. Consequently, the Commission 
should be able to deliver State aid decisions within more business relevant deadlines. 
1.2. Recovery  policy 
31.  When a negative decision is taken in cases of unlawful State aid, the Commission 
shall decide that the Member State must take all necessary measures to recover the 
aid from the beneficiary. Recovery has not been conceived as a penalty, but as a 
means to restore the situation previous to the granting of the illegal and unlawful aid. 
This objective is obtained once the aid (plus compound interests) is repaid by the 
recipient who enjoyed an advantage over its competitors on the market. 
32.  A Member State is deemed to comply with the recovery decision when the aid (plus 
compound interests) has been fully reimbursed within the prescribed time limit or, in 
the case of an insolvent beneficiary, when the company is liquidated under market 
conditions. Where the Member State concerned has not complied with the recovery 
decision, and where it has not been able to demonstrate the existence of absolute 
impossibility, the Commission may initiate infringement proceedings: 
•  The Commission may refer the matter directly to the Court of Justice (CoJ) in 
accordance with Article 108(2) TFEU. 
•  If the Member State concerned has not complied with a judgment of the CoJ, the 
Commission may pursue the matter in accordance with Article 260(2) TFEU. If 
the CoJ recognises that the Member State did not comply with its judgment, the 
CoJ may impose the payment of penalties on the Member State. 
33.  It is essential for the credibility of the Commission's State aid policy that recovery 
decisions are enforced effectively and immediately. However, enforcement of the 
recovery orders by the Member State is not always easy due to the obstacles existing 
in the different national legal and judicial systems. In 2007, the Commission 
therefore adopted a Notice on the implementation of decisions ordering Member 
States to recover unlawful and incompatible State aid (Recovery Notice)
35 in order to 
clarify the applicable rules and give Member States concrete guidance on how to 
achieve a more immediate and effective execution of recovery decisions. So far, the 
adopted measures have proven to be successful. 
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34.  By 31 December, the amount of illegal and incompatible aid recovered had further 
increased from EUR 2.3 billion in December 2004 to EUR 10.4 billion. The 
percentage of illegal and incompatible aid still to be recovered has evolved 
accordingly (from 75% at the end of 2004 to 12% at 31 December 2009). The share 
of the total amount recovered has however slightly decreased between 2008 and 
2009 (from 90.9% to 88%), due to seven new recovery decisions adopted in 2009 
and high amounts of aid identified
36 in several 2008 decisions. In order to ensure 
better enforcement of its decisions, the Commission initiated actions under Article 
108(2) TFEU
37 in five cases, and an action under Article 260(2) TFEU
38 in one case, 
thus leading to 27 cases under litigation. DG Competition currently has 44 pending 
active recovery cases. 
  2000 –2009 
Decisions adopted  140 
Cases closed  85 
Aid amount known (in mio EUR)  11 806,5 
Amounts recovered (in mio EUR)  10 391,8 
Recovery interests  2 336,5 
Amounts outstanding  1 414,6 
% recovered  88% 
1.3.  State aid enforcement by national courts 
35.  The enforcement of the State aid rules by the Commission is, for the time being, the 
most important system of State aid review in the EU. National courts could 
nevertheless play a important role in the State aid field, since they can offer possible 
complainants effective legal protection "close to home", including remedies 
unavailable at Commission level. According to a recently updated study
39, more and 
more cases are brought before national courts, covering an increasing variety of 
issues. 
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36.  The potential of private State aid enforcement underlies a new Notice on State aid 
Enforcement by National Courts
40 issued by the Commission in April. This new 
Notice has two key objectives: 
•  To provide more detailed guidance to national courts and to potential claimants on 
all aspects of private State aid enforcement. This guidance is based on the existing 
CoJ case law on the role of national courts in the State aid field. The guidance 
covers issues such as the protection of individual rights, the recovery of illegal 
aid, interim relief and damages actions. 
•  To offer national courts more practical and user-friendly Commission support in 
their daily work. National judges would thus be able to ask the Commission for 
information in its possession and/or for its opinion on the application of the State 
aid rules. A number of such requests have already been received following the 
publication of the Notice. 
37.  The Commission also undertook additional advocacy and public awareness efforts to 
ensure wide-spread use of the Notice, in particular through web pages dedicated to 
national judges
41. 
1.4.  Monitoring of State aid measures 
38.  To ensure effective enforcement of the State aid rules, in which an increasing 
number of aid measures are no longer subject to the notification obligation (–see 
GBER), the Commission has stepped up ex post monitoring since 2006. 
39.  Since then, the Commission has covered an important part of the main substantive 
types of aid: the SME block exemption regulation (hereinafter, "BER"), training 
BER, employment BER, regional BER, the Research, Development and Innovation 
(R&D&I) Framework, the environmental guidelines and the rescue and restructuring 
guidelines. The Commission has also addressed aid measures adopted by 24 of the 
27 Member States of the Community, thereby ensuring a balanced geographical 
coverage. Monitoring takes place both at the level of the general legislation outlining 
the conditions for the scheme and at the level of important individual decisions 
implementing such schemes (typically cases above EUR 500 000). 
40.  The analysis of the results of the first exercises shows that, overall, this part of the 
existing State aid architecture (schemes and BERs) functions in a satisfactory 
manner. In a minority of cases substantive problems or procedural issues (such as 
transparency, reporting, speed and quality of answers) were identified. The cases in 
which no appropriate solution was yet identified are currently still being investigated 
(2 in 2006, 2 in 2007, at this stage 2 in 2008). Finally, it has to be noted that all 
Member States have cooperated with the Commission, albeit many have submitted 
the requested information requested with considerable delay. The CFI also delivered 
a judgment
42 which confirms the legality of the monitoring exercises. 
                                                 
40  OJ C 85, 9.4.2009, p. 1. 
41 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/state_aid.html 
42  Judgment in Case T-376/07, Germany v Commission, 25.11.2009. EN  18     EN 
1.5.  Horizontal State aid 
41.  In 2009, the Commission approved 29 aid schemes and adopted 4 non aid decisions 
on the basis of the Community Framework for research and development and 
innovation
43; 19 out of these measures were pure R&D schemes, 2 were innovation-
oriented schemes and 12 were mixed, pursuing both R&D and innovation objectives. 
In addition, and following an in-depth economic assessment, the Commission has 
decided not to raise objections on 9 individually notifiable aids to large R&D 
projects. Furthermore, it has monitored information submitted on aids to 73 other 
R&D projects, which exceed EUR 3 million although without falling under the duty 
for individual notification. 
42.  As to State aid granted in favour of R&D projects under the GBER
44, there were 51 
schemes providing aid for fundamental research, 186 for industrial research and 181 
for experimental development. At the same time, the GBER was also used by 
Member States for measures relating to innovation, 57 of which referred to industrial 
property rights for SMEs, 26 to young innovative enterprises, 47 to innovation 
advisory and support services, and 23 to the loan of highly qualified personnel. 
43.  As far as environmental aid is concerned, the Commission approved 34 aid schemes 
and four individual applications, most of them under the Environmental Aid 
Guidelines
45. Furthermore, the Commission cleared one case as not constituting State 
aid. Moreover, following a formal investigation procedure, the Commission took two 
negative decisions, one conditional decision as well as a positive decision. At the 
same time the Commission decided to open formal investigations in four other cases 
related to environmental aid. 
44.  In the area of risk capital financing for SMEs, and in addition to the six aid schemes 
authorised under the Temporary Framework, the Commission approved 25 measures 
under the Risk capital guidelines
46; 16 of these complied with the safe harbour 
provisions allowing for a light assessment. The Commission has conducted a detailed 
assessment of the compatibility of the measures in seven other cases, and considered 
that they did not involve State aid in the remaining two cases. Furthermore, 13 
additional aid schemes have been implemented in 2009 under the GBER, which 
Member States also start to use for risk capital purposes. 
45.  In total the Commission received some 971 aid measures which have been 
implemented in 2009 under the GBER. Apart from the above-mentioned objectives, 
these exempted aid measures covered also the fields of employment aid, training aid, 
aid for environmental purposes
47 and regional aid. 
46.  In the field of regional aid, in 2009 the Commission approved 45 schemes, mostly on 
the basis of the Guidelines on national regional aid for 2007-2013
48, as well as 12 ad 
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hoc aid measures in favour of single enterprises for investments in areas under the 
Regional Aid maps 2007-2013
49. 
47.  On the basis of the same Guidelines on national regional aid for 2007-2013, the 
Commission approved State aid to nine large investment projects
50 and decided to 
initiate the formal investigation procedure regarding two others
51 as well as one ad 
hoc regional aid case
52. The Commission also closed the formal investigation 
procedure for two other large investment projects with a positive decision
53. 
48.  Under the Temporary Framework, in 2009 the Commission adopted 30 decisions 
approving limited amounts of compatible aid schemes, 15 decisions approving 
measures for State aid in the form of guarantee and 9 decisions approving measures 
in the form of subsidized interest rates. 
1.6. Coal 
49.  Following a sharp fall during the last quarter of 2008, mainly due to the economic 
crisis, coal prices are now returning to the levels registered at the end of 2007 
(around EUR 56 per tonne of coal equivalent). Negotiated prices for 2010 are 
expected to be low in this range with an increasing trend. Recent forecasts until 2020 
foresee a constant rise of coal prices which should, however, remain below EUR 100 
per tonne of coal equivalent. 




56. These aid schemes are intended to support access to coal 
reserves and to restructure the coal sector in these countries. 
51.  In view of the forthcoming expiry of Regulation (EC) No1407/2002
57 (on 31 
December 2010), the Commission carried out a public consultation on the future 
policy options with respect to the aid to the coal industry
58. 
1.7.  State aid in the agricultural sector 
52.  The Commission assesses State aid granted to the agriculture and to the forestry 
sector on the basis of the Guidelines for State aid in the agriculture and forestry 
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sector 2007 to 2013
59. In 2009, the Commission registered 139 new State aid 
notifications and adopted 146 decisions. State aid decisions adopted in relation to 
four separate issues merit a closer look.  
53.  First, in the aftermath of the dioxin contamination of pigs, cattle and pigmeat and 
beef products, first discovered in Ireland in December 2008, the Commission 
adopted three State aid schemes
60 authorising Ireland and the United Kingdom 
(region of Northern Ireland) to grant compensation to processors and primary 
producers who suffered losses as a result of the dioxin incident. In addition to the 
compensation for the losses, support would be granted towards the transport, 
rendering and slaughtering costs in order to ensure the safe destruction of the eligible 
products and animals. 
54.  Second, on 28 January the Commission adopted a final negative decision with 
recovery concerning the contingency plans in the French fruit and vegetable sector 
designed to prevent or mitigate the potential effects of a surplus of French fruit and 
vegetables on the Community market
61. It was found that the sums allocated for 
financing contingency plans between 1992 and 2002 (between EUR  14 and 
46 million a year), constituted operating aid, likely to disturb seriously the operation 
of the common organisation of the market in fruit and vegetables. On 8 April France 
filed an appeal
62 against the negative decision of the Commission seeking the 
annulment of the decision, on the grounds that it does not constitute State aid. 
55.  Third, on 3 June the Commission approved an aid scheme
63 designed to compensate 
for the damages caused in North-West France by the passage of storm Klaus on 
24 January 2009. This climatic phenomenon was recognised by the Government as 
“natural disaster”. The estimated budget of the scheme was approximately EUR 791 
million. 
56.  Finally, the Commission approved a final negative decision with recovery 
concerning an Italian aid scheme providing for exemptions from excises duties 
applicable to diesel used for heating greenhouses between October 2000 and the end 
of 2004
64. After having examined all data received from Italy, the Commission 
noticed that the aids could not be justified in the light of the Community guidelines 
concerning State aid in the agriculture and forestry sector 2007-2013 (because they 
were not granted without differentiation between operators), nor in the light of the 
Community Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection from 1994 and 
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2001, applicable during the above-mentioned period. Italy challenged the 
Commission's decision before the CFI. 
57.  In the context of the exceptional and transitory financing problems linked to the 
financial crisis and its impact on the agricultural sector, the Commission adopted on 
28 November an amendment to the Temporary Community framework for State aid 
measures to support access to finance in the current financial and economic crisis, 
enabling the Member States to grant compatible limited amount of aid of EUR 
15 000 for undertakings active in the primary production of agricultural products
65. 
This amount can be granted once per undertaking until 31 December 2010. Any 
agricultural  de-minimis aid received since the beginning of 2008 by individual 
undertakings in compliance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 1535/2007
66 has 
to be deducted from this amount. A scheme put in place under the newly introduced 
possibility will have to be open to all primary producers and it will have to 
complement a general scheme put in place by the Member State concerned.  
2. SELECTED COURT CASES 
58.  In 2009, the Community Courts handed down several judgments which had 
implications for State aid control in general and for the areas of definition of state 
aid, compatibility of aid, procedural issues and recovery in particular. A summary of 
the main judgments is set out below. 
2.1.  Notion of aid 
59.  In case Iride SpA and Iride Energia SpA v Commission
67, the CFI upheld a 
Commission decision declaring that the aid to AEM Torino for stranded costs was 
compatible subject to the effective recovery of the earlier illegal aid granted to this 
company. AEM Torino claimed that the stranded costs compensation did not 
constitute aid. The CFI followed the Commission confirming in particular the 
fulfilment of the State resources and imputability criteria. The CFI considered that 
the resources at stake were collected from private persons but transferred to a public 
Fund under constant control of the State. Furthermore, the Fund had no legal 
personality distinct from that of the State, who should be regarded as the owner of 
the funds. 
60.  The CFI also confirmed the Commission's position stating that the beneficiary 
received an economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal 
market conditions. In fact, the alteration of the legislative framework in the 
electricity sector which occurred as a result of Directive 96/92/EC
68 has to be 
considered as part of normal market conditions. When AEM Torino made the 
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investments that gave rise to the stranded costs in question, it was taking the normal 
risks related to possible legislative amendments. 
61.  As to the notion of selectivity, the CFI ruled in case Italian Republic v 
Commission
69 that the tax advantages granted by the Italian authorities to newly 
listed companies were selective, since they were available only to undertakings 
newly listed on regulated markets and having obtained the listing during the brief 
period for which the aid scheme was applicable. Furthermore, the measure was not 
justified by the nature and the overall scheme of the Italian tax system and in any 
case Italy did not demonstrate that it was justified by the alleged objective, i.e. to 
encourage listing on the stock exchange. 
62.  In joined cases Basque tax credits
70,  the CFI upheld the negative Commission’s 
decisions on the tax reductions granted by the Basque authorities. The Court 
confirmed that the measures were selective and restricted to undertakings which have 
at their disposal significant financial resources. The Court also noted the 
discretionary powers of the Basque authorities relating to the amount of the tax credit 
and the scope of the eligible investment. The CFI also found that the measures were 
not justified by the nature and the internal logic of the tax system as to restrict 
entitlement to aid to a limited category of businesses is not symptomatic of a general 
intention to encourage investment and, in any case, general objectives of economic 
policy are extraneous to the tax system.  
63.  The CFI upheld in joined cases Italian Republic v Commission
71 the Commission’s 
decision stating that a three-year income tax exemption and the possibility to contract 
reduced-interest loans with Cassa Depositi e Prestiti granted to utilities companies 
with a majority public shareholding, must be considered as State aid. These measures 
had the effect of strengthening the competitive position of the undertakings 
concerned vis-à-vis that of privately owned operators, Italian or other, and conferring 
a selective advantage. 
64.  In its judgment of 15 December 2009
72, the General Court annulled the 
Commission’s decision declaring aid granted in favour of EDF incompatible with the 
common market as the Commission failed to assess whether the French State acted 
according to the private investor principle.  
65.  The case AceaElectrabel v Commission
73 provides interesting clarifications on the 
identification of the aid beneficiary and the notion of economic entity. The CFI 
underlined that the Commission has in the context of State aid broad discretionary 
powers to determine if an undertaking which forms part of a group should be 
considered as a single economic entity or a legally and financially autonomous unit. 
It upheld the Commission's conclusion that, based on a number of elements, the 
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“old” and the “new” beneficiary constituted a single economic entity, for the purpose 
of applying the Deggendorf jurisprudence (see paragraph 69 below).  
66.  In the same case, the CFI also confirmed that aid in a sector which is subject to 
liberalisation at EU level can lead by itself to a real or potential impact on 
competition and trade. The CFI thereby rejected the argument that heating through 
a municipal heating network is not in competition with any other products. 
67.  The ECJ confirmed in case Commission v Italy and Wam
74 the judgment of the CFI 
which had annulled the Commission’s decision for reasons of insufficient motivation 
on the existence of aid. The ECJ stated that in the specific circumstances of the case 
(small amounts of aid for market penetration targeting specifically third countries), 
the Commission did not properly motivate how the aid affected competition and 
trade between Member States. However, it confirmed the traditional EC 
jurisprudence concerning the meaning of these two notions.  
2.2. Compatibility  assessment 
68.  In case FAB v Commission
75, the CFI endorsed the Commission’s policy regarding 
the funding of digitisation of broadcasting. The Court confirmed that the 
Commission was entitled to assess compatibility according to the criterion of market 
failure and that the Commission had not exceeded its discretion under Article 
87(3)(c) EC (current Article 107(3)(c) TFEU) when finding that the aid was 
incompatible. In fact, Germany was not able to demonstrate that the financial support 
granted for terrestrial digital television was an appropriate and necessary means to 
enable the switch-over from analogue to digital broadcasting.  
69.  In case Iride SpA and Iride Energia Spa v Commission
76, as well as in case 
AceaElectrabel v Commission
77 the CFI upheld the Commission's application of the 
Deggendorf case law. It confirmed that in its compatibility assessment the 
Commission has to take account of all relevant factors, including earlier non-
recovered aid, regardless of whether the earlier aid was granted as individual aid or 
under an incompatible aid scheme. 
70.  On 9 September the CFI ruled on Case T-369/06 Holland Malt
78, dismissing the four 
grounds of appeal raised by Holland Malt. The judgment confirmed the factual 
assessment of the Commission on the existence of overcapacity and the lack of 
normal market outlets. In addition, the Court stated that a Member State has to 
provide all information necessary to enable the Commission to verify that the 
conditions of Article 87(3)(c) EC are satisfied and that the Commission is under no 
obligation to consider on its own motion and on the basis of prediction, what 
information might have been submitted to it. 
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2.3. Procedural  issues 
71.  In case FAB  v Commission, the CFI found that the application of the Media 
Authority (MABB, the public body granting the aid) was not admissible. The Court 
considered that MABB was not independent but part of the State, because it was 
under budgetary and legal supervision. In addition, its resources were State resources 
because they came from charges imposed by the public authorities and non-used 
resources went back to the Länder. 
72.  The ECJ dismissed the Commission’s appeal to set aside the judgment of the CFI, 
which had partially annulled the Commission’s decision of 9 April 2002 because the 
Commission had not sufficiently motivated why it ordered to recover jointly and 
severally from SKL-M and MTU Friedrichshafen GmbH (MTU)
  79 the amount of 
EUR 2.71 million. The Court clarified that, although in case of lack of cooperation 
the Commission can decide on the basis of the information available, it cannot 
presume solely on the basis of a negative presumption, based on a lack of 
information, that an undertaking has benefited from aid. It must ensure that the 
information at its disposal, even if incomplete and fragmented, constitutes a 
sufficient basis on which to make such conclusion, in particular where the 
Commission orders, as in the present case, the recovery of the aid.  
73.  In case NDSH AB v Commission
80, the CFI clarified that, when the examination of a 
complaint does not reveal the existence of illegal aid, the Commission does not need 
to take a decision. This is in particular the case where the complaint concerns 
existing aid. In such a case, it is sufficient to inform the complainant by an informal 
communication under Article 20(2) of Regulation 659/1999 EC
81, which does not 
constitute an actionable measure for the purposes of Article 230 of the EC Treaty.  
74.  In the Commission v Koninklijke FrieslandCampina NV
82 case, the ECJ set aside the 
judgment of the CFI in case T-348/03, which partially annulled the Commission's 
negative decision regarding the Dutch tax scheme for international financial 
activities insofar as it excluded transitional periods for certain beneficiaries and 
referred the case back to the CFI. The ECJ confirmed the CFI assessment as regards 
the admissibility of an action by a potential beneficiary of a scheme. However, the 
Court considered that the CFI erred in law by accepting the existence of legitimate 
expectations also for companies which did not benefit from the scheme but merely 
submitted an application when the Commission opened the investigation procedure 
on the compatibility of the scheme. The Court also stated that the CFI erred in law by 
finding the Commission to have breached the equal treatment principle by allowing 
transitional periods only for companies already accepted by the scheme and not for 
those with a pending application at the date of the opening.  
75.  Finally, the CFI confirmed in case Germany  v Commission
83 the Commission's 
powers to request additional information on block exempted schemes for monitoring 
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purposes. It thus rejected Germany's argument that information could only be 
requested where the Commission had evidence raising doubts about compliance.  
2.4.  Recovery of aid 
76.  In  Italian Republic v Commission
84,  the CFI upheld the Commission’s negative 
decision with recovery and confirmed that the Commission is not required to analyse 
the individual measures granted under an aid scheme.  
77.  In Commission v Hellenic Republic
85, the Court for the first time imposed penalties 
in a State aid case for non compliance with a previous 2005 judgment, which 
confirmed the non implementation of a recovery decision. Greece was ordered to pay 
to the Commission EUR 16 000 for each day of delay to comply with the judgment, 
as well as a lump sum of EUR 2 million. These amounts were based on the duration 
of the infringement, its degree of seriousness and the Member State’s ability to pay. 
B – ANTITRUST – ARTICLES 101, 102 AND 106 TFEU 
1. SHAPING AND APPLYING THE RULES  
1.1. Enforcement  rules 
78.  On 29 April, the Commission adopted its Report on the functioning of Council 
Regulation 1/2003
86. The Regulation introduced the most far-reaching reform of the 
rules for enforcing the EU competition rules in more than 40 years. It abolished the 
centralised notification and authorisation system and replaced it by a system based 
on the direct application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The Regulation also granted 
the Commission enhanced investigation and decision-making powers and 
empowered national competition authorities (NCAs) and courts to apply the EU 
antitrust provisions in their entirety, including with regard to agreements the 
assessment of the conditions under Article 101(3) TFEU. 
79.  In its Report the Commission takes stock of how the modernisation of EU antitrust 
enforcement rules has worked since the entry into force of the Regulation on 1 May 
2004. It describes the experience in all major areas covered by the Regulation and 
evaluates the progress made by introducing new instruments and working methods. 
80.  The main conclusion of the Report is that Regulation 1/2003 has contributed to 
stronger enforcement of antitrust rules within the EU. The change from the 
centralised notification system to one of direct application has worked very smoothly 
in practice without any major difficulties with the direct application of Article 101(3) 
TFEU, which has been widely welcomed by stakeholders.  
81.  The Report shows that EU competition rules have to a large extent become the 'law 
of the land' for the whole of the EU. This is the result of Article 3(1) of the 
Regulation which obliges NCAs and courts to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to 
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all cases within their scope. It has led to a very significant increase in the application 
of the EU antitrust provisions. At the end of March 2009 more than 1000 cases had 
been pursued by both the Commission and NCAs in a wide variety of sectors, 
making a single legal standard a reality on a very large scale. 
82.  The system change also supported a shift in the Commission's priorities to areas 
where it can make an important contribution to the enforcement of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU, such as cartels and other serious infringements, and led to an increase in 
the number of enforcement decisions adopted. It has allowed the Commission to 
become more proactive, tackling weaknesses in the competitiveness of key sectors of 
the economy in a focused way by using sector inquiries as a major investigative tool. 
Accordingly, the new enforcement system is more focused on giving general 
guidance that can be useful to numerous undertakings and other enforcers instead of 
offering comfort to individual agreements. 
83.  The Regulation entrusts NCAs with a key role in the effective and consistent 
enforcement of the EC antitrust rules. The Commission had been informed by the 
end of the reporting period of more than 300 envisaged decisions by the national 
authorities on the basis of Article 11(4) of the Regulation and none of these cases 
resulted in the Commission relieving a national authority of its competence for 
reasons of coherent application of the EU antitrust rules. The Report confirms that 
cooperation within the European Competition Network (ECN) has successfully 
contributed towards the aim of ensuring consistency. The ECN has proven to be an 
innovative model of governance for the implementation of EU law by the 
Commission and Member State authorities and a successful forum for discussing 
both specific cases and general policy issues. The flexible and pragmatic 
arrangements on work sharing and cooperation within the ECN introduced by the 
Regulation have worked well over the past five years. 
84.  National courts are also empowered by the Regulation to apply both Article 101 and 
102 TFEU in full. They have used this power in a number of sectors and have tackled 
a range of issues. By the time of the report, the Commission had issued 18 opinions 
on questions concerning the application of the EU antitrust rules. In addition, both 
the Commission and the NCAs have submitted observations as amicus curiae under 
Article 15(3) of the Regulation. The Commission has used this power on two 
occasions during the reporting period when it considered that issues arose as to the 
coherent application of the EU competition rules. 
85.  Finally, the Report highlights a number of aspects which merit further evaluation, in 
view of enabling the Commission to assess, in a next stage, whether further policy 
initiatives are deemed appropriate. The Report first mentions certain specific issues 
relating to the Commission's enforcement powers including, for example, a perceived 
lack of clarity in Article 22(2) of the Regulation, which provides the Commission 
with the power to request NCAs to carry out inspections on its behalf. Second, the 
Report identifies the persisting substantive divergence of national laws in the area of 
unilateral conduct. The convergence rule contained in Article 3(2) of the Regulation 
does not cover unilateral conduct and, as a result, Member States remain free to enact 
and maintain stricter national rules. This divergence was criticised by the business 
and legal community and the Report foresees an assessment of the extent of the 
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86.  Third, the Regulation does not formally regulate or harmonise neither the procedural 
divergence nor the variety of sanctions which still exist when NCAs are applying 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Although such differences do not impede the 
functioning of Regulation 1/2003 as such and many Member States have voluntarily 
aligned elements of their procedures with Commission procedures, there may be 
potential for further enhancing effective enforcement and cooperation. Fourth, in 
response to stakeholders requests for greater recourse by the Commission to amicus 
curiae interventions the Report calls for a reflection on how to further develop this 
practice. Moreover, it proposes to explore options for ensuring effective access to 
national court judgments as the obligation for the Member States to transmit these 
judgments under Article 15(2) of the Regulation has not functioned optimally. 
Finally, the Report considers that in the context of third country enforcement the 
current legal framework may benefit from further clarification to enhance existing 
levels of protection against disclosure of information from the Commission's file, as 
well as of disclosure of the Statement of Objections (SO) and non-public version of 
the Commission Decision. 
1.2.  Private enforcement of the EU antitrust rules 
87.  The EU antitrust rules are enforced not only by the Commission and NCAs (public 
enforcement). Given that these rules have direct effect, they confer rights on 
individuals, including the right to damages, that can be enforced before national 
courts (private enforcement). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has pronounced 
that the full effectiveness of the EU antitrust rules would be put at risk if it were not 
open to any individual to claim damages for harm caused by infringements of these 
rules
87. Yet, in practice the victims, often consumers and SMEs, only rarely obtain 
compensation. 
88.  The Commission has therefore launched a policy project aimed at ensuring the 
effectiveness of EU antitrust damages actions. The Commission's 2005 Green 
Paper
88 identified the main obstacles to effective enforcement and launched a public 
debate on various options to overcome them. The Commission's 2008 White Paper
89 
put forward concrete suggestions, such as: 
•  clarifying what type of damages can be claimed by whom; 
•  facilitating the position of consumers and other indirect victims in situations 
where an illegal overcharge has been passed on to them; 
•  improving the efficiency of follow-on actions for damages by providing that final 
infringement decisions of NCAs constitute sufficient proof of an infringement; 
•  ensuring that claimants can obtain fair access to evidence through disclosure in 
court; 
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•  providing for effective collective redress; and 
•  suggesting rules to ensure a smooth interplay between private and public 
enforcement, including protection of leniency programmes. 
89.  On 25 March, the European Economic and Social Committee adopted an opinion on 
the White Paper
90 that welcomes the White Paper and explicitly calls on the 
Commission to propose appropriate follow-up measures to achieve the White Paper's 
objectives. 
90.  On 26 March, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the White Paper
91 
that welcomes the White Paper and stresses that effective enforcement of the EU 
antitrust rules requires that victims of breaches of these rules must be able to claim 
compensation for the damage suffered. The resolution agrees with the main finding 
of the White Paper, namely that consumers as well as businesses are currently 
hampered in exercising their right to compensation. The resolution also agrees with 
the overall objective of the White Paper, namely that measures are to be taken to 
ensure full compensation of the victims, while avoiding excessive litigation, and 
broadly supports the policy suggestions of the White Paper. 
91.  As regards collective redress, the Parliament's resolution acknowledged the 
importance of collective redress mechanisms for the ability of victims to obtain 
compensation in cases of scattered damage, and welcomed the suggestions in the 
White Paper to set up collective redress mechanisms which are designed to include 
safeguards against excessive litigation. The resolution encouraged the Commission 
to give careful consideration to the possibility of a horizontal or integrated approach 
to collective redress and to ensure consistent treatment of damages claims in the area 
of EU competition law and in other areas, such as consumer protection laws. It 
stressed, however, that such a horizontal or integrated approach does not necessarily 
require a single horizontal instrument and, moreover, must not delay or avoid the 
development of proposals and measures identified as necessary for the full 
enforcement of the EU antitrust rules. 
92.  The Commission services have started work on the technical instruments designed to 
achieve the objectives of the White Paper, while taking due account of the 
resolutions, opinions and comments received within the public consultation. 
93.  Apart from the follow-up measures to the White Paper, the Commission services 
have started work on a non-binding guidance on quantification of damages. The 2005 
Green Paper already identified the existence of a number of specific difficulties faced 
by parties as well as judges with regard to quantification of harm resulting from 
breaches of the EU antitrust rules. In the White Paper, the Commission therefore 
committed to publishing a pragmatic, non-binding guidance paper designed to 
facilitate quantification of damages. In 2008, the Commission signed a contract for 
the provision of an external study on this subject-matter. Key aspects to be addressed 
in the guidance include the conceptual framework for quantifying antitrust damages, 
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including identification of the types of harm that can be inflicted by various 
infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, concrete methods that can be 
employed in quantifying the harm, as well as any economic insights that can be 
useful to judges and parties when estimating the harm suffered. 
1.3. Cartels 
94.  In 2009, the Commission continued its strong enforcement record for the application 
of the antitrust rules to cartel cases by adopting six decisions
92 imposing fines 
amounting to EUR 1 623 million
93, on 43 undertakings
94. An important cartel case 
concerns the Commission's 2009 decision relating to the energy markets 
(E.ON/GDF), imposing fines of EUR 553 million on GDF Suez as well as on the 
German E.ON group for participating in a market sharing arrangement relating to the 
French and German gas markets.  
95.  For the first time it served a cartel decision to undertakings in Slovakia and Slovenia 
in the Calcium Carbide case. The fight against cartels with an international 
dimension continued to be very successful, epitomized by the decisions in Marine 
Hoses (a market sharing and price fixing cartel for which the EU co-operated with 
the US, UK and Japan
95), as well as in Power Transformers (a market sharing 
agreement between European and Japanese producers. The Commission has also 
underscored its policy of deterrence towards companies that are repeat offenders
96. 
96.  The coordination between competition authorities during the investigation period 
was important, particularly in Marine Hoses as the UK and the US also foresee 
criminal prosecution of individuals for cartel violations. This demanded a 
particularly sensitive and coordinated approach, ensuring the integrity of the 
respective procedures. The case showed how well competition authorities worked 
together and coordinated their efforts without compromising procedural protections 
offered under their laws, be it of administrative or of criminal nature. 
97.  In the case of Heat Stabilisers the Commission fined the Swiss based company AC 
Treuhand again for its active role as facilitator in a cartel. AC Treuhand already 
received a fine from the Commission in 2003 for the same function, but in the 
context of another cartel. Back in 2003 the Commission imposed a mere symbolic 
fine on AC Treuhand of EUR 1 000 as it was to a certain extent a novelty to impose a 
fine for this kind of role
97. This time, however, the Commission calculated the fine 
based on the gravity, duration and deterrent effect taking into account AC Treuhand's 
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involvement in the cartel activities leading to a total amount of EUR 348  000
98. 
Apart from Treuhand, the Commission also fined a number of EU and US 
undertakings. 
98.  The Court confirmed its jurisprudence and thereby the Commission's practice in 
relation to parental responsibility in case C-97/08P, Akzo Nobel et al. v. Commission. 
According to the Court, the Commission is entitled to assume that the parent 
company which owns 100% of its subsidiary forms one undertaking with the latter 
and therefore may be held responsible for the payment of the cartel fine (for more 
details see point 171 below). 
99.  With Concrete Reinforcing Bars the Commission sent, yet again
99, the clear message 
that cartel participants cannot escape fines if, for procedural reasons, the Court 
quashes the Commission's decision. In 2009 the Commission readopted its initial 
decision from 2002 after the judgment of the CFI in 2007
100 and retained all eight 
undertakings, confirming an almost identical fine to them
101. 
100.  The Leniency policy of the Commission continues to prove helpful in detecting and 
investigating cartels. About 75% of cartel investigations are based on immunity 
applications. Undertakings which provided significant added value when cooperating 
with the Commission during the investigation received substantial reductions to their 
respective fines for which the cartel decisions in 2009 are a case in point. 
101.  The Commission attaches great importance to the protection of its leniency 
programme and more generally to the protection of the integrity of its enforcement 
procedure. That is why the Commission intervened in a US Court
102, where the 
discovery of leniency material as well as other documents from the Commission file 
were being ordered, in a matter relating to the Commission investigation into Flat 
Glass, a case decided end of 2007. The intervention by the Commission in this case 
was successful, as discovery was avoided through settlement of the parties. 
102.  In order to detect and/or examine cartels, Regulation 1/2003 gives the Commission 
powers of investigation, notably the power to conduct inspections either at business 
premises or in private homes. During 2009, on-site inspections took place in a wide 
variety of sectors, such as Power Cables
103,  Compressors for Refrigeration
104, 
Shrimps
105, Special glass sector
106 as well as Cement and related products
107. 
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1.4.  Other agreements and concerted practices 
103.  In July, the Commission adopted its final report on the sector inquiry into 
pharmaceuticals (launched in 2008) identifying serious shortcomings in the sector. 
104.  Concerning the application of the antitrust rules to non-cartel cases, the Commission 
adopted, on 14 October, a commitment decision
108 under Article 9(1) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 rendering legally binding commitments offered by the 
International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) to address concerns 
raised in the course of an investigation pursuant to Article 81 EC and Article 53 of 
the EEA Agreement in the worldwide ship classification market.  
105.  The Commission also opened proceedings in relation to the cooperation between 
certain STAR alliance and Oneworld airline companies on transatlantic routes. 
106.  The Commission is presently in the process of reviewing a number of Block 
Exemption Regulations and, when relevant, accompanying guidelines relating to the 
application of Article 101 TFEU, which are due to expire in the near future. These 
reviews concern in particular the Block Exemptions for Vertical Agreements and for 
Horizontal Agreements as well as the sector specific Block Exemption for Insurance. 
The revisions of the Block Exemptions for Motor Vehicles and for Maritime 
Transport (liner shipping consortia) were concluded in 2009. 
1.4.1.  The review of the Block Exemption Regulation on Vertical agreements 
107.  Vertical agreements are agreements for the sale or purchase of goods or services 
between companies operating at different levels of the distribution chain, for 
example between a manufacturer, a wholesaler and a retailer. Vertical agreements 
are pervasive: indeed, the vast majority of agreements entered into between firms are 
vertical, as this term covers agreements relating to the purchase of inputs and 
distribution of outputs. 
108.  In 2009, the Commission continued its review of the current EU block exemption 
regulation applicable to vertical agreements (the BER) and the accompanying 
guidelines on vertical restraints (the Guidelines). In 1999, this package was the first 
of a new generation of exemption regulations and guidelines inspired by a more 
economic and effects-based approach which, in the Commission's and the NCAs' 
assessment, has worked well in practice.  
109.  The Commission issued draft BER and Guidelines for public consultation in July, 
where the Commission proposed to maintain, in essence, the current rules, while at 
the same time adapting and refining them to take account of developments in the 
marketplace, in particular the market power of buyers, and the continuous increase of 
on-line sales.  
110.  In order to reflect the increased attention to buyer power issues, the Commission 
proposed that for a vertical agreement to benefit from the block exemption, not only 
the supplier's market share (as is currently the case) but also the buyer's market share 
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should not exceed 30% on the affected markets where the buyer resells the contract 
products. In addition, the Commission added in the draft Guidelines two new 
sections which provide guidance on the assessment of restraints which are mainly 
buyer driven, namely upfront access fees, such as slotting allowances, and category 
management. 
111.  Regarding on-line sales, on the one hand there is a need to protect consumers' 
possibilities to purchase to their advantage across borders, which is greatly facilitated 
by the internet. On the other hand, certain sales restrictions that aim at limiting or 
preventing distributors from taking unfair advantage of marketing and brand 
promotion undertaken by others (i.e. free riding) may enable consumers to benefit 
from better services. The Commission's suggested approach therefore refines, in the 
on-line context, the distinction, between sales made as a result of active marketing 
and sales made as a result of the consumer taking the initiative (i.e. between active 
and passive sales), and explains how the revised texts would deal with conditions 
imposed in relation to internet sales, such as a requirement imposed by a supplier that 
the distributor should have a "brick and mortar" shop before engaging in on-line 
sales. 
112.  The Commission received some 160 contributions from a wide range of 
stakeholders, including businesses, consumer organisations, national authorities, 
academics and the legal community. The stakeholders expressed strong support to 
maintain in force a system of block exemption and accompanying Guidelines, which 
is considered to have overall worked well in practice. The stakeholders commented 
extensively on the two major issues, in particular the extension of the market share 
threshold to buyers and the treatment of restrictions on the use of the internet. 
Beyond these issues, the Commission's proposed approach to hardcore restrictions 
was generally welcomed, in particular the clarification that also hardcore restrictions 
may individually fulfil the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU. 
113.  The Commission services are currently analysing the results of the public 
consultation in order to propose a final text for the adoption by the College. The new 
rules should enter into force upon the expiry of the current BER in May 2010. 
1.4.2.  The review of the Block Exemption Regulations on Horizontal agreements 
114.  Horizontal agreements are agreements between competitors operating at the same 
level, cooperating in areas such as research and development, joint production or 
selling, information exchange, standardisation etc. Such agreements may lead to 
important efficiencies and increased consumer welfare. However, since they imply 
cooperation by competitors they also risk leading to anti-competitive effects.  
115.  The Block Exemption Regulations for Specialisation agreements
109 ("Specialisation 
BER") and for Research and Development agreements
110 ("R&D BER") expire on 31 
December 2010. The Commission has therefore started the revision of these 
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regulations and the accompanying horizontal guidelines
111. The horizontal guidelines 
cover not only specialisation and R&D agreements but also other types of 
agreements such as production, commercialisation and joint purchasing agreements 
and aim at giving guidance on how to assess such agreements under EU competition 
law. 
116.  The Commission is in the process of examining how the Specialisation and the R&D 
BERs have been applied so far and whether there is a need to amend the current 
rules. This work is done in close cooperation with the NCAs within the European 
Competition Network. A first consultation of stakeholders took place at the turn of 
2008/2009. The Commission intends to publish the draft block exemption regulations 
and guidelines in early 2010.  
1.4.3.  The review of the Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation 
117.  On 28 October, the Commission adopted a set of draft guidelines and a draft Block 
Exemption for the motor vehicle sector ("Motor vehicle BER"). These two draft 
instruments apply to agreements for motor vehicle distribution (primary market) as 
well as to the markets for repair, maintenance and the distribution of spare parts 
(aftermarket). They are intended to replace the existing BER
112 as of 1 June 2010 
with regard to the aftermarket, and as of 1 June 2013 for the primary market. 
Following the Advisory Committee meeting with Member States, on 21 December 
the Commission published the two documents for public consultation until 10 
February 2010. 
118.  The two draft texts follow the course set in the Commission's Communication of 22 
July. That Communication identified clear differences between the primary market, 
on which competition is strong, and the markets for repair and maintenance and 
spare parts, on which competition is more limited due to their brand-specific nature. 
119.  An in-depth market analysis
113 revealed that there are no significant competition 
shortcomings justifying distinguishing the markets for new motor vehicles from 
other economic sectors. The markets are fairly open, with relatively low barriers to 
entry. Technology is an increasingly important factor driving competition. Model 
ranges have expanded, and manufacturers tend to have a global or regional presence 
rather than simply having a strong position on their home market. This vigorous and 
increasing inter-brand competition has translated into highly competitive price levels. 
120.  The Commission believes that car distribution agreements should not be treated 
differently from any similar agreements in other sectors. The draft BER therefore 
provides that the future general Block Exemption for vertical restraints will take the 
place of the current specific rules for such agreements. However, in order to protect 
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investments made by car dealers under the old rules, for instance in multi-brand sites, 
it is proposed that this changeover will not occur until 31 May 2013. As to the 
assessment of such agreements after this date, the draft Guidelines give explanations 
on key issues such as the protection of cross-border trade in cars and the approach to 
be taken should single-branding arrangements between manufacturers and dealers 
lead to competing manufacturers being shut out of a particular market. 
121.  In the Communication, the Commission took the line that the application of the 
future general Block Exemption to the motor vehicle aftermarkets might prove 
insufficient to protect competition. Sector-specific provisions were needed in a 
number of areas, although the Communication left open the question as to what form 
they would take. 
122.  The draft Guidelines adopted on 28 October deal with issues such as access to the 
franchised repair networks, the provision of technical information to independent 
repairers, and refusals to honour warranties unless all repairs have been carried out in 
the authorised networks. The Block Exemption was considered a more appropriate 
instrument for protecting competition as regards the supply of spare parts, in 
particular since market definition in this area can be problematic, and contains 
specific hardcore clauses in this respect. The draft proposal foresees that new rules 
will apply to agreements for repair and maintenance and to the distribution of spare 
parts from 1 June 2010.  
1.4.4.  The review of the Insurance Block Exemption Regulation 
123.  The Commission has carried out a review of the functioning of the current Block 
Exemption Regulation in the insurance sector
114 ("the current Insurance BER") with 
a view to determining whether a new Insurance BER should be adopted before the 
current one expires on 31 March 2010. 
124.  Under the Implementing Regulation
115, the Commission is required to submit a 
report to the European Parliament and Council on the functioning of the Insurance 
BER, six years after its entry into force, together with any proposals for amendment 
which would derive from experience.  
125.  The Commission began its review of the functioning of the Insurance Block 
Exemption Regulation (the Review) in November 2007 by consulting NCAs and in 
April 2008 it launched a public consultation. In addition, the Commission sent 
targeted questionnaires to certain stakeholders, public authorities and consumer 
organisations. Following closure of the consultation, the Commission sent follow-up 
questionnaires to certain stakeholders including small and medium-sized insurers, 
pools and producer federations of security devices. The NCAs were closely involved 
in the review.  
126.  The primary original objective of the current Insurance BER was to facilitate the 
Commission's task in view of the large number of notifications being received. Since 
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the adoption of Regulation 1/2003 and the consequent abolition of the notification 
system, such objective is no longer of relevance. To assess whether to renew the 
current Insurance BER, the Commission asked: (i) whether the business risks or 
other issues in the insurance sector make it "special" and different from other sectors 
and whether this leads to an enhanced need for cooperation; (ii) if so, whether this 
enhanced need for cooperation requires a legal instrument such as for example, the 
BER to protect or facilitate it; and (iii) if so, whether the current BER is the most 
appropriate legal instrument (or whether partial renewal, amended renewal, or 
Guidelines would be preferable). 
Report to European Parliament and Council 
127.  On 24 March, the Commission adopted its Report
116 to the European Parliament and 
Council which is accompanied by a detailed Working Document. The documents 
analyse in detail the Commission's findings during the Review. On 2 June the 
Commission held a public event, in order to hear further reactions on the Report and 
accompanying Working Document.  
Public Consultation on Draft New Insurance BER 
128.  The Commission's conclusion on the basis of the evidence it found during the 
Review is that it is not appropriate to renew two of the four exemptions in the current 
Insurance BER, i.e. the exemptions for standard policy conditions ("SPCs") and 
security devices.  
129.  The Commission considers that both SPCs and agreements on security devices are 
not specific to the insurance sector and as such do not require a sector-specific BER. 
However, the Commission is considering addressing both SPCs and security devices 
in the general standardisation chapter in its Horizontal Guidelines which are 
currently being revised. 
130.  The evidence did however support renewal of the BER for the remaining two 
categories of agreements, namely joint compilations, tables and studies as well as 
agreements on co-insurance and co-reinsurance pools. The draft new Insurance BER 
therefore exempts both these categories. This draft was published for consultation on 
5 October for 8 weeks. 
131.  The Commission plans to have the new Insurance BER adopted and published before 
expiry of the current Insurance BER on 31 March 2010. 
1.4.5.  The Review of the Consortia Block Exemption Regulation 
132.  On 28 September the Commission adopted Regulation (EC) No 906/2009 on the 
application of Article 81(3) EC to certain categories of agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices between liner shipping companies (consortia)
117. This Regulation 
allows operational cooperation to provide a joint liner shipping service between liner 
shipping carriers subject to certain conditions. Such type of cooperation has been 
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exempted from the EU competition rules since 1995. The new Regulation enters into 
force on 25 April 2010 for a duration of five years. 
133.  Liner shipping involves the transport of cargo on a regular basis to ports of a 
particular geographic route, in accordance with time tables and sailing dates 
advertised in advance and available to any transport user. A consortium is an 
operational cooperation agreement between two or more liner shipping carriers to 
provide a joint liner shipping service on a given route. Due to the high level of 
investment required to set up a service with fixed schedules, liner shipping is mostly 
provided by groups of shipping lines organised in consortia. 
134.  The review of the Regulation was launched with a general market investigation in the 
summer of 2007, followed by a public consultation in October 2008. The aim was to 
incorporate amendments necessary due to the repeal of the liner conference Block 
Exemption Regulation 4056/86
118 and the adoption of Regulation 1/2003, as well as 
to better reflect current market practices and to bring the consortia block exemption 
in line with other block exemption regulations for horizontal cooperation between 
companies. 
135.  The new Regulation has reduced the market share threshold to 30% from previously 
35% or 30% depending on whether a consortium operated within or outside a liner 
shipping conference. Furthermore the Regulation clarified that for assessing the 
market share threshold the sum of the market shares of the individual consortium 
members in the relevant market needs to be taken into account. For that purpose not 
only the volumes the consortium member transports within the consortium in 
question is relevant, but also all volumes carried by it outside the consortium need to 
be taken in to account. Such volumes might either be carried by the member, on the 
basis of a parallel individual service, or by another carrier on behalf of that member, 
on the basis of a slot charter arrangement or another consortium agreement. 
136.  In view of the increasing cross-linking of consortia and their members, the 
Regulation clarifies in its recitals that the Commission may withdraw the benefit of 
the block exemption if a consortium agreement has effects incompatible with Article 
81(3) EC that may derive from the existence of links between the consortium and/or 
its members and other consortia and/or liner carriers on the same relevant market. 
137.  Finally the scope of the Regulation was widened to include all liner shipping services 
transporting cargo, whether containerised or not. The list of exempted activities was 
revised to better reflect current market practices. The new Regulation simplifies the 
conditions which a consortium agreement has to comply with in order to benefit from 
the Block Exemption Regulation. In particular, it sets the maximum duration of the 
so-called exit clauses and lock-in provisions in case a member wants to withdraw 
from the consortium. 
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1.5.  Abuse of dominant positions (Article 102 TFEU) 
138.  The "Commission's Guidance on its enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 EC 
of the Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings" was 
published in the Official Journal (OJ)
119. 
139.  On 13 May, the Commission adopted a prohibition decision in the Intel case
120 
finding that Intel had infringed Article 82 EC by engaging in illegal anticompetitive 
practices with the aim of excluding competitors from the market for x86 Central 
Processing Units (CPU). These practices harmed consumers throughout the EEA. By 
undermining its competitors' ability to compete on the merits of their products, Intel's 
actions undermined competition, reduced consumer choice and hindered innovation.  
140.  In the Microsoft case, the commitments offered by Microsoft provide for a timely 
and satisfactory solution to the competition concerns raised by the Commission in a 
Statement of Objections in January 2009 related to the tying of Microsoft's web 
browser Internet Explorer to its dominant client PC operating system Windows. 
Microsoft committed (a) to distribute a Choice Screen software update to users of 
Windows client PC operating systems within the EEA by means of Windows Update 
that will offer users an unbiased choice between the most widely used web browsers 
in the EEA, and (b) to make available a mechanism in Windows 7 and subsequent 
versions of Windows in the EEA enabling PC manufacturers and end users to turn 
Internet Explorer on and off. The commitments were made binding on Microsoft by 
a Decision of 16 December 2009
121. 
141.  In the Rambus case, the Commission had expressed concerns that Rambus was 
imposing unreasonable royalties for the use of certain patents for DRAM chips used 
in virtually all PCs. The Commission adopted a decision on 9 December 2009 that 
renders legally binding commitments offered by Rambus that in particular put a cap 
on its royalty rates
122. In 2008, worldwide DRAM sales exceeded US$ 34 billion 
(more than EUR 23 billion). Rambus committed to put a worldwide cap on its 
royalty rates for five years. Rambus agreed to charge zero royalties for the earlier 
generations of chips concerned in combination with a maximum royalty rate of 1.5% 
for the later generations of chips concerned. This is substantially lower than the 3.5% 
Rambus was previously charging. The case shows once more that an effective 
standard-setting process should take place in a non-discriminatory, open and 
transparent way to ensure competition on the merits and to allow consumers to 
benefit from technical development and innovation
123.  
142.  In the field of energy, the Commission adopted a further decision as part of the 
follow-up of the energy sector inquiry in 2007. In March 2009, the Commission 
adopted a decision rendering binding divestiture commitments from the German gas 
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121  The Decision is published on the website of the Directorate-General for Competition under "Antitrust 
cases". 
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incumbent RWE which committed to divesting its Western German gas transmission 
network
124. 
143.  The Commission also initiated proceedings against the Polish and Slovakian 
incumbents in the broadband market
125 and against Svenska Kraftnät concerning the 
Swedish electricity transmission market
126. 
144.  Lastly, in the field of financial services, the Commission sent a SO to Standard & 
Poor's (S&P) in October, outlining the preliminary view that S&P infringed its 
dominant position in relation to issuance and licensing of securities identifier codes 
called ISINs
127. The Commission also opened formal proceedings against Thomson 
Reuters concerning the use of RICs
128. 
1.6.  State measures (Public undertakings/Undertakings with exclusive and special 
rights) 
145.  In 2009, the Commission was also active in the area of Article 106 TFEU.  
146.  On 2 February, following up on the infringement proceedings initiated in the course 
of 2008
129, the Commission sent a Reasoned Opinion
130 to the Slovak Republic 
requesting it to bring the Slovak Competition Act in conformity with EU law. The 
Reasoned Opinion concerned in particular Section 2(6) of the Slovak Competition 
Act, which excluded the applicability of the Act in situations where the conduct of 
the undertakings is at the same time subject to sector specific ex-ante regulatory 
obligations (such as in the electronic communications, energy or postal sectors), thus 
limiting the ability of the NCA to effectively apply Articles 81 and 82 EC to 
anticompetitive behaviour which would also fall within the competence of regulatory 
authorities. In the Reasoned Opinion the Commission considered this provision of 
the Competition Act to be incompatible with Article 10 EC and Regulation 1/2003 
and enjoined the Slovak Republic to take the necessary measures to put an end to the 
infringement. Following the Reasoned Opinion, the Slovak Republic repealed the 
contested provision in its entirety with effect from 1 June. On 25 June the 
Commission therefore adopted a decision to close the infringement procedure
131. 
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147.  In August, the Commission adopted a decision pursuant to Article 86(3) EC by 
which it has accepted commitments made by Greece to ensure fair access to Greek 
lignite deposits
132. 
148.  On 10 May 2007, the Commission adopted a decision on the basis of Article 86(3) 
EC finding that the exclusive right for the distribution of a savings book product 
(Livret A) granted by France to three banks (Banque Postale, Caisses d’Epargne and 
Crédit Mutuel) constituted an infringement of Article 86(1) EC in conjunction with 
the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services (Articles 43 and 49 
EC) due to the resulting obstacles for French and foreign competitors to enter and 
develop the market for liquid savings in France. The decision also set a deadline to 
amend the legislation within nine months. As no such amendment was adopted 
within the prescribed period, the Commission sent a Letter of Formal Notice on 5 
June 2008 with a view to obliging France to ending the infringement. As a result of 
the infringement proceedings, France opened up the distribution of Livret A on 1 
January 2009. Since then, a significant number of new "livret A" accounts have been 
opened in banks which are now enabled to distribute these accounts and the 
brokerage fees have been cut by nearly half. On 8 October the European Commission 
therefore decided to close the infringement procedure. 
149.  The Commission pursued its infringement proceedings under Article 226 EC against 
the Slovak Republic for the non-implementation of the 2008 Commission decision 
on the Slovakian postal Law
133. 
2. SELECTED COURT CASES  
2.1.  Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands & Others v. Raad van bestuur van der 
Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (NMa) 
Criteria for establishing a concerted practice 
150.  The background to this case is a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 
EC from a Dutch court in the proceedings between five mobile telephone network 
operators
134 and the Dutch competition authority (NMa). The NMa imposed a fine on 
the mobile telephone operators active in the Netherlands for exchanging information 
and agreeing, during a meeting, on the reduction and "standardisation" of the fees for 
postpaid subscriptions required by dealers who sell to final consumers those 
subscriptions on behalf of the telecom operators. This decision was appealed before 
the referring court which referred to the ECJ several questions related to the 
interpretation of Article 81 EC. 
151.  On 4 June, the ECJ clarified, in accordance with existing jurisprudence, when a 
concerted practice, in particular an exchange of information between competitors, 
restricts competition by object. According to the ECJ, the criteria laid down in the 
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Court’s case-law for the purpose of determining whether an agreement has as its 
object a restriction of competition are applicable mutatis mutandis to a concerted 
practice. Accordingly, there is no need to consider the effects of a concerted practice 
where its anti-competitive object is established. A concerted practice pursues an 
anti-competitive object where, according to its content and objectives and having 
regard to its legal and economic context, it is capable in an individual case of 
resulting in the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
common market. It is not necessary for there to be actual prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition or a direct link between the concerted practice and 
consumer prices. The prohibition in Article 81 EC is not limited to concerted 
practices which have a direct effect on the prices paid by end users, since Article 81 
EC, like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is designed to protect not only the 
immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers but also to protect the 
structure of the market and thus competition as such. An exchange of information 
between competitors is tainted with an anti-competitive object if the exchange is 
capable of removing uncertainties concerning the intended conduct of the 
participating undertakings. 
152.  In addition, contrary to the opinion of its Advocate General, the ECJ held that the 
presumption of a causal connection between the "concertation" and the conduct of 
the undertakings on the market established in the case law does not constitute a 
procedural rule, but rather stems from Article 81(1) EC, and it consequently forms an 
integral part of the applicable Community law, which has to be followed by the 
national enforcers. The ECJ finally ruled that the presumption of a causal connection 
between "concertation" and market conduct can be established even if the concerted 
practice is an isolated event, one meeting of the undertakings being enough for this 
presumption to apply. The ruling of the ECJ therefore strengthens the enforcement of 
Article 81 EC since the presumption established in the case law facilitates 
considerably the bringing of evidence of a concerted practice. 
2.2.  Case C-429/07, Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst v. X BV  
Deductability of fines for tax purposes and the effectiveness of EU competition 
law 
153.  The background to this case is a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 
EC from a Dutch court (the referring court) in the proceedings between the Dutch 
Tax authorities and a company, X BV who was trying to partially deduct the amount 
of the fine imposed by the Commission from the amount of its taxable profits. 
154.  This ruling of the ECJ of 11 June relates to the interpretation of Article 15(3) of 
Regulation 1/2003, which provides that the Commission may submit on its own 
initiative written observations (intervention as amicus curiae) to national courts 
applying Articles 81 and 82 EC where "the coherent application of Articles 81 or 82 
EC so requires". The ECJ ruled that the option for the Commission, acting on its 
own initiative, to submit written observations to courts of the Member States is 
subject to the sole condition that the coherent application of Articles 81 or 82 EC so 
requires. That condition may be fulfilled even if the proceedings concerned to not 
pertain to issues relating to the application of Article 81 or Article 82 EC. The ECJ 
stated further that the effectiveness of the fines imposed by the Commission relates 
to the coherent application of Articles 81 and 82 EC. The effectiveness of the EN  41     EN 
Commission’s decision by which it imposed a fine on a company might be 
significantly reduced if the undertaking concerned was allowed to partially deduct 
the amount of that fine from the amount of its taxable profits. The ECJ concluded on 
this basis that the Commission was entitled to submit its written observations in this 
case. The ruling of the ECJ, by an extensive interpretation of the Commission's 
possibilities to intervene as amicus curiae in national proceedings, strengthens the 
Commission's role in ensuring uniform and effective application of competition rules 
by national courts in the EU. The Commission has subsequently submitted its written 
observations opposing tax deductibility of competition fines. 
2.3.  T-301/04, Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream International SA v. 
Commission  
Refusal to supply certain post-trading services in the financial sector 
155.  The case concerns an appeal before the CFI launched against the Commission's 
decision COMP/38096 Clearstream (Clearing and Settlement). The Commission 
found in its decision that Clearstream Banking AG (CBF), the German Central 
Securities Depository, and Clearstream SA, its 100% shareholder, had infringed 
Article 82 EC by refusing to supply certain clearing and settlement services
135 to one 
of its customers, Euroclear Bank SA (EB) as well as by applying discriminatory 
prices to the same customer. 
156.  In their appeal, the applicants contested the definition of the product market and 
hence the dominant position held by CBF. The applicants claimed also that their 
conduct was not abusive with regard to the refusal to supply as the difficulties 
resulting in the delay of linking EB to CBF's settlement processing system were 
attributable to EB. Furthermore, the applicants argued that the pricing was not 
discriminatory, as foreign central securities depositories (CSDs) and international 
central securities depositories (ICSDs) like EB received different service packages 
involving different costs. 
157.  On 9 September, the CFI dismissed the appeal in its entirety. The judgment of the 
CFI confirming the Commission's decision is particularly important since 
competition in the post-trading arena is still limited and national monopolies of 
historic incumbents are often reinforced by various state measures. 
158.  First, as regards market definition the Commission argued that a distinction had to be 
made between primary and secondary clearing and settlement services. The CFI 
confirmed this definition by rejecting the applicants' argument that the persons 
requesting post-trading clearing and settlement services are the sellers and the buyers 
of the security transaction and that therefore there should be one general market for 
clearing and settlement services in which those seeking services are the parties to the 
securities transaction. The CFI reached the conclusion that CBF's custody monopoly 
in respect of securities issued under German law results in a monopoly of primary 
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clearing and settlement for those securities. This market definition proposed by the 
Commission and the differentiation between primary and secondary clearing and 
settlement services constitutes a good basis for future cases. 
159.  Secondly, the case was the first major case relating to the technically complex and 
evolving sector of cross-border post trading services for securities. Cross-border 
arrangements in the EU on clearing and settlement are still considered to be complex 
and fragmented, imposing costs, risks and inefficiencies on investors, institutions and 
issuers. 
2.4.  Case C-202/07 P, France Télécom SA v. Commission 
Criteria for establishing an abuse in the form of predatory pricing 
160.  On 2 April the ECJ dismissed in its entirety France Télécom's appeal of a 2007 
judgment of the CFI
136. The 2007 judgment had confirmed the Commission decision 
of 2003 imposing a fine of EUR  10.35 million on Wanadoo Interactive S.A. 
(Wanadoo), at the time a subsidiary of France Télécom
137, for an abuse of a 
dominant position in the form of predatory pricing.  
161.  The judgment of the ECJ confirms the Commission's finding that Wanadoo abused 
its dominant position on the French market for high-speed internet access for 
residential customers by charging below cost prices for its Pack eXtense and 
Wanadoo ADSL services. The Commission also found that Wanadoo had developed 
a plan aimed at excluding competitors from the market for high speed internet 
access, restricted market entry by competing internet providers and thus harmed 
consumers.  
162.  In 2007, the CFI dismissed France Télécom's action for annulment against the 
Commission decision, holding that the Commission correctly concluded that 
Wanadoo had abused its dominant position in the French market for high-speed 
internet access. The CFI upheld all aspects of the Commission decision including the 
amount of the fine imposed on Wanadoo. 
163.  In its judgment the ECJ approved the CFI's and Commission's definition of predatory 
pricing as it results from the previous case law such as AKZO v. Commission
138, and 
Tetra Pak v. Commission
139. The ECJ confirmed, first, that price below average 
variable costs must always be considered abusive and, second, that prices below 
average total costs but above average variable costs are only to be considered abusive 
if an intention to eliminate competitors can be shown. 
164.  In addition, the ECJ held that the CFI was right in confirming that for a finding of 
predatory pricing the Commission was not required to prove that Wanadoo had the 
possibility of recouping its losses. The ECJ also stated that this interpretation does 
not preclude the Commission from finding that the possibility of recoupment of 
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losses may be a relevant factor in assessing whether or not the practice concerned is 
abusive. 
165.  In addition, the Court held that demonstrating that it is possible to recoup losses is 
not a necessary precondition for finding a predatory pricing. It stated that the lack of 
any possibility of recoupment is not sufficient to prevent the undertaking concerned 
reinforcing its dominant position, so that the degree of competition existing on the 
market is further reduced and customers suffer loss as a result of the limitation of the 
choices available to them. Nevertheless, the Court stated that this does not preclude 
the Commission from finding such a possibility of recoupment to be a relevant factor 
in assessing whether or not the practice concerned is abusive, for example to assist in 
excluding economic justifications other than the elimination of a competitor or in 
establishing that a plan to eliminate a competitor exists. 
2.5.  Case C-125/07 P e.a., Bank Austria v Commission 
Burden of proof as regards effects of price fixing cartels 
166.  In a judgment rendered on 24 September
140, the ECJ clarified the Commission's 
burden of proof in qualifying price fixing cartels as "very serious" due to restrictive 
effects on the market
141. 
167.  In 2002, the Commission qualified a price fixing cartel on the Austrian banking 
market (the "Lombard Club")
142 for several reasons as "very serious" amongst others 
because it led to effects on the market concerned. Indeed, the Commission could 
prove that the banks had implemented their agreements. The banks had claimed, 
based on an economic study, that the cartel had had no effects on the Austrian 
banking market. The Commission rejected the conclusion in the study that the cartel 
had not affected the business strategies of the banks involved. The possibility that 
interest rates and bank profit margins in Austria developed more or less similarly to 
those in a neighbouring country cannot prove that the cartel did not produce effects 
on the Austrian market. In the Commission's view, it was only relevant whether and 
to which extent the cartel influenced the banks' business strategies and decisions, i.e.: 
whether the agreed interest rates were also implemented. The Commission 
demonstrated that this was indeed the case, based on ample evidence in the file. 
168.  The CFI in 2006 upheld the Commission's conclusion
143. 
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169.  However, on appeal, Advocate General (AG) Bot recommended that the ECJ set 
aside the CFI's ruling on this point and consequently that the fines be reduced
144. AG 
Bot found that a fine distinction should have been drawn between the 
implementation of a cartel and its effects on the market. The Commission could not 
derive effects on the market from the mere implementation of the cartel. Rather, the 
Commission should have investigated transaction prices before the infringement 
started and after it was implemented. The AG did not further consider the CFI's view 
that such burden of proof was disproportionate
145. Advocate General Bot also upheld 
the appellants' arguments regarding the attribution to central institutions of market 
shares held by banks operating in decentralised sectors. 
170.  On 24 September, the ECJ finally did not follow the opinion of its AG on these two 
points, and upheld the CFI judgment in all respects. Like the CFI, the ECJ found that 
the Commission had sufficiently demonstrated effects on the market by proving the 
implementation of the cartel. The cartel members had announced the agreed prices to 
their customers, they gave instructions to employees to use them as a basis for 
negotiations and they monitored their application by competitors' and their own sales 
departments
146. The ECJ also upheld the attribution to central institutions of market 
shares held by banks in the decentralised sector. The ECJ noted that the Commission 
had thereby sought to ensure that the level of fines imposed on central institutions 
appropriately reflects the gravity of their own unlawful conduct. The central 
institutions had played an essential role within their respective networks through 
exchanges of information and as representatives of the decentralised sectors within 
the cartel.  
2.6.  Case C-97/08P, Akzo Nobel et al. v. Commission 
Liability of a parent company for the behaviour of a subsidiary 
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171.  On 10 September the ECJ confirmed its jurisprudence and the judgment of the CFI
147 
on the question if a parent company may be held liable for the payment of the fine 
imposed resulting from the involvement of the subsidiary in an infringement. The 
judgment confirmed that in case a parent company holds – directly or indirectly - 
100% of the capital of the subsidiary which infringed competition rules, the 
Commission may apply the rebuttable presumption that the parent company did 
exercise decisive influence over the conduct of the subsidiary and thus infer that both 
constitute a single undertaking within the meaning of Article 81 EC In these 
circumstances, it is for the parent company to show that the subsidiary was able to 
determine its business policy autonomously, having regard in particular to the 
economic and legal links between them such as a unitary organisation of personal, 
tangible and intangible elements pursuing a specific economic aim on a long-term 
basis. In case the parent company fails to rebut the presumption the Commission may 
hold the parent company liable for the payment of the fine as imposed on the directly 
involved subsidiary.  
C – MERGER CONTROL 
1 SHAPING AND APPLYING THE RULES 
172.  In 2009 the number of mergers notified was below the record levels of previous 
years. In total, 259 transactions were notified to the Commission and 243 final 
decisions were adopted. Of these final decisions, 225 transactions were approved 
without conditions during Phase I, 82 decisions were approved without conditions 
under the normal procedure and 143 (or 63.6%) were cleared using the simplified 
procedure. A total of 13 transactions were cleared in Phase I subject to conditions. 
173.  Furthermore, the Commission initiated five Phase II proceedings, with three 
decisions adopted subject to conditions. Two cases were withdrawn in Phase II and 
six cases in Phase I. No prohibition decisions were taken during the year. 
174.  The legal powers provided for in Article 21(4) of the EC Merger Regulation allow 
the Commission to intervene in order to deter and ultimately prevent Member States 
from preventing or restricting the takeover of domestic companies by companies 
from other Member States on unjustified grounds. This provision also provides a 
procedural framework to exchange views in a timely manner with Member States to 
distinguish interventions with a "protectionist" motivation from a genuine pursuit of 
legitimate public interests (other than competition). From its inception, there have 
been fewer than 20 cases in application of Article 21. After a period of more frequent 
                                                 
147 Case  T-405/06,  Arcelor Mittal et al. v Commission, judgment of 31.3.2009, paragraph 89; Case T-
85/06, General Quimica,SA et al. v Commission, judgment of 18.12.2008, paragraph 62; Case T-69/04 
Schunk et al. v Commission, judgment of 8.10.2008, paragraph 56; Case T-112/05, Akzo et al. v 
Commission [2007] ECR II-5049, paragraph 60; Joined Cases T-71/03 etc, Tokai Carbon and Others v 
Commission [2005] ECR II-10, paragraph 60; Case T-354/94, Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags v 
Commission [1998] ECR II-2111, paragraph 80, upheld in case C-286/98P, Stora Kopparbergs 
Bergslags v Commission, [2000] ECR I-9925, paragraphs 27, 28 and 29; Case 107/82, AEG v 
Commission, [1983] ECR 3151, paragraph 50. See also the Opinion of AG Kokott in case C-97/08 - the 
appeal to the Akzo judgment in case T-112/05 paragraphs 46-76. EN  46     EN 
application of Article 21, in 2009 no new proceeding was opened under this 
provision. 
1.1.  The Merger Report 
175.  On 18 June the Commission presented a report to the Council on the application of 
the European Community Merger Regulation (ECMR)
148. The Commission had an 
obligation to report to the Council on the application of the ECMR five years after its 
entry into force. In preparation for this report, the Commission launched a public 
consultation which focused, in particular, on the application of the jurisdictional 
thresholds and the referral mechanisms, but also on general issues relating to the 
application of the ECMR. 
176.  The report concludes that overall, the jurisdictional thresholds and the referral 
mechanisms have provided the appropriate legal framework for a flexible allocation 
and re-allocation of cases between the Commission and the NCAs. In fact, the 
jurisdictional thresholds, including the "two-thirds rule", have in most cases been 
effective in distinguishing cases that have Community relevance from those with a 
primarily national nexus. Also, the pre-notification referral mechanisms introduced 
in 2004 have significantly contributed to the efficient allocation of merger cases to 
the authority which is more appropriately placed to carry out a review and have 
avoided unnecessary parallel proceedings. For example, it is estimated that during 
the period 2004 to 2008, these referral mechanisms reduced the number of potential 
parallel proceedings from around 1 000 to about 150. During the same period 40 
cases were referred from the Commission to NCAs. The report also finds that the 
post-notification mechanisms in the hands of the Member States provided by the 
ECMR have proven to continue to be useful in re-allocating cases notwithstanding 
the introduction of the pre-notification referral mechanisms. 
177.  The report nevertheless highlights areas where there may be potential room for 
improvement: For example there were a small number of cases which potentially had 
cross-border effects across the Community which nevertheless were assessed by 
NCAs as a result of the operation of the "two-thirds rule". Also, in some cases, 
companies continue to notify mergers to three or more NCAs rather than make a 
single notification to the Commission (about 100 cases in 2007). There may therefore 
be further scope to achieve a "one-stop-shop" review for such cases, e.g. through the 
increased use of referral mechanisms. Conversely, there may also be scope for more 
referrals in the direction of the Member States. In this regard, some concerns were 
raised by stakeholders regarding the cumbersomeness and the length of the pre- and 
post-merger referral procedures. The public consultation also suggested that efforts 
towards further convergence of the various national rules governing merger control 
and their relation to Community rules would be beneficial to alleviate any difficulties 
encountered in connection with multiple filings. 
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2. SELECTED COURT CASES  
2.1.  Case C-440/07 P, Commission v. Schneider Electric SA 
Causal link between an infringement of the rights of defence by the Commission 
and the loss suffered by a notifying party in the context of non-contractual 
liability 
178.  By its appeal, the Commission requested the ECJ to set aside the judgment of the 
CFI in which the CFI found the Community liable in damages as a result of the 
infringement by the Commission of the rights of the defence of the notifying 
undertaking (Schneider) in the merger case COMP/M.2283 Schneider/Legrand. The 
ECJ partially annulled the CFI judgment. The ECJ upheld the CFI's finding that, in 
the present case, the violation of the rights of the defence resulted in a sufficiently 
serious breach of Community law capable of engaging the non-contractual liability 
of the Community. 
179.  However, the ECJ ruled that the CFI incorrectly held there to be a direct causal link 
between the Commission's illegality and the loss suffered by Schneider as a result of 
the reduction in the transfer price of the target company (Legrand). The ECJ 
considered that the direct cause of the damage claimed by Schneider was Schneider's 
decision to allow the transfer of Legrand to take effect, which it was not obliged to 
take following the annulment by the CFI of the Commission decisions declaring its 
proposed acquisition of Legrand incompatible with the common market and ordering 
it to separate itself from Legrand. 
180.  The ECJ nevertheless upheld the judgment of the CFI in so far as it ordered the 
Community to make good the loss represented by the expenses incurred by 
Schneider as a result of its participation in the resumed merger control procedure 
following the annulment by the CFI of the Commission's incompatibility and 
separation decisions. 
II – Sector Developments 
A – FINANCIAL SERVICES  
1. OVERVIEW OF SECTOR 
181.  Financial markets continue to be crucial to the functioning of modern economies. 
They are the lifeblood of the real economy as they provide and facilitate businesses' 
and consumers' access to finance. The more integrated and the more competitive they 
are, the more efficient the allocation of capital and long-run economic performance 
will be. With the financial and economic crisis continuing into 2009, the year has 
been another extremely difficult one for the financial sector and EU governments 
have continued to take a series of emergency measures. 
182.  Therefore, in the field of State aid, the Commission has played a leading role by 
providing legal certainty as regards Member States' measures. Building on its 2008 
Communications on Banking and Recapitalisation, the Commission issued an EN  48     EN 
Impaired Assets Communication on 25 February
149 and a Restructuring 
Communication on 22 July
150. 
183.  The Commission also ensured that national measures did not exported problems 
across borders. The Commission approved, subject to conditions, a number of 
restructuring measures in respect of banks that have received state support which 
should lead to the restoration of long-term viability in the sector and a return to 
normal market conditions. In 2008 and 2009, the Commission authorised over 30 
rescue schemes in 19 countries and a large number of measures in favour of specific 
credit institutions. The overall authorised aid amounts to more than 
EUR 3.630 billion or approximately 29% of the EU-27 GDP
151. 
184.  The Commission's actions contributed to maintaining financial stability whilst 
ensuring that a level playing field to the benefit of consumers and competition. 
185.  In 2009 merger activity in the financial sector declined as a result of the financial 
crisis. However, cases notified in 2009 and the implementation of remedies from 
earlier cases often raised difficult jurisdictional and procedural questions. 
2. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
2.1.  Financial services – State aid 
The financial crisis 
186.  Since the beginning of the financial crisis, the role of the Commission in the field of 
competition policy was twofold: (i) to support financial stability by rapidly giving 
legal certainty to measures taken by Member States and (ii) to maintain a level 
playing field and ensure that national aid measures would not simply export 
problems to other Member States.  
187.  In 2009, the restructuring of many European banks became the biggest challenge. 
Restoring the viability of the EU banking sector as a whole includes restoring 
viability of individual financial institutions. Restructuring is a prerequisite for the 
return to viability of credit institutions, lending to the real economy, re-establishing a 
level playing field across institutions, and for the smooth functioning of the European 
internal market. 
188.  The restructuring process of banks is based on the crisis-related State aid rules as laid 
down in the Restructuring Communication of 22 July 2009. The communication 
provides guidance on the conditions under which restructuring aid for banks in need 
of financial assistance beyond an emergency rescue can be authorised. The first 
principle is the return to long-term viability without State aid, based on a sound 
restructuring plan (including stress-testing of the bank's financial projections). The 
second principle is burden sharing between the bank/its stakeholders and the State. 
Shareholders and other capital holders must adequately contribute to bearing the 
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costs of financial, organisational and other necessary restructuring measures. Finally, 
the third principle requires measures to limit competition distortions. These usually 
comprise structural measures (divestitures) and behavioural measures (e.g. 
acquisition bans, limitations to aggressive commercial behaviour financed by State 
aid). The measures are decided on a case-by-case basis. 
189.  The Commission requests detailed regular reports on the implementation of the 
restructuring plans. Moreover, separate managers, monitoring trustees and divestiture 
trustees can be appointed to ascertain that the approved restructuring plans are being 
implemented properly. 
190.  In the course of 2009, the discussion began on how to return to market discipline in 
the financial sector. While it seemed too early to withdraw support measures to the 
economy and the financial sector, a debate about how to incentivise banks to 
progressively return to the markets began. 
191.  Discussions on a gradual phasing out of financial support to banks when the situation 
allows it took place with Member States and the European Central Bank in the 
context of the wider policy debate on how to best pave the way for a return to normal 
market conditions.  
Restructuring cases 
192.  In 2009, the Commission approved, subject to specific conditions, a number of 
restructuring measures in respect of banks that received State support. The 
restructuring aims at restoring long-term viability of the institutions concerned 
without the need for further State aid and at encouraging the return to normal market 
conditions in the financial sector. 
Commerzbank AG (DE) 
193.  Commerzbank is a credit institution with a total group balance sheet of 
approximately EUR 1 100 billion. It is the second biggest private credit institution in 
Germany since its acquisition of Dresdner Bank AG ("Dresdner Bank") in 2008.  
194.  In December 2008 and January 2009, Commerzbank received capital injections l 
amounting to EUR 18.2 billion from SoFFin
152 under the German bank rescue 
scheme. The capital was granted in the form of ordinary shares (25% plus one share) 
and silent participations. In addition, SoFFin provided a guarantee for bond issuances 
worth EUR 15 billion.  
195.  On 7 May, the Commission approved that recapitalisation of Commerzbank (The 
total amount corresponds to 8.2% of risk weighted assets). It was one of the 
Commission's first decisions on a restructuring case originating from the financial 
crisis.  
196.  The main element of Commerzbank's viability plan is the focus on its core 
businesses, namely retail and corporate banking. To achieve that, Commerzbank will 
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sell a significant amount of ownership stakes and other assets, amounting to roughly 
45% of its current balance sheet total.  
197.  The plan also includes a number of measures which are aimed at keeping the aid to 
the minimum necessary and which, at the same time, limit its potential to distort 
competition. These measures include divestments by Commerzbank of activities and 
the sale of subsidiaries (including the sale of its subsidiary Eurohypo) to address the 
Commission's concerns regarding possible distortions of competition due to the large 
size of the aid granted. 
198.  The Commission found that the large-scale divestments and the suspension of 
payments of dividends and interest provided for in the plan limit the aid to the 
minimum necessary and ensure an adequate contribution of the bank and its owners 
to the restructuring.  
199.  In addition, behavioural measures in the Commission's Decision limit organic and 
external growth at the expense of competitors that have not received State support, 
which have become a standard of other restructuring decisions in the meantime. 
Commerzbank is subject to a ban of acquisitions of financial institutions and is 
furthermore not allowed to do business under more favourable price conditions than 
its top three competitors in markets/products where it has a market share above 5%. 
Commerzbank must not pay out dividends and coupons on own funds instruments 
for the business years 2009 and 2010 unless there is a binding legal obligation to do 
so. Moreover, Commerzbank must not liquidate any reserves in order to make such 
payments possible. 
ING (NL) 
200.  Based in the Netherlands, ING operates in more than 50 countries, with a balance 
sheet of EUR 1.332 billion in 2008.  
201.  In November 2008 the Dutch authorities granted a recapitalisation for the benefit of 
ING amounting to EUR 10 billion. On 26 January 2009, the Dutch government 
provided ING with an impaired asset measure of USD 39 billion. In October 2009, 
the Netherlands have provided a detailed commitment to bring the measure fully in 
line with the Impaired Assets Communication of 25 February 2009 in particular by 
raising the guarantee fee, lowering the funding fee and reducing the management fee. 
In addition, ING had received guarantees on medium-term liabilities amounting to 
about EUR 12 billion under the Dutch guarantee scheme. The total aid amount 
corresponds to 5% of risk weighted assets. 
202.  On 18 November 2009, the Commission approved ING's restructuring plan and 
illiquid asset back-up facility. Actions in the plan include the reduction of the risk 
profile of ING's balance sheet and the divestment of activities amounting to 45 % of 
the balance sheet, including ING's insurance and asset management. The Netherlands 
also committed that ING adheres to a temporary acquisition ban of other firms. 
203.  The plan also envisages additional guarantees of up to EUR 10 billion provided by 
the Netherlands to make this carve-out possible. In addition to regular monitoring 
reports, trustees will be appointed, subject to the Commission approval, to monitor 
the implementation of various commitments foreseen in the restructuring plan. The 
Netherlands committed to a clear timetable for implementing the restructuring plan. EN  51     EN 
204.  The Commission considered the proposed measures sufficient in respect to burden-
sharing, and appropriate and proportional to offset the competition-distorting effects 
of the aid measures in question, namely the recapitalisation, the impaired asset 
measure, the already granted liability guarantees and the liability guarantees foreseen 
in the restructuring plan. Also, the Commission considered that additional aid 
deriving from the modified terms of the repayment conditions for the capital from the 
Netherlands was sufficiently taken into account with the presented measures foreseen 
in the restructuring plan and can therefore be considered compatible. 
205.  In particular the structural and behavioural commitments as described above are 
sufficient to mitigate the distortions of competition stemming from such a large 
amount of aid. The use of trustees for monitoring the implementation of the 
restructuring plan is also viewed positively. 
Royal Bank of Scotland (UK) 
206.  RBS has been particularly hit by the financial crisis, because of its risky lending 
activities, its aggressive acquisition policy and its very leveraged balance sheet. As a 
consequence, RBS has received the largest aid by a Member State with GBP 45.5 
billion of recapitalisation, a GBP 8 billion of contingent capital and participation in 
the UK asset protection scheme for a portfolio of GBP 281 billion of impaired assets 
(total restructuring aid between 11.3% and 19.6% of risk weighted assets). As a 
consequence, the State is now the controlling shareholder with an economic 
ownership of 84% of the capital of the bank. 
207.  The restructuring plan was submitted to the Commission on 2 June 2009 and is based 
on the run-off of a risky and funding-consuming loan portfolio. These actions are 
necessary to restore the bank's long-term viability. Following the discussion with the 
Commission, the plan also contains some material divestments as well as some 
behavioral commitments in order to address issues of viability, burden-sharing and 
limitations of distortions of competition. In addition, following a detailed evaluation 
of the expected losses of the assets covered by the asset protection scheme, it was 
decided to increase the first loss tranche – the amount of credit losses borne by RBS - 
from GBP 43 billion to GBP 60 billion. This means that the State will only 
indemnify the bank for the losses exceeding that amount. This significant adjustment 
put the measure in line with the Impaired Assets Communication of 25 February 
2009.  
208.  The divestments proposed consist of: (i) a divestment of 318 branches and associated 
customers in the SME and mid-corporate banking market; (ii) the sale of Global 
Merchant Services, a transaction service business; (iii) the sale of the RBS insurance 
business, which is the leading UK general insurance company; (iv) the sale of a 
business active in commodities trading; and v) the sale of a contingent divestment 
representing in the event its core Tier 1 capital ratio declines to below 5% or RBS 
falls short of its balance sheet reduction targets. 
209.  RBS will respect an acquisition ban for at least three years. RBS will pay an 
adequate remuneration for its capital injection which is in line with the Commission's 
Recapitalisation Communication, as well as for its guarantees on medium-term 
liabilities in line with the UK guarantee scheme which, in turn, is in line with the 
Banking Communication. Except when it is legally compulsory, RBS will not pay EN  52     EN 
dividends or coupons on existing hybrid capital instruments for a period of two 
years.  
210.  The bank also committed to a cap in its overall annual position in the Global Debt 
League Table, to be in the leading edge of implementing the G20 principles and the 
UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) code on remuneration practices and bonuses, 
as well as not to make any reference to State support in its marketing.  
211.  The Commission considered that RBS' restructuring plan entails sufficient structural 
and behavioural measures to address the distortion of competition created by the aid 
and that the restructuring measures are apt to enable RBS to restore its long-term 
viability. Therefore, the Commission approved under EU State aid rules the impaired 
asset relief measure and the restructuring plan of Royal Bank of Scotland on 14 
December 2009.  
212.  The restructuring plan has a number of provisions with regards to the monitoring of 
the plan (monitoring trustee), the enforcement of divestments (divestiture trustee if 
divestments not completed by the deadlines) and the preservation of the value of the 
businesses (hold separate manager). 
Lloyds Banking Group (UK) 
213.  The Lloyds Banking Group ("LBG") was formed through the acquisition of Halifax 
Bank of Scotland (HBOS) by Lloyds TSB announced in September 2008. It rapidly 
turned out that the situation of HBOS was much worse than expected. Therefore, this 
acquisition, while allowing the group to consolidate its leading position on the UK 
retail market, contributed to LBG's difficulties which lead to the need for State 
intervention in the bank.  
214.  In its decision of 13 October 2008, the Commission approved a package of financial 
support measures to the banking industry in the UK. On the basis of that scheme 
LBG received a capital injection of GBP 17 billion, of which GBP 2.3 billion was 
repaid in June 2009.  
215.  In addition, the State participated in LBG's rights issue of November 2009, 
amounting to a State participation of GBP 5.9 billion to maintain its 43.5% 
shareholding. In total, the recapitalisations by the State corresponds to 4.1% of the 
risk weighted assets of the bank at the end of 2008. 
216.  LBG submitted a restructuring plan on 16 July 2009. After discussions with the UK 
authorities, the Commission approved a modified plan on 18 November 2009. The 
measures described in the approved restructuring plan will result in the disposal or 
run-down of non-core businesses and activities resulting in an asset reduction of 
around GBP 181 billion by the end of 2014. In order to limit the distortion of 
competition created by the aid LBG will divest part of its UK retail banking activities 
by selling more than 600 branches accounting for a market share of 4.6% in the 
current account segment. In addition, LBG will respect a number of behavioural 
commitments such as an acquisition ban for at least three years.  
217.  LBG will pay an adequate remuneration for its capital injection which is in line with 
the Recapitalisation Communication. LBG will also pay an adequate remuneration 
for its guarantees on medium-term liabilities in line with the UK guarantee scheme EN  53     EN 
which, in turn, is in line with the Banking Communication. Finally, LBG will comply 
with the Commission's policy on Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments, i.e. during 
two years LBG will not pay investors any coupon on existing hybrid capital 
instruments (issued before 3 November 2009) unless there is a legal obligation to do 
so. 
218.  The Commission concluded that the restructuring plan enables LBG to restore its 
long-term viability, is sufficient in respect to burden-sharing requirements and 
contains sufficient structural and behavioural measures to offset the distorting effects 
of the aid measures in question. The Commission has therefore concluded that the 
aid was compatible pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC. 
KBC 
219.  KBC is a Belgium-based bank with a total balance sheet of EUR 355 billion (as per 
December 2008), which got into difficulties largely because of the substantial 
downward revaluation of its portfolio of Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs). 
220.  In December 2008, KBC received a recapitalisation of EUR 3.5 billion. This measure 
was approved for a period of six months and subject to the submission of a plan 
showing how KBC would return to viability within this period.  
221.  On 22 January 2009, a second recapitalisation of EUR 3.5 billion was announced by 
the Belgian authorities. On 14 May 2009, an asset relief measure, covering the losses 
on a CDO portfolio with a notional value of EUR 20 billion was announced by 
Belgium. Consequently, the total aid amount corresponds to at least 4.1% of risk 
weighted assets. On 30 June 2009, the Commission initiated the formal investigation 
procedure with regard to several aspects of that asset relief measure, while it 
approved the second recapitalisation as rescue aid for a period of six months and 
subject to the submission of a restructuring plan. The Belgian authorities submitted a 
restructuring plan on 30 September 2009. 
222.  On 18 November 2009, the Commission approved the restructuring plan, concluding 
that it met the criteria of the Restructuring Communication. The Commission found 
that the restructuring measures proposed by the Belgian authorities were appropriate 
to enable KBC to restore its long-term viability through the run-off of KBC Financial 
Products, the unit that originated the CDOs which were the cause of most of its 
problems, and the divestment of subsidiaries that either cannot operate on a stand-
alone basis or do not fit in the refocused KBC business model. 
223.  The restructuring plan furthermore provided for sufficient own contribution and 
burden-sharing through the listing of two fully-owned subsidiaries in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary on local stock exchanges and the divestment of KBC’s 
European Private Banking business unit. The Commission also concluded that KBC 
pays a remuneration for the aid which is higher than the minimum required in the 
Recapitalisation Communication.  
224.  Finally, the Commission concluded that appropriate and proportional measures to 
offset the market-distorting effects of the aid measures in question have been put into 
place amounting to around 17% of KBC's total balance sheet. More specifically, this 
includes the sale of Centea (bank) and Fidea (insurer) in Belgium, businesses in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as well as various merchant banking and leasing EN  54     EN 
operations. These divestments should, amongst others, help stimulate competition on 
the concentrated Belgian market. KBC is also subject to behavioural constraints, 
including an acquisition ban and a price leadership ban in countries where the market 
share is higher than 5% (except Belgium). Moreover, KBC will not pay investors any 
coupon on hybrid capital instruments during 3 years, unless there is a legal obligation 
to do so. KBC will also refrain from calling hybrids during this period. 
2.2.  Financial services – Merger control 
225.  In 2009 merger activity in the financial sector declined as a result of the financial 
crisis. However, cases notified in 2009 and the implementation of remedies from 
earlier cases often raised difficult jurisdictional and procedural questions. Two main 
points should be noted about the merger activity in the financial sector in the past 
year. 
226.  Firstly, the acquisition of majority stakes in financial institutions by Member States 
raised jurisdictional questions, in particular, whether nationalisations of financial 
institutions were notifiable under the Merger Regulation. This required an 
assessment of whether or not the nationalised entity would continue to act 
independently in the market post-nationalisation, or whether the nationalised entity 
should be considered as part of a single economic entity with other state-controlled 
undertakings. In most cases, the Commission was satisfied that the arrangements put 
in place by the Member States ensured the independence of the nationalized banks 
and thus that no concentration took place. However, in one case the facts were 
different and a concentration was subsequently notified
153. 
227.  Secondly, divestiture commitments had to be closely monitored in a number of cases 
and the implementation of commitments was made more difficult by market 
circumstances. In the Fortis/ABN AMRO Assets
154 case, dating from 2007, Fortis had 
committed to the Commission not to merge the Dutch activities of ABN Amro and 
Fortis without prior divestments. During the financial crisis the Dutch State acquired 
control of the Dutch parts of both banks and took over Fortis’ position in the 
Consortium Agreement. The Commission extended the deadline for divestiture 
several times.  The Parties finally signed a Sales and Purchase Agreement on 23 
December 2009 which remains subject to a certain number of closing conditions 
2.3.  Financial services – Antitrust  
228.  Whilst in some fields of the financial services sector like payment systems and 
payment cards, the Commission has been very active in the past, the Commission is 
only starting to intensify its work in antitrust in other sectors like banking, securities, 
trading, clearing & settlement infrastructure, insurance and financial market data 
distribution. 
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2.3.1.  Single Euro Payments Area 
229.  SEPA (Single Euro Payments Area) was an important focus of antitrust advocacy in 
the field of financial services in 2009. SEPA is a self regulatory initiative launched 
by the European Banking Industry and led by the European Payments Council (EPC) 
to move to an integrated Euro payments area, ensuring that cross border payments 
become as easy and efficient as domestic payments. Once fully implemented, SEPA 
will cover credit transfers, payment cards and direct debits. SEPA, whilst primarily 
devised by the industry itself, is strongly supported by the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and the Commission. Since it is based on decisions of and agreements 
between undertakings that are (potential) competitors it deserves close competition 
scrutiny. It also needs to be implemented in accordance with the existing Community 
framework for payment services. 
230.  As a result of the informal dialogue ("the Dialogue") with the EPC launched in 
October 2007, a number of competition concerns were addressed. For instance the 
SEPA Card framework (SCF) was clarified to the extent that SEPA compliant card 
schemes do not need to cover all 32 states of the SEPA territory. New schemes stand 
a real chance of entering the market. In the course of 2009, informal discussions with 
potential new entrants – Payfair and Monnet in particular – were held, notably to 
clarify the compatibility of their envisaged financing mechanisms with competition 
rules and to encourage the creation of a competitive SEPA-wide payment cards 
market. 
231.  The Dialogue continued in 2009, with a focus on interchange fees for SEPA Direct 
Debit (SDD), governance of the EPC and of the schemes as well as standardisation. 
With SEPA Direct Debit launched on 2 November 2009, it was urgent to provide the 
necessary incentives for banks to migrate. As SEPA involves agreements between 
competing parties, collective financing arrangements for SDD must comply with the 
EC Treaty competition rules. As a result, the Commission and the ECB clarified in 
September 2008 that a transitional default multilateral interchange fee (MIF) for 
cross border SDD transactions, as well as maintaining the same interchange fees as 
domestic legacy direct debit for domestic SEPA transactions could be envisaged for a 
short and well defined transition period. This was taken on board in the discussions 
on and incorporated in Regulation 924/2009 which applies from 1 November 2009. 
In addition, the joint Commission and ECB statement of March 2009
155 clarified 
financing principles. On the basis of the information available, the Commission's 
preliminary assessment was that there appeared to be no clear and convincing 
reasons for per transaction MIFs to exist after 31 December 2012. This provided the 
industry with the clarity needed to agree on the launch of this scheme. The EPC took 
a decision to this effect at the end of March. 
232.  In addition, the joint statement said that the Commission expected to be in a position 
to provide further guidance by November 2009 (provided that the Commission will 
have received the necessary contributions by relevant market actors). Even though no 
submissions have been received, a Commission working document that aims to 
consult on further guidance to participants in the SDD scheme as regards the 
assessment of collective financing mechanisms under European competition rules 
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was released and a public consultation launched on 3 November, for contributions to 
be received by 14 December. The Commission will then decide on next steps and it 
may, if appropriate, decide to adopt final guidance to provide greater clarity and 
predictability on the general framework of analysis. 
233.  The momentum created in the earlier stages of the Dialogue should help to tackle the 
remaining obstacles to the achievement of a truly competitive European payment 
cards market. Reinforcing and strengthening the competition dimension of SEPA 
will in turn help to achieve better services at a better price for retailers and 
consumers. 
2.3.2 Payment  cards 
234.  Following its decision prohibiting MasterCard's cross border Multilateral Interchange 
Fees (MIFs) in 2007
156, the Commission continued to closely monitor MasterCard's 
implementation of the Decision. In June 2008, MasterCard withdrew its cross border 
MIFs. However, on 1 October 2008 it increased certain acquirer fees. This led to 
negotiations with the Commission's services on compliance, which, in April 2009, 
resulted in a decision by MasterCard to reintroduce substantially lower cross-border 
MIFs
157 to repeal the scheme fee increases, and to change its system rules as of July 
2009 in order to increase transparency and competition in the payment cards 
market
158. These changes were considered by The Commissioner for Competition to 
be sufficient in order to conclude that it was not appropriate to pursue MasterCard 
for non-compliance with the Decision of 19 December 2007 or for infringing the 
antitrust rules. Implementation of these undertakings is closely monitored by an 
independent trustee. 
235.  Further to the Commission’s opening of investigations in March 2008 regarding 
VISA Europe's cross border MIFs, a SO was sent in April 2009. A hearing took place 
in this case on 30 November and 1 December 2009.The investigation is on-going. 
236.  In addition, in May the Commission has commissioned a study comparing the costs 
of payments by cash and by cards, which is carried out by an external consultant 
2.3.3  Financial market data distribution 
237.  The financial sector is highly dependent on the delivery of highly precise market data 
in relation to prices and structures of securities. A large number of internal and 
external banking applications rely upon encoded standards and identifiers that permit 
to recognise securities and interoperate. The sector of market data distribution in 
general is characterised by a high degree of concentration, as well as by competition 
issues related to standard setting, IP rights and interoperability or possibility to 
switch providers. 
238.  In 2009 the Commission opened formal proceedings against Standard & Poors' for 
allegedly abusing its dominant position related to the issuance and licensing of 
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securities identifier codes called ISINs
159. The Commission also opened formal 
proceedings against Thomson Reuters concerning the use of RICs
160. The 
Commission will investigate Thomson Reuter's practices in the area of real-time 
market datafeeds and in particular, whether customers or competitors are prevented 
from mapping RICs to alternative identifiers of other datafeed providers and whether 
this potentially creates a "lock-in"-effect for customers as the replacement of RICs in 
customers' applications may be a long and costly procedure. Such a practice may 
potentially constitute an infringement of Article 102 TFEU. 
2.3.4.  Securities Trading, Clearing and Settlement (C&S) 
239.  The implementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) has 
contributed to opening up these markets. Significant changes to market structures 
were observed, especially with the entry of new players like Multilateral Trading 
Facilities (MTFs) on the trading layers and new Central Counterparties (CCPs) on 
the clearing layer. On the post-trading layer, the Code of Conduct which was signed 
by the post-trade infrastructure providers ensured positive developments on the level 
of unbundling the services and increasing the level of price transparency. But the 
progress in the implementation of interoperability links with the competitors that 
operate or will operate behind the same trading venue is slow. From a competition 
policy perspective, a closer scrutiny of the sector and the market practices that 
determine slow progress in opening up these markets might be required. 
240.  While each case has to be assessed individually, the Clearstream judgment (see 
paragraphs 155 to 159) brought some clarification with regard to the market 
definition and the differentiation between primary and secondary clearing and 
settlement services, which will serve as a good basis for future cases. Furthermore, 
the judgment clearly illustrates special obligations of incumbent infrastructures in the 
area of Clearing and Settlement (C&S) that enjoy dominant positions in a given 
market when dealing with market access requests from other infrastructures wishing 
to compete. 
2.3.5. OTC  Derivatives 
241.  In the area of derivatives, on 20 October, the Commission adopted a Communication 
on ensuring efficient, safe and sound derivatives markets that sets out the future 
policy actions to increase transparency of the derivatives market and reduce 
counterparty and operational risks. In response to the Commission's call for central 
clearing of credit default swaps (CDS), ten major dealers committed to clear CDS on 
European reference entities through central counterparties (CCPs) established and 
regulated in the European Union. The high degree of concentration in CDS markets 
both on the level of market data and transactional levels as well as possibly emerging 
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concentration on the clearing layer require closer market monitoring from the 
competition policy point of view. 
2.4. Insurance  sector 
242.  In the field of insurance, the current Insurance Block Exemption Regulation (BER) 
expires on 31 March 2010 (see Section I.B.1.4.4. above). 
B – ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT  
1. OVERVIEW OF SECTOR 
243.  European energy policy is built around three pillars: sustainability, security of supply 
and competitiveness. Reducing greenhouse gases is vital to combating climate 
change, and all European consumers (households as well as commercial and 
industrial users) depend heavily on the secure and reliable provision of energy at 
competitive prices. Interconnections between European gas and electricity grids need 
to be substantially improved. These objectives can only be met effectively through a 
properly functioning and competitive European energy market which sends the right 
signals to investors and policy makers. This requires continued efforts to open up 
Europe’s gas and electricity markets to competition and to create a single European 
energy market. 
244.  Competition policy in the energy field aims at ensuring a secure flow and supply of 
energy at competitive prices to the EU’s households and businesses. An open and 
competitive single EU market will guarantee a secure provision of energy in the 
future by sending the necessary signals for investment and making it attractive to 
suppliers. Such a market will also be open to new energy mixes and will play a major 
role in developing and deploying new environmentally friendly technologies. Prices 
that reflect costs will help encourage energy efficiency, thereby supporting 
sustainability and security of supply. 
2. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
245.  The Internal Energy Market package proposed by the Commission on 19 September 
2007 was adopted in 2009. It is recalled that the Commission's Final Report on the 
energy sector inquiry
161 was a key element in the Commission's resolve to propose an 
improved regulatory framework for electricity and gas. Subsequent to the conclusion 
of the first reading on 9 January 2009
162, the European Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission entered into intensified discussions ("trilogue") with a view to 
reaching agreement on the package in the second reading. These discussions 
succeeded
163 and the package was adopted on 13 July
164. 
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246.  On 6 April the European Parliament and the Council adopted the climate-energy 
legislative package containing measures to fight climate change and promote 
renewable energy that had been proposed by the Commission in January 2008. This 
package is designed to achieve the EU's unilateral commitment of a 20% reduction in 
greenhouse gases compared to 1990 and a 20% share of renewable energy in the 
EU's total energy consumption by 2020. The package contains a directive on 
renewable energy establishing sustainability criteria for biofuels and bioliquids
165 
which are also relevant for the assessment of State aid in that area. Moreover, as part 
of the package, the Council adopted a Directive revising the EU Emissions Trading 
System (ETS) for greenhouse gases
166. Under the revised directive up to 300 million 
emission allowances (at current EUA price worth some EUR 4 billion) will be set 
aside for the financing of clean technologies. They will contribute to the funding of 
up to twelve demonstration projects in carbon capture and storage and also 
innovative renewable energy projects. 
247.  Furthermore, on 13 July the European Parliament Council adopted a regulation
167, 
which had been proposed by the Commission in November 2008 as a response to the 
financial crisis with the aim of reinforcing the EU's energy supply. The projects in 
the field of energy supported under the regulation will contribute to achieving the 
objectives of security of energy supply and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. A 
financial envelope of nearly EUR 4 billion is foreseen in the following 3 areas: gas 
and electricity interconnection, offshore wind technology and Carbon Capture and 
Storage. 
248.  After adoption of a second Strategic Energy Review in 2008
168 and endorsement of 
its main conclusions by the European Council in March 2009, the Commission 
adopted on 16 July a proposal for a Regulation concerning measures to safeguard 
security of gas supply and repealing Directive 2004/67/EC
169. 
2.1. Antitrust  enforcement 
249.  The work in 2009 concentrated on carrying forward existing Article 102 and 101 
TFEU cases. 
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2.1.1. Decisions 
250.  In RWE Gas Foreclosure
170, the Commission adopted on 18 March a decision
171 
under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 rendering commitments previously proposed by 
RWE legally binding upon RWE and closing its investigation. The Commission had 
concerns that RWE may have abused the dominant position on its gas transmission 
network to restrict its competitors' access to the network, thereby violating Article 82 
EC. The Commission's suspicion related to a possible refusal to supply gas 
transmission services to other companies and to network-related behaviour aiming at 
lowering the margins of RWE's downstream competitors in gas supply ("margin 
squeeze"). In reaction to the Commission's concerns, RWE offered to divest its entire 
Western German high-pressure gas transmission network
172. On 5 December 2008, 
the Commission had consulted interested parties on the commitments proposed by 
RWE
173. The respondents confirmed that the commitments were necessary and 
proportionate to remedy the concerns. The divestment constitutes a clear-cut and 
lasting solution to the concerns the Commission raised, ensuring that RWE will no 
longer be able to use the control of its network to favour its own gas supply affiliate 
over its competitors. 
251.  In E.ON/GDF
174 the Commission adopted on 8 July a decision under Article 7 of 
Regulation 1/2003, imposing toal fines of EUR 1 106 million on E.ON and GDF 
Suez for market sharing in breach of EC Treaty rules on cartels and restrictive 
business practices (Article 81 EC)
175. After conducting surprise inspections in 
2006
176 and formally opening proceedings in July 2007
177, the Commission had 
issued a SO to E.ON and GDF Suez in June 2008
178 and both companies had the 
opportunity to fully exercise their rights of defence. The infringement took the form 
of an agreement between E.ON and GDF, according to which they would not sell gas 
transported via the MEGAL pipeline in the other party's home market. The 
agreement was concluded in 1975, when the parties concerned decided to jointly 
build the MEGAL pipeline across Germany to import Russian gas into Germany and 
France. It was maintained after European gas markets were liberalised, and only 
abandoned definitely in 2005. The fines in this case were the first Commission fines 
imposed for an antitrust infringement in the energy sector and constitute the highest 
fines imposed in 2009. 
252.  The Gaz de France Foreclosure
179 case addresses suspected abusive behaviour by 
the French incumbent GDF Suez. The Commission was concerned in particular that 
GDF Suez might be closing off competitors from access to gas import capacity into 
France and that it thereby might have infringed EC Treaty rules on abuse of a 
dominant market position (Article 82 EC) in the gas sector. GDF Suez proposed to 
address the Commission's concerns through a major structural reduction in its long-
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term reservations of gas import capacity into France. The proposed remedies foresee 
a very significant immediate reduction of the long-term capacities held by GDF and a 
reduction to below 50% within 4-5 years. The Commission received commitments 
offered by GDF Suez to remedy these concerns and reviewed the commitments in 
close cooperation with the French energy regulator. On 8 July, the Commission 
invited interested parties to present their comments on the commitments offered by 
GDF Suez. On 2 December, the Commission adopted a decision under Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003 making the commitments legally binding on GDF Suez. The 
commitments will make it easier for competitors to enter the French gas market and 
so contribute to delivering the benefits of the Single Market to French energy 
consumers in terms of greater choice of gas supplier and more competition on prices. 
253.  On 6 August, the European Commission accepted commitments made by Greece to 
ensure fair access to Greek lignite deposits
180. The commitments were made to 
comply with a decision adopted by the European Commission on 5 March 2008
181 
which found that Greece had infringed competition rules (Articles 82 and 86 EC) by 
maintaining rights giving the state-owned electricity incumbent Public Power 
Corporation (PPC) privileged access to lignite. In particular, Greece has committed 
to granting exploitation rights to four lignite deposits through public tenders 
excluding PPC, to ensure that competitors of PPC in the Greek electricity market 
obtain access to lignite and to lignite-fired generation. The Commission's decision 
makes the proposals legally binding on Greece and requires the commitments to be 
implemented within one year. The Commission's decision makes sure that 
competitors of PPC will get fair access to lignite, which is crucial to allow new 
entrants into the Greek electricity generation market. This should ensure greater 
choice of electricity supplier for Greek consumers and increase the security of 
supply. 
2.1.2.  Other procedural steps 
254.  The Commission addressed a SO to ENI S.p.A. on 6 March
182. The SO sets out the 
Commission's preliminary view that the management and operation of natural gas 
transmission pipelines by ENI may be in breach of EC Treaty rules on abuse of a 
dominant market position (Article 82 EC). This behaviour concerns an alleged 
refusal to grant access to capacity available on the transport network (capacity 
hoarding), the granting of access in an allegedly less useful manner (capacity 
degradation) and an alleged strategic limitation of investment (strategic 
underinvestment) in ENI's international transmission pipeline system. These 
practices allegedly took place despite very significant short- and long-term demand 
from third party shippers. The SO indicates that these practices may have weakened 
competitors on the market, and harmed customers in Italy. In the interest of ENI's 
exercise of its rights of defence, a hearing took place in this case on 27 November. 
255.  In the Svenska Kraftnät
183 case the Commission opened proceedings on 23 April
184. 
On 6 October, the Commission launched a market test
185 inviting comments from 
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interested parties on the commitments offered by Svenska Kraftnät (SvK), the 
Swedish transmission system operator, following the Commission's concerns that 
SvK might have breached EC Treaty antitrust rules on the abuse of a dominant 
market position (Article 82 EC). The Commission's concerns relate to the Swedish 
electricity transmission market, and in particular that SvK is limiting the amount of 
export transmission capacity available on electricity interconnectors situated along 
Sweden's borders, with the objective of relieving internal congestion on its network. 
This would appear to favour consumers in Sweden over consumers in neighbouring 
EU and EEA Member States by reserving domestically produced electricity for 
domestic consumption. To alleviate these concerns, SvK has offered to subdivide the 
Swedish transmission system into two or more bidding zones and to manage 
congestion in the Swedish transmission system without limiting trading capacity on 
interconnectors. If the result of the market test is positive, the Commission may 
adopt a decision under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, making the commitments 
legally binding on SvK. 
256.  In the EDF Customer Foreclosure case
186
,  in which a SO was sent  to the party 
concerned in December 2008
187, the Commission launched a market test on 4 
November. The European Commission thereby invited comments from interested 
parties on commitments offered by the French energy company EDF. These 
commitments seek to address the Commission's concerns that EDF may be abusing 
its dominant position in France. Under the proposed commitments, EDF would 
ensure that competitors could compete for on average 65% of the electricity it 
contracts with large industrial users in France each year during the period of the 
commitments. Should EDF's market share fall, this percentage would be reduced but 
the volumes which EDF could contract for more than one year would be capped. In 
addition, the duration of any new contract concluded with large industrial users 
would not exceed five years. Therefore, the proposed commitments have the 
potential to provide actual and potential competitors with a regular opportunity to 
acquire EDF customers. If the market test indicates that EDF's proposals would 
remedy the Commission's competition concerns, the Commission may adopt a 
decision under article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 making the commitments legally 
binding on EDF. Together with the reform of the regulated electricity market being 
implemented by the French government
188, the commitments in this case have the 
potential to constitute an important step towards a fully competitive electricity 
market in France. 
257.  Furthermore, on 11 March, the Commission carried out surprise inspections in the 
French electricity sector
189. 
2.2. Merger  control 
258.  In 2009 the European Commission cleared three transactions concerning the supply 
of gas and electricity with remedies: Vattenfall's acquisition of Nuon Energy
190, 
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RWE's purchase of Essent
191 and Segebel's acquisition by EDF
192. In all of these 
three cases the Commission identified competition problems and the parties offered 
remedies that resolved these issues. Furthermore, the Commission cleared 
unconditionally two cases




259.  Vattenfall, which is ultimately controlled by the Swedish State, operates along the 
entire energy chain. Its main activities are in Sweden, Germany, Finland, France, 
Denmark and Poland. Nuon Energy is also active across the entire energy chain, in 
the production and supply of electricity and gas, and in the supply of heating and 
cooling services. It is mainly active in The Netherlands but also has activities in 
Belgium and Germany. 
260.  When assessing the Vattenfall/Nuon case, the Commission's investigation revealed 
that the proposed transaction would not raise competition concerns on most relevant 
markets due to the minor horizontal overlaps between the parties' activities. 
However, the Commission found that the two firms' retail operations in Germany and 
in particular the supply of electricity to small commercial and domestic customers in 
Berlin and Hamburg raised competition issues. Vattenfall was the incumbent supplier 
and Nuon the strongest new entrant in these cities. Consequently the proposed 
transaction would have further strengthened the position of Vattenfall, reversing a 
substantial part of the gains of market liberalisation. 
261.  To resolve these competition concerns, Vattenfall proposed to divest Nuon 
Deutschland GmbH, Nuon Energy's electricity retail business in Germany. This 
divestiture will ensure that effective competition is maintained. 
RWE/Essent 
262.  RWE is active on both electricity and natural gas markets in most EU Member States 
and in particular in Germany, the UK, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Essent is 
active in the electricity and natural gas markets, mainly in The Netherlands and to a 
lesser extent in Germany and Belgium. The two companies' activities overlap in the 
electricity and gas markets in both The Netherlands and Germany. 
263.  In this case the Commission's investigation found that the proposed transaction 
would have raised competition concerns in the German wholesale electricity and gas 
markets. At the time of the proposed transaction, Essent had a controlling 
shareholding in Stadtwerke Bremen AG (SWB), which, like RWE, is active in these 
markets. On the wholesale electricity market, the Commission found that the 
proposed transaction would have strengthened RWE's current collective dominant 
position (together with at least E.ON) by removing SWB as an actual competitor 
while at the same time increasing RWE's incentives to withdraw generation capacity 
to raise prices. 
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264.  On the gas wholesale market the Commission was concerned that the proposed 
transaction would have given rise to a vertical relationship, resulting in closing off 
supplies to customers, between the upstream market for gas short-distance wholesale 
supply and the downstream markets for gas retail sales in RWE's TSO area. 
265.  To resolve these competition concerns, RWE proposed to divest Essent's controlling 
shareholding of 51% in SWB and thus transferring swb's gas and electricity 
operations to an independent third party. 
EDF/Segebel 
266.  On 23 September, EDF notified a proposed concentration whereby EDF would 
obtain 51% stake in SPE by acquiring Segebel. EDF is active, in France and other 
countries, in the generation and wholesale trading of electricity and in the 
transmission, distribution and retail supply of electricity, as well as in the provision 
of other electricity-related services. Its presence in Belgium had been relatively 
limited, although it was the third largest operator. SPE is a Belgian company active 
in the production of electricity and in the trading and supply of electricity and gas in 
Belgium. It is the second largest electricity operator in Belgium, after the incumbent 
operator GDF SUEZ (Electrabel).  
267.  Although the Commission's investigation revealed that the transaction would not 
significantly affect competition on most relevant markets, competition concerns were 
identified, in particular with regard to the Belgian wholesale electricity market. 
These arose because the transaction removed EDF as a significant potential entrant in 
this market. The incentives of the merged entity to develop new generation capacity 
in Belgium would be significantly reduced because of the concentration.  
268.  To remove the Commission's concerns, EDF proposed the immediate divestment of 
the assets of the company responsible for the development of one of the two sites and 
the divestment of the assets of the other company if, by a later date, EDF had not 
taken a final investment decision or had decided not to develop the remaining site.  
269.  On 14 October, the Belgian NCA requested the partial referral of the transaction to 
allow it to assess the Belgian electricity markets under Belgian competition law. As 
the Commission was the better placed authority to review the transaction and 
because the commitments solved the identified competition concerns, the 
Commission, on 12 November, refused the referral request and approved the 
transaction subject to commitments. 
2.3.  State aid enforcement 
270.  In the area of State aid control the Commission has made progress with regard to 
French regulated electricity tariffs
195. These tariffs are lower than market prices and 
provide French companies with an economic advantage. They also contribute to the 
foreclosure of the French electricity market since mainly EDF was entitled to provide 
such tariffs. The Commission had opened a State aid procedure against regulated 
electricity tariffs for French companies in 2007. On 19 the Commission welcomed 
the French government's announcement of a reform plan providing for a phasing-out 
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of the tariffs and a mechanism aimed at stimulating competition on the electricity 
market by ensuring access to competitors to a certain percentage of EDF nuclear 
generation capacity at a regulated price. The adoption of the French legislation is 
required before the Commission can take a final decision
196. In addition, a similar 
State aid procedure against Spanish regulated tariffs is still pending
197. 
271.  A distinction can be made between regulated tariffs and preferential tariffs. While 
regulated tariffs usually apply to the whole of the economy of a Member State, 
preferential tariffs apply only to certain sectors or individual companies. So far, the 
Commission has taken decisions only on preferential tariffs. In particular, the 
Commission adopted on 18 November a negative decision with recovery in the 
preferential tariffs for Alcoa plants in Veneto and Sardinia
198, reaffirming the 
negative approach already taken in the Terni case in 2007 towards this type of 
operating aid given for competitiveness reasons and distorting competition in the 
Single market
199. Following the opening of the formal investigation procedure
200, 
Italy decided to withdraw a notification for a preferential tariff for selected energy-
intensive industries in Sardinia on 30 September. In the meantime the Commission is 
assessing a notification from Germany concerning electricity tariffs for certain 
energy intensive industries
201. 
272.  In the area of renewable energies the Commission authorised a Cypriot scheme
202, 
three Danish schemes
203 and an Austrian scheme subsidising feed-in tariffs in favour 
of producers of renewable energies
204. Concurrently the Commission opened an in-
depth investigation in certain provisions of the Austrian scheme which seem to 
favour large energy consumers
205. The Commission expressed doubts with regard to 
the compatibility of the scheme with State aid rules since the partial exemption of 
energy intensive industries from the feed-in tariffs may provide these industries with 
an unfair competitive advantage that does not seem justified by the logic of the 
system. 
273.  At the same time the Commission cleared a Danish project to grant CO2 tax 
exemptions to companies covered by the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS), subject to conditions
206. After an in-depth investigation, opened in September 
2006, the Commission concluded on 17 June 2009 that if the proposed full tax 
exemption would be implemented, some of the environmental objectives inherent to 
a tax on energy products would be lost. The Commission also had concerns that a 
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full tax exemption would distort competition by increasing tax differentiations in an 
area where the EU has harmonised taxes and set tax minima to create a level playing 
field between companies. The Commission therefore approved the measure on the 
condition that it is amended, so that all the companies concerned pay an energy tax 
and thus respect at least the harmonised minima tax levels. Furthermore the 
Commission approved NOx tax reductions for the Danish cement industry which was 
the first of such cases to be approved under the new rules for aid in the form of 
reductions of environmental taxes in the Environmental Aid Guidelines
207. Another 
case of waste tax reductions for the Danish cement industry has been made subject to 
an in-depth investigation because of doubts with regard to the necessity and 
proportionality of the measure
208. In a similar Dutch case on tax exemptions for the 
ceramic industry the Commission concluded on 15 December 2009 after an in-depth 
investigation that the measure was incompatible with the internal market since the 
tax exemptions could not be found necessary or proportional
209. 
274.  On the other hand the Commission authorised under State aid rules a scheme 
proposed by the United Kingdom introducing a trading system for CO2 emissions 
related to energy consumption
210. The scheme does not fall under the rules for 
exemptions from environmental taxes of the Environmental Aid Guidelines, because 
of its innovative character and because of the specific objective it pursues. The 
national system, called "the Carbon Reduction Commitment" (CRC), applies to non 
energy intensive sectors of economy e.g. hospitals, hotels, banks, not covered by the 
EU ETS. In these sectors, energy costs are so minor that the additional costs related 
to the introduction of the system would not be enough to trigger a change in 
behaviour of the companies. Therefore in addition to all allowances in the CRC 
system being sold by auction, participants’ environmental performance would be 
ranked in a performance league table and the auction revenue would be paid back to 
participants as a subsidy. Participants ranked on the top of the Performance League 
Table would benefit the most from the recycling mechanism. The measure is in line 
with Article 87(3)(c) EC because it pursues an objective of common interest in a 
necessary and proportionate way. 
275.  Furthermore, the Commission has approved a Polish
211, a Lithuanian
212 and a 
Bulgarian
213 scheme providing for tax reduction to stimulate the production of 
certain forms of biofuels. In the Polish case the tax reductions were accompanied by 
supply obligations and in the Bulgarian and Lithuanian cases such type of obligations 
are not in force but were about to be implemented. The coexistence of supply 
obligations and tax reductions may raise the question of the need for aid since both 
instruments pursue the same goal of bringing biofuels to the market. However, in all 
of these cases the duration of the schemes was limited to less than three years. This 
timeframe should enable the Member States to collect sufficient data to assess the 
                                                 
207 Case  N327/2008  NOx tax reductions for large polluters and companies reducing pollution, and tax 
reductions for biogas and biomass (the public version is not yet available). 
208  Case C30/2009 (ex N328/2008) Tax exemption for pollution from companies' own cement production 
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210 Case  N629/2008  Carbon Reduction Committment (CRC). 
211 Case  N57/2008  Operating aid for biofuels – Poland (OJ C 247, 15.10.2009, p. 1). 
212 Case  N372/2007  Support for biofuel (OJ C 106, 8.5.2009, p. 14). 
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long term effects of the coexistence of these two instruments in the market for 
biofuels. Also, in the Polish case the incentive effect was justified as being temporary 
because the functioning of the obligation was expected to drive the demand for 
biofuels up to a level when it was not excluded that for a limited time companies 
subject to the obligation will rather pay a fine than comply with the obligation. In 
such a case, the environmental effect would not be reached by applying the 
obligation alone. 
276.  Furthermore the Commission dealt with a number of measures promoting electricity 
and heat generation and distribution infrastructure. With regard to Austria, the 
Commission approved a scheme supporting the construction of combined heat and 
power plants (CHP plants)
214 under the Environmental Aid Guidelines as well as a 
scheme promoting the construction of district heating and cooling installations
215 
which was approved partly under the Environmental Aid Guidelines and partly under 
Article 87(3)(c) EC. Moreover, the Commission authorised three Polish schemes on 
heating distribution networks
216, on electricity connection networks for renewable 
energies
217 and on modernisation of electricity distribution networks
218 directly under 
Article 87(3)(c) EC. Also, in the United Kingdom the Commission cleared a scheme 
for a tender to conduct two front end engineering and feasibility studies (FEED 
studies) on two industrial-scale carbon capture and storage (CCS) demonstration 
projects. The FEED studies should reduce the technical, environmental and financial 
risks of the construction of a commercial scale coal-fired power plant equipped with 
post-combustion CCS technology
219. 
277.  Finally, on the basis of the Temporary Framework
220 the Commission approved 
national aid schemes from France, United Kingdom, Spain, Germany and Italy
221. 
The Temporary Framework had been introduced in 2009 in order to give Member 
States additional possibilities for providing businesses with improved access to 
financing during the economic and financial crisis. Since the schemes fulfilled the 
conditions set out in the Temporary Framework, they were found compatible with 
Article 87(3)(b) EC, which permits aid intended to remedy a serious disturbance in 
the economy of a Member State. The approved schemes support businesses faced 
with financing problems because of the credit squeeze, while at the same time 
preserving investments in products with an environmental benefit (i.e. green 
products). The schemes were dealt with in an accelerated procedure as compared to 
standard cases. 
                                                 
214 Case  N461/2008  Law on Combined Heat and Power Stations (CHP) (OJ C 109, 13.5.2009, p. 1). 
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220  Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support access to finance in the current financial and 
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C – ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS  
1. OVERVIEW OF SECTOR 
278.  In 2009, it is estimated that growth in the electronic communications sector was 
close to zero. The sector however remained relatively resilient to the current 
economic crisis. More effective competition due to competition law enforcement, 
sector regulation, technological developments and new business models has resulted 
in lower prices for electronic communication services, investment in new network 
infrastructure and innovative service offers. Business and retail costumers have both 
benefited from a broad choice of electronic communications services in the fixed and 
mobile markets. 
279.  As regards retail competition, the trend of lower prices for electronic 
communications services persisted. In the light of the steady rise of Voice over 
Internet Protocol (VoIP) and fixed mobile convergence, the market for traditional 
fixed voice telephony continued to decline. In the mobile voice markets, penetration 
increased again, while growth of revenues slowed down. The broadband service 
market showed a slight increase of broadband penetration and an increase of average 
download speeds. 
280.  In the mobile market, decreasing prices for mobile voice services resulted in lower 
revenues for operators. This development was partially offset by increasing use of 
mobile data services. In addition, an increasing number of consumers decided to 
replace fixed access with mobile access only. This trend also reflected the advanced 
acceptance of mobile broadband by the consumers, even if prices and product 
characteristics widely differ throughout the EU. The trend towards fixed-mobile 
integration could also advance further, when mobile network operators will upgrade 
their networks to new transmission technologies that will allow download speeds up 
to 100 MBit/s. However, increased data traffic may only produce limited revenue 
growth given that retail offerings are increasingly based on flat rates. 
281.  In some Member States the fixed network operators have started the deployment of 
optical fibre networks to provide very high bandwidth broadband internet services, 
although these deployments have so far been very limited. In addition, many cable 
operators have also been upgrading their networks to deliver internet services up to 
100 MBit/s. The upgrade of the existing infrastructure for electronic communications 
may bring large growth opportunities for the IT and content industries and for the 
European economy as a whole. Gradual availability of very high bandwidth will 
allow content providers to market new broadband applications and services. 
Consumers will not only benefit from higher download speeds and the availability of 
services, both for entertainment (on-line gaming, high-definition TV, etc.) and daily 
life (interactive applications, e-health, e-government, etc.) but also from wider choice 
and enhanced competition between operators. 
282.  Since the beginning of the Internet, network capacity and availability of bandwidth 
have influenced the offer of certain types of content/services on-line (the move from 
text based to image based websites; from web 1.0 to web 2.0 etc). The emergence of 
new content/services also creates a societal need for further increase in bandwidth, EN  69     EN 
even where it is not profitable for market operators to offer access, e.g. in remote and 
sparsely population areas. This often triggers use of public funding, and therefore 
numerous aid schemes have been motivated in the past by the need to follow the 
above evolution. Public intervention in some Member States is now gradually 
shifting towards support for very high speed broadband networks, the so-called "next 
generation access" (NGA) networks. 
2. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
2.1.  Application of the Regulatory Framework and other policy developments 
283.  Providers of electronic communications services continued to operate within the 
confines of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications
222, which is 
designed to facilitate access to legacy infrastructure, foster investment in alternative 
network infrastructure and bring choice and lower prices for consumers. 
284.  Ex ante regulation under the Regulatory Framework builds on competition law 
principles. This approach has been adopted by National Regulatory Authorities 
(NRAs) in their assessment of electronic communication markets. National 
regulators concluding that a market is not effectively competitive must identify 
operators with significant market power and impose appropriate regulatory 
obligations. Regulators are required to make accessible to the Commission and other 
regulators their proposals under a consultation mechanism provided by the 
Framework Directive (the so-called "Article 7 procedure"). These can comment on 
the regulator's draft measures. The Commission may also, following in-depth 
investigation, ask the regulator to withdraw a draft measure which concerns market 
definition or the assessment of the significant market power if it does not comply 
with EU law. In its new Recommendation on relevant product and service markets 
within the electronic communications sector the Commission identified seven 
specific product and services markets, susceptible to ex ante regulation
223, both at 
wholesale and at retail level. 
285.  In 2009 the Commission received 161 notifications from NRAs and adopted 87 
comments letters and 59 no-comments letters within the Community consultation 
mechanism under Article 7 of the Framework Directive. Five notifications were 
                                                 
222  Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) (OJ 
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concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) (OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, 
p. 37). 
223  Commission recommendation of 17.12.2007 on relevant product and service markets within the 
electronic communications sector (OJ L 344, 28.12.2007, p. 65), replacing Commission 
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withdrawn by the notifying NRA, whereas 9 cases were still open at the end of the 
year. In one of these cases
224, the Commission raised serious doubts as to the 
compatibility of the notified measures with EU law and opened a second phase 
investigation under Article 7(4) of the Framework Directive. 
286.  On 7 May the Commission issued a Recommendation on termination rates
225 in view 
of the fact that termination rates of mobile operators as well as of fixed network 
operators are not consistently regulated in the EU, and the rates feature wide 
differences which cannot be explained solely by national circumstances. The 
Recommendation sets out a methodology for regulating termination rates, aiming at 
ensuring consistency of regulatory approaches and promoting competition. It 
indicates specifically that termination rates at national level should be set at the level 
of the real costs that an efficient operator incurs when receiving (terminating) a call 
in its network. This implies that the same (symmetric) termination rate will apply to 
all operators. The Commission expects that eliminating price distortions between 
phone operators across the EU will lower consumer prices for voice calls within and 
between Member States. All EU national regulators should apply the recommended 
approach to termination rates by the end of 2012. However, national regulators with 
limited resources may use different approaches for a limited further period as long as 
the resulting termination rates do not exceed the average level calculated according 
to the recommended cost methodology. 
287.  On 1 July a new EU Regulation on intra-community roaming became applicable. The 
new rules further reduce price caps for mobile roaming calls to EUR 0.43 for calls 
made abroad and EUR 0.19 for calls received abroad (per minute and excluding 
VAT) as from July 2009 with further yearly reductions, limit the price that 
consumers can be charged for sending a text message while abroad to EUR 0.11 
excluding VAT (compared to a previous average of EUR 0.28) and reduce the cost of 
downloading data with a mobile phone while abroad by introducing a wholesale cap 
of EUR 1 per MB downloaded which will also be reduced on a yearly basis. The new 
roaming rules build on the first EU Roaming Regulation of 2007, which introduced 
the "Euro tariff" caps for calls made and received while travelling in the EU. As a 
result, Euro tariff roaming consumers saved on average 70% compared to 2005, 
before the EU acted. The new roaming rules will apply until the summer of 2012. 
The European Parliament and Council have asked the Commission to prepare an 
Interim report on the new rules and the developments of roaming services in the 
Community by June 2010. In addition, the Commission will review the functioning 
of the EU Roaming Regulation by June 2011 and would then propose the appropriate 
actions if required. 
288.  On 18 December new rules for the EU telecoms markets were published in the 
Official Journal of the European Union (the Telecoms package)
226. The EU telecoms 
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reform comprises two Directives amending five different EU Directives of the 
European regulatory framework (Framework Directive, Access Directive, 
Authorisation Directive, Universal Service Directive and the e-Privacy Directive) 
and a new Regulation setting up the European Body of Telecoms Regulators BEREC 
(Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications). 
289.  The new telecoms rules comprise inter alia the following prominent reforms: 
•  The Commission acquires additional power to oversee regulatory remedies 
proposed by national regulators (e.g. the conditions on which network operators 
with significant market power have to grant access to the network; or concerning 
termination rates). The objective is to avoid inconsistent regulation that could 
distort competition in the single telecoms market. 
•  The creation of the new European Telecoms Authority (BEREC). BEREC will 
provide opinions in the context of the Commission's analysis of remedies notified 
by national regulators, and will also advise, support and complement the 
independent work of national telecoms regulators, especially when it comes to 
regulatory decisions with cross-border relevance. 
•  The introduction of the additional tool of functional separation that enables 
national telecoms regulators to oblige telecoms operators to separate 
communication networks from their service branches. 
•  With regard to "net neutrality", i.e. the differentiation between the various data 
transmissions or data users on the internet, national telecoms authorities will have 
the power to set minimum quality levels for network transmission services. 
Furthermore network operators will be required to inform end-users – before 
signing a contract – about the nature of the service to which they are subscribing, 
including traffic management techniques and their impact on service quality. 
290.  The Member States are required to transpose the two Directives of the package into 
national legislation by 26 May 2011. BEREC is foreseen to be established in spring 
2010. 
2.2. State  aid 
291.  There is widespread consensus about the crucial importance of investments in 
broadband infrastructures for the countries' economic and social development. The 
Commission actively supports the widespread availability of broadband services for 
all European citizens as laid down in the Lisbon strategy and the subsequent 
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Communications
227. The importance of broadband investments has been further 
stressed by President Barroso in the European Economic Recovery Plan (the 
"Recovery Plan")
228, where the Commission decided to earmark part of EUR 1.02 
billion from the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) to be 
invested in the roll-out of broadband networks in rural and remote areas. 
292.  The Commission encourages aid measures having the objective to provide adequate 
broadband coverage at affordable prices for all European citizens. In its assessment 
of public funding schemes under the State aid rules, the Commission acknowledges 
that, due to the economic or technological restrictions of broadband networks, private 
operators may not have sufficient market incentives to provide adequate broadband 
services, typically in rural and remote areas. The Commission has built up a clear 
and consistent State aid policy in the last years and endorses properly justified and 
proportionate broadband schemes if the distortion of competition and the effect on 
trade is limited
229. Until 2009, the Commission has assessed and approved the use of 
State aid and other types of public funding of approximately EUR 2 billion
230 in 
Europe that generated total investments in broadband networks of more than EUR 3 
billion. 
293.  Building on the Commission's practice in this area, in order to help Member States to 
design State aid measures compatible with the Treaty, the Commission has adopted a 
horizontal document that lays down the detailed rules and conditions for public 
support of broadband infrastructure. Following consultation with all interested 
stakeholders, the "Community Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in 
relation to rapid deployment of broadband networks" (hereafter: Broadband 
Guidelines) were adopted in September
231. 
294.  The Broadband Guidelines address not only aid to basic broadband networks (such 
as ADSL, cable, mobile, wireless or satellite broadband services) but also support to 
very high speed NGA networks (fibre-based or advanced upgraded cable networks, 
at the current stage). 
295.  The section on public funding of basic broadband networks outlines the Commission 
current case practice in this field. To grant State aid for broadband development, the 
granting authorities have to clearly identify the targeted areas requiring public 
support through a thorough market research and consultation with existing operators. 
Furthermore, a number of safeguards are included to limit distortion of competition 
and to minimise the use of public funds; for example, aid shall be granted via an 
open tender procedure, effective wholesale access shall be provided on the 
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subsidised networks to other operators, the measure shall be neutral as regards the 
technology and adequate monitoring of the use of public funds shall be implemented 
by the granting authorities. 
296.  Concerning public funding of NGA networks, the main objective of the Commission 
is to accelerate the deployment of such networks, in order to avoid the creation of a 
new digital divide in the area of NGA networks. The Commission's policy in this 
field builds on the experience with "traditional" broadband networks and adds certain 
new specific safeguards to promote competition and limit crowding out of private 
investment. Since investments to NGA networks are just starting and are not 
completed yet, when a public authority intends to support the roll-out of an NGA 
network, it needs to take into account also the investments plans of the private 
operators for the next 3 years. Furthermore, in order to help existing basic broadband 
operators to upgrade their services, the new infrastructure shall support effective and 
full unbundling and satisfy all different types of network access that operators may 
seek. 
297.  For the cases in which a member State qualifies the operation of a broadband 
network as a service of general economic interest (SGEI), the Guidelines provide 
additional explanation about the way the existing case law applies in the broadband 
sector. In this context, the Commission approved public financing worth EUR 59 
million for an NGA project in the French department of Hauts-de-Seine
232. The 
Commission concluded that the public funding constituted a compensation for 
complying with the obligations of a SGEI according to the Altmark criteria, and did 
not constitute State aid. The network will cover the entire French department of 
Hauts-de-Seine, including the non-profitable areas with a passive, neutral and open 
broadband network that will further stimulate competition and the provision of 
innovative services. 
D – INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY  
1. OVERVIEW OF SECTOR 
298.  The recent economic crisis negatively affected the global information and 
communications technology (ICT) industry during 2009, but a sudden upturn in 
global sales of ICT goods in May and June suggested that the industry may have 
reached a turning point and may be on the road to recovery
233. 
299.  The ICT sector is of particular importance for driving innovation and realizing the 
potential of the digital economy. Information technology markets are frequently 
prone to network effects, as illustrated by the Commission's 2004 Microsoft case
234. 
These effects may result in customer lock-in as well as in the emergence of dominant 
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market positions, which are not in and of themselves problematic, but may 
necessitate timely competition law enforcement to ensure competition on the merits 
in the markets concerned or in related markets. In this context, interoperability and 
standards are key recurring issues in an increasingly inter-connected world. 
300.  The main features of the ICT sector as it stands today remain digital convergence and 
the growing importance of interoperability and standards. 
301.  Given that network effects are one of the major characteristics of the ICT sector, 
interoperability steadily growing in importance in the market. Although personal 
computers (PCs) are considered to be the main gateway to the digital world, users are 
increasingly accessing data through other devices such as smart-phones, which are 
able to communicate with each other and with computing devices. This reinforces the 
need for interoperability between software products and devices. 
302.  Also standards play an increasingly important role in the rapidly changing 
information society. Against this background, it is of utmost importance that 
standard-setting organisations establish rules which ensure fair, transparent 
procedures and early disclosure of relevant intellectual property. 
2. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
303.  In the field of standard-setting, a number of developments occurred, particularly in 
relation to intellectual property rights (IPR). The Commission is currently reviewing 
the regime for the assessment of horizontal cooperation agreements under EU 
antitrust rules. To this end, it held a public consultation from 4 December 2008 to 30 
January 2009
235. The review also covers standard-setting with a view to providing 
more guidance on this topic. Furthermore, from 3 July to 15 September, a public 
consultation took place on the Commission White Paper on Modernising ICT 
Standardisation in the EU
236. 
304.  The issue of ex ante disclosure came to the fore in these public consultations. To 
obtain more complete information about proposed licensing terms earlier in the 
standards development process, some standards development organizations consider 
adopting IPR policies that require or permit early disclosure of actual licensing 
terms. Some participants in standards development favour the adoption of such 
policies because they believe they promote competition between technological 
alternatives before a particular alternative is selected for inclusion in a standard. 
305.  The US standards development organization VITA already adopted an IPR policy 
including ex ante disclosure in 2006, while the discussion in the EU ensued in 2009. 
VITA adopted an IPR policy under which each member of a working group must not 
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only identify all patents or patent applications of which the member that knowledge 
and that the member believes may become essential to the implementation of the 
future standard, but in addition the member must declare the maximum royalty rates 
and most restrictive non-royalty terms. A working group member who fails to 
disclose this information is obliged to license the essential claims of the undisclosed 
patent for implementation of the VITA standard to all interested parties on a royalty-
free basis
237. 
306.  Under the current European Telecommunications Standards Institute ( ETSI) IPR 
policy, any public and unilateral ex ante disclosure of licensing terms by licensors of 
essential IPRs in ETSI is fully voluntary and for the sole purpose of assisting 
members in making informed decisions in relation to whether solutions best meet the 
technical objectives
238. 
307.  At present, the Commission does not prescribe specific schemes to industry and 
standard setting bodies, but rather sets the limits within which these are free to adopt 
the policies of their choice. The upcoming guidelines on horizontal cooperation 
agreements will address various issues with respect to standardisation (i.e. ex-ante 
disclosure). 
3. MAIN CASES 
Intel 
308.  On 13 May 2009, the Commission adopted a prohibition decision against Intel. The 
Commission found that between October 2002 and December 2007 Intel had abused 
its dominant position on the market for x86 CPUs by engaging in two specific forms 
of illegal practice. First, Intel gave wholly or partially hidden rebates to computer 
manufacturers conditional upon (quasi) exclusivity for its x86 CPU. Intel also made 
direct payments to a major retailer to sell only computers with its x86 CPUs. Second, 
Intel made direct payments to computer manufacturers to halt or delay the launch of 
specific products containing competitors' x86 CPUs and/or to limit the sales channels 
available to these products. The Commission ordered Intel to cease its 
anticompetitive practices and refrain from engaging in similar or equivalent 
practices. The Decision also imposes on Intel a fine of EUR 1.06 billion, which is the 
highest fine ever imposed on a single company by the Commission. A provisional 
non-confidential version of the decision was published on 21 September on the 
website of the Directorate-General for Competition
239. Intel lodged an appeal against 
the decision with the CFI on 22 July
240. 
Microsoft 
309.  In the Microsoft case, the Commission sent a SO to Microsoft in January 2009, 
outlining the preliminary view that Microsoft infringed its dominant position in the 
client PC operating system market by tying its web browser Internet Explorer to 
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Windows. The Commission was concerned that the tying distorted competition on 
the merits between competing web browsers insofar as it provided Internet Explorer 
with an artificial distribution advantage which other web browsers were unable to 
match. The Commission also took the preliminary view that, through the tying, 
Microsoft shielded Internet Explorer from head to head competition with other 
browsers which was detrimental to the pace of product innovation and to the quality 
of products which consumers ultimately obtain. In addition, the Commission 
preliminarily concluded that the ubiquity of Internet Explorer created artificial 
incentives for content providers and software developers to design websites or 
software primarily for Internet Explorer, which ultimately risks undermining 
competition and innovation in the provision of services to consumers. 
310.  In October, Microsoft proposed commitments in order to solve the competition 
concerns raised by the Commission in its SO. The Commission decided to put these 
proposals to a formal market test. Microsoft proposed to make available a 
mechanism in Windows client PC operating systems within the EEA that enables 
computer manufacturers (OEMs) and end users to turn off Internet Explorer in 
Windows 7 and subsequent versions of Windows. Under Microsoft's proposal, 
OEMs would be free to pre-install any web browser(s) of their choice on PCs they 
ship and set it as default web browser. Microsoft would distribute a Choice Screen 
software update to users of Windows client PC operating systems within the EEA by 
means of Windows Update. Users who have Internet Explorer set as their default 
web browser would be prompted with this Choice Screen. The Choice Screen would 
give users an opportunity to choose whether and which competing web browser(s) to 
install. The Choice Screen would display icons of and basic identifying information 
on the most widely-used web browsers. Following the result of the market test, 
Microsoft improved the design of the Choice Screen and agreed regular review. An 
Article 9(1) decision adopted on 16 December 2009 made these commitments 
binding on Microsoft for a period of 5 years
241. 
Rambus 
311.  In the Rambus case, the Commission sent a SO to Rambus on 30 July 2007, in which 
it came to the preliminary conclusion that Rambus had infringed Article 82 EC by 
claiming unreasonable royalties for the use of certain patents for “Dynamic Random 
Access Memory” chips subsequent to a so-called "patent ambush." Whilst 
disagreeing with the Commission's provisional findings, Rambus eventually decided 
to offer commitments to the Commission on 8 June
242. On 12 June, the Commission 
published a notice in the OJ pursuant to Article 27(4) of Regulation 1/2003, outlining 
its intention to adopt a decision under Article 9(1) of Regulation 1/2003 declaring the 
commitments to be binding on Rambus, subject to market testing
243. 
312.  In light of the comments received, the Commission asked Rambus to clarify a 
number of issues, such as that all relevant current and future standards are covered 
and that the sale of patents to a third party would not affect the commitments. The 
Commission then concluded that the commitments in their final form, as modified by 
Rambus, were adequate to meet the competition concerns expressed in the SO. 
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313.  Therefore, on 9 December 2009, the Commission adopted a decision based on 
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 ("commitment decision"). This decision, which does 
not come to a finding on an infringement, legally binds Rambus to the commitments 
it offered
244.  
314.  The Commission clarified in the decision that an effective standard-setting process 
should take place in a non-discriminatory, open and transparent way to ensure 
competition on the merits and to allow consumers to benefit from technical 
development and innovation. Abusive practices in standard setting can harm 
innovation and lead to higher prices for companies and consumers. For its part, the 
Commission will vigorously enforce the competition rules in this area, for the benefit 
of technical progress and European consumers. 
E – MEDIA 
1. OVERVIEW OF SECTOR 
315.  Two general trends in the media sector can be identified. Firstly, the multiplication of 
distribution platforms and ongoing technological development and changing 
consumption patterns are breaking down barriers between broadcasters and other 
media operators and will lead to increased competition between traditional actors like 
broadcasters and new players. Secondly, media convergence
245 will demand new 
business models and the production of more content. Competition issues resulting 
from these trends affect both businesses and consumers. They generally fall into 
three categories: (i) availability of attractive content, (ii) access and digitisation 
issues (including "copyright" bottlenecks), and (iii) challenges posed by new 
revenue-generating models (a "monetisation" issue) as well as the limitations of State 
financed intervention in this sector. 
316.  Regarding State aid policy, private media operators continue to be concerned about 
State aid for public service broadcasters, with whom they compete for audience 
share, especially for what they consider to be purely commercial offers. They also 
allege that the State funding for public service broadcasters may exceed what is 
necessary for their public service mission, allowing them to subsidise commercial 
activities and to engage in anti-competitive practices. Private operators claim that the 
public funding of public service broadcasters' new media activities distorts 
competition and discourages private initiatives to develop new and innovative 
services. 
317.  The switch from analogue to digital broadcasting, which Member States are due to 
complete by the beginning of 2012
246, is increasingly providing consumers with a 
greater number of TV channels and radio stations, and better sound and picture 
quality. The digital switchover concerns all commonly available broadcasting 
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transmission platforms such as satellite, cable and terrestrial, and obliges 
broadcasters and network operators to update their transmission equipment and 
viewers to install digital decoders. The Commission is committed to support the 
switch off of analogue terrestrial TV broadcasting and recognises that the process 
may be delayed if left entirely to market forces. A number of Member States are 
providing public funding to encourage broadcasters and consumers to facilitate the 
switchover. The Commission has no general objection to the granting of State aid in 
this area. However, Member States have to demonstrate that the aid is a necessary 
and appropriate instrument, is limited to the minimum necessary and does not unduly 
distort competition. 
2. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
318.  The Commission's main objective from a competition perspective is to ensure that 
there is a level playing field in the media sector, whether between different 
commercial operators or between commercial operators and publicly-funded 
operators. 
2.1.  Roundtable on opportunities and barriers to on-line distribution of music 
319.  In 2009, the Commissioner for Competition continued discussions with senior 
consumer and industry representatives about the business opportunities created by 
the Internet and the existing barriers to, in particular, increased on-line distribution of 
music in Europe. In such context, a report on opportunities and barriers to on-line 
retailing was published in May 2009 and two further meetings of the Roundtable 
were held in September and October 2009 under the aegis of the Commissioner for 
Competition. These meetings were attended not only by the initial participants 
(iTunes, EMI and the French collecting society SACEM), but also by other important 
market players (Nokia, Amazon, the UK's PRS for Music and Sweden's STIM 
collecting societies and Universal Music Publishing). Consumers' interests were 
represented by the European Consumers' Organisation (BEUC). The Roundtable 
initiative resulted in two joint statements: a Joint Statement by the Roundtable 
participants on "General principles for the on-line distribution of music" and a 
statement from some Roundtable participants on a "Working Group on a Common 
Framework for Rights Ownership Information". Following the Roundtable, a number 
of participants announced concrete steps and commitments that should result in 
improved access of European consumers to music online
247. 
2.2. Digital  broadcasting 
320.  In 2009, the Commission continued to closely monitor the transition from analogue 
to digital terrestrial broadcasting in Italy in the context of the infringement procedure 
that it had started in 2006 concerning the Italian broadcasting legislation. Following 
close contacts with the Commissioners for Competition and Information Society
248, 
the Italian authorities adopted new criteria for the "digitization" of terrestrial 
television networks in Italy aimed at ensuring that more frequencies would be 
available to newcomers and to smaller existing broadcasters. The Italian Authority 
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for Communications (AGCom) conducted a public consultation on draft tendering 
rules for the allocation of the frequencies at the end of 2009 and the tender is 
expected to be launched in early 2010. 
321.  As regards State aid, the Commission continued to monitor the transition (switch-
over) from analogue to digital terrestrial broadcasting in the EU Member States. The 
CFI confirmed on 6 October a negative decision concerning Germany
249, also based 
on a lack of technology neutrality of the scheme
250. 
2.3. Sports 
322.  On 12 October, the Commission issued a rejection decision for the lack of 
Community interest in the case Certain joueur de tennis professionnel v. World Anti-
Doping Agency, ATP Tour Inc. and International Council of Arbitration for Sport
251. 
The case concerned a professional tennis player who complained against the alleged 
excessive scope of the international anti-doping rules and their application in his 
case. The complainant questioned the proportionality of the anti-doping rules applied 
by the three bodies – the World Anti-Doping Agency, the international tennis 
federation (ATP Tour Inc.) and the International Council of Arbitration for Sport 
(ICAS) and claimed that they together or separately breached Articles 81 and/or 82 
EC. The Commission examined the complaint and rejected it for lack of Community 
interest, as the rules did not appear to be applied in a disproportionate manner. The 
Commission also noted that in the context of the application of legitimate anti-
doping rules by the relevant sporting bodies, its role is not to act as an appeals body 
in individual cases. 
2.4.  Public service broadcasting 
323.  In line with the interpretative Protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam on the system of 
public service broadcasting (the Amsterdam Protocol) and the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice mentioned above, the Commission recognises that it is the 
prerogative of Member States to organise the functioning and funding of public 
service broadcasting. The objective of the Commission's policy is to ensure that 
public funding does not exceed what is necessary for public broadcasters to fulfil 
their public service mission and does not lead to unnecessary distortions of 
competition. 
324.  On 2 July, the Commission adopted a revised Broadcasting Communication which 
aims at demonstrating the specific mechanisms on which the Commission's 
assessment of publicly funded new media services is based
252. The new framework 
provides more flexibility for the financing of public service broadcasters and at the 
same time clarifies the requirements for an effective control of the public service 
mission at the national level. It adapts the framework to the fast changing market 
environment while maintaining the core principles of the Commission's policy based 
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on the Amsterdam Protocol (see section 2.4) and the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Justice
253. A centerpiece of the new Communication is the prior evaluation 
of new audiovisual services at national level. Publicly funded audiovisual services 
must satisfy the social, democratic and cultural needs of a society without distorting 
cross border trade and competition contrary to the common interest of the European 
Union. 
325.  The Commission continued to approve State financing for public service 
broadcasters where both the public service remit and the financing are determined in 
full transparency and where the State funding does not exceed what is necessary to 
fulfil the public service mission. In 2009, the Commission also adopted a number of 
positive individual decisions concerning the financing of public service broadcasting 
systems in France, Spain, Austria and Denmark. Regarding the financing of Austria's 
public service broadcaster ORF, the Commission applied for the first time the revised 
Broadcasting Communication. The decision of 28 October accepts a number of 
commitments to modify Austria's existing aid scheme for ORF. This decision
254 
closed an investigation which started in January 2008 and was triggered by 
complaints from newspaper publishers and commercial television operators. On 1 
September, the Commission also opened a formal investigation into the new system 
of financing the public service broadcaster France Télévisions in view of the phasing 
out of advertising by this chain. The opening decision raises preliminary concerns 
regarding a potential overcompensation by the envisaged measures and the way 
France Télévisions' funding will in the future be financed from taxes on telecom 
operators and on commercial television companies
255. On 2 December the 
Commission opened for similar reasons the formal procedure to investigate the new 
financing of Spain's public broadcaster RTVE which is likewise triggered by the 
phasing out of advertising
256. In July 2009 the Commission opened an in depth 
investigation regarding the restructuring plan for the Danish public service 
broadcaster TV2 Denmark
257. Having agreed to rescue aid in favor of TV 2 in 2008, 
the Commission will now assess whether the restructuring support is necessary and 
whether the compensatory measures proposed by Denmark for mitigating the 
competition distortions, e.g. not to launch new pay channels, are proportionate to the 
strength of TV2 on the Danish market. 
2.5.  State aid for films 
326.  In January the Commission extended the validity of the State aid assessment criteria 
in the 2001 Cinema Communication, until 31 December 2012 at the latest. As in 
previous years, there were several State aid decisions approving film support 
schemes. The most notable of these in 2009 were the second package of Italian film 
tax incentives
258, the French tax credit for foreign films
259 and the Irish film support 
scheme
260. The Commission also opened a formal investigation into the proposed 
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Italian tax credit for digitisation of cinemas, the outcome of which is likely to set a 




327.  In June, the Commission adopted a proposal for appropriate measures necessary to 
make the Swedish press aid to high circulation metropolitan newspapers compatible 
with the State aid rules
262. 
F – PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY & HEALTH 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
1. OVERVIEW OF SECTOR  
328.  In 2009 the Commission concluded its sector inquiry into the EU pharmaceutical 
sector. This inquiry dealt with the competitive relationship between originator and 
generic companies as well as between originator companies. It made important 
policy recommendations to improve the functioning of the sector. The Commission 
stepped up its antitrust enforcement and adopted a number of merger decisions. 
Finally, the ECJ adopted its long awaited judgment on the application of EU 
competition law to dual pricing mechanisms (parallel trade). 
329.  The pharmaceutical sector is essential for the health of Europe's citizens who need 
access to innovative, safe and affordable medicines. The sector is highly regulated 
and R&D driven. On the supply side, originator companies aim to bring innovative 
products to the market. The patent system provides the legislative framework 
allowing the companies to reap the benefits of their research and development 
activities. At the same time, public health systems are under financial constraints. 
Generic companies, which bring generic versions of previously patent protected 
products to the market, help to keep public budgets under control, as their products 
are much cheaper than the originator product whilst having the same therapeutic 
effects. 
330.  An intensified consolidation has been observed in the pharmaceutical sector in recent 
years. The consolidation concerns acquisition of generic and originator companies by 
other originator companies, as well as mergers between generic companies creating 
large multinationals. 
331.  On the demand side, the pharmaceutical sector is unusual in that, for prescription 
medicines, the ultimate consumer (the patient) is not the decision maker. Decisions 
are generally made by the prescribing doctors. The patient does not directly bear the 
costs either, as these are generally covered and/or reimbursed largely, or even 
wholly, by national health (insurance) schemes. 
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2. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
2.1. Pharmaceutical  Sector  Inquiry 
332.  Given the importance of a well-functioning pharmaceutical sector and the presence 
of indications that competition in the pharmaceutical market in the European Union 
may not be working well, the Commission launched a sector inquiry into 
pharmaceuticals on 15 January 2008
263. After the presentation of the Preliminary 
Report in November 2008
264 and a subsequent public consultation involving all 
interested stakeholders, the Commission published its Final Report on 8 July 2009
265. 
333.  The Final Report confirmed the preliminary findings of the sector inquiry suggesting 
that the behaviour of originator companies contributes to generic delay and is among 
the reasons for the difficulties encountered in bringing new medicines onto the 
market. The report also confirmed the important role of the legislative framework 
and called upon all stakeholders to ensure a proper implementation of the existing 
framework and to take the necessary measures adapting the framework in the areas 
of patent law, marketing authorisation and pricing and reimbursement. 
334.  The sector inquiry was part of well-established Commission policies and initiatives 
relevant to the pharmaceutical sector including the Lisbon Strategy, the 
Commission's Industrial Property Rights Strategy
266, the Communication on a 
Renewed Vision of the Pharmaceutical Sector
267 and the Innovative Medicines 
Initiative
268. 
335.  Within this context, the pharmaceutical sector inquiry sought to examine the reasons 
for observed delays in the entry of generic medicines to the market and the apparent 
decline in innovation as measured by the number of novel medicines reaching the 
market. Taking into account that sector inquiries are a tool under EU competition 
law, the inquiry's main focus was company behaviour. The inquiry concentrated on 
those practices which originator companies may use to block or delay generic 
competition as well as to block or delay the development of competing originator 
products. 
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2.1.1.  Competition between originator and generic companies – The issues 
336.  The results of the sector inquiry indicate that originator companies use a variety of 
instruments (referred to as "tool-box") to extend the commercial life of their 
medicines and suggest that the behaviour of companies contributes to generic delay. 
Patent filing strategies 
337.  A strategy commonly applied by originator companies is to seek to extend the 
breadth and duration of patent protection by filing numerous patents for the same 
medicine (forming so-called "patent clusters" or "patent thickets"). Documents 
gathered in the course of the inquiry confirm that an important objective of this 
approach is to delay or block the market entry of generic medicines
269. In some 
cases, individual blockbuster medicines can be protected by up to nearly 100 
product-specific patent families, which can lead to up to 1  300 patents and/or 
pending patent applications across the Member States This can cause uncertainty for 
generic competitors affecting their ability to enter the market. 
Patent-related exchanges and litigation 
338.  Enforcing patent rights in court is legitimate and a fundamental right guaranteed by 
the European Convention on Human Rights. Like in any other industry the inquiry's 
findings show, however, that litigation can also be an efficient means of creating 
obstacles for generic companies, in particular for smaller ones. In certain instances 
originator companies may consider litigation not so much on its merits, but rather as 
a signal to deter generic entrants. 
339.  According to the conclusions of the pharmaceutical sector inquiry, between 2000 and 
2007, originator and generic companies engaged in at least 1.300 patent-related 
contacts and disputes out-of-court concerning the launch of generic products for the 
219 molecules in the sample under investigation. The number of patent litigation 
cases between originator and generic companies increased fourfold between 2000 
and 2007. Whilst the originator companies initiated the majority of the 700 court 
cases reported to the Commission, generic companies won 62% of cases where a 
final judgment was given. Patent litigation took on average 2.8 years with 
considerable variations across EU Member States. Of the cases, in which the 
originator companies originally obtained interim injunctions, approximately 50% 
ultimately ended with an outcome that was favourable to the generic company (i.e. 
they won the main proceedings or a settlement was concluded that was beneficial for 
the generic allowing immediate entry or foreseeing a value transfer). The total cost of 
patent litigation in the EU in the cases reported is estimated to exceed EUR 420 
million. In 11% of the final judgments reported, courts in different EU Member 
States gave conflicting final judgments on the same issue of patent validity or 
infringement. 
Oppositions and appeals before the European patent office (EPO) 
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340.  The sector inquiry confirmed that the opposition rate (i.e. the number of oppositions 
filed per 100 granted patents) before the EPO is consistently higher for the 
pharmaceutical sector than across all other sectors. In the cases where they opposed a 
patent, generic companies prevailed in approximately 60% of final decisions 
rendered by the EPO (including appeal) in the period 2000 to 2007. The scope of the 
originator patent was restricted in another 15% of the cases. However, it took more 
than two years on average to obtain 80% of the final decisions which can limit 
generic companies' ability to clarify the patent situation of potential generic products 
in a timely manner. 
Patent settlements and other agreements 
341.  The inquiry established that between 2000 and June 2008, more than 200 settlement 
agreements were concluded between originator and generic companies with nearly 
50% restricting the generic company's ability to market its medicine. A significant 
proportion of these settlements contained – in addition to the restriction – a value 
transfer from the originator company to the generic company (e.g. direct payment, a 
licence, distribution agreement or a "side-deal"). Direct payments from originator 
companies to generic companies occurred in more than 20 settlement agreements and 
exceeded EUR 200 million. The latter type of agreements has attracted antitrust 
scrutiny in the USA. 
Other practices affecting generic entry 
342.  The sector inquiry found that originator companies intervene before national 
marketing authorisation and/or pricing and reimbursement authorities claiming that 
generic medicines are less safe, less effective and of inferior quality or will violate 
their patent rights even though marketing authorisation bodies must not take this 
argument into account according to EU legislation. However, originator companies 
were rarely successful in challenging the decisions of national authorities in court, 
e.g. the success rate against marketing authorisations was only 2%. The sector 
inquiry estimated that in cases, in which interventions by originator companies took 
place, the duration of the authorisation procedures takes four months longer. The 
sector inquiry also observed information campaigns by originator companies against 
individual generic medicines and generic medicines in general. 
Lifecycle strategies for second generation products 
343.  Incremental research is important as it can lead to significant improvements of 
existing products, also from the perspective of the patients. However, generic 
companies and consumer associations sometimes questioned the actual improvement 
of certain medicines in terms of therapeutic benefits. For 40% of the medicines in the 
sample selected, which had lost exclusivity between 2000 and 2007, originator 
companies launched second generation products, undertaking intensive marketing 
efforts with the aim of switching a substantial number of the patients to the new 
medicine prior to the market entry of a generic version of the first generation 
product. When the launch of a second generation product took place prior to the 
launch of the generic version of the first generation product the switching rates are 
reported to be significantly higher. EN  85     EN 
344.  Patent and other strategies/instruments described above may sometimes be used 
cumulatively with a view to prolonging the life cycle of medicines depending on 
their commercial importance. The sector inquiry shows that more life cycle 
instruments are used for best-selling medicines. 
Impact of generic entry 
345.  The sector inquiry confirmed that, in many instances, generic entry takes place later 
than might be expected. For the sample of medicines facing loss of exclusivity in the 
period 2000 to 2007, the average time to enter after loss of exclusivity was almost 
eight months (on a weighted average basis), and still around four months for the most 
valuable medicines. Delays are important as the price at which generic companies 
enter the market was, on average, 25% lower than the price of the originator 
medicines prior to the loss of exclusivity. Two years after entry, prices of generic 
medicines were on average 40% below the former originator price leading to 
important savings for the national health systems. Econometric analysis suggests that 
a number of factors have an influence on the observed pattern and speed of generic 
entry, e.g. the turnover of the originator medicines before the expiry of the patent, 
data exclusivity or the regulatory environment. 
346.  In relation to the sample of medicines analysed, the report estimates that savings due 
to generic entry could have been 20% higher than they actually were if entry had 
taken place immediately following loss of exclusivity. Hence, the aggregate 
expenditure on the sample of EUR 50 billion would have been about EUR 15 billion 
higher without generic entry (evaluated at constant volumes). However, additional 
savings of some EUR 3 billion could have been attained, had entry taken place 
immediately. This is a very conservative estimate as volume developments and other 
factors were not taken into account in the calculations. 
2.1.2.  Competition between originator companies – The issues 
347.  The inquiry also sought to examine whether the behaviour of originator companies 
might be among the reasons for the difficulties to bring new medicines to the 
market
270. 
Patent strategies and litigation 
348.  While patent strategies to protect innovative efforts are legitimate, in certain cases, 
however, these strategies may interfere with the development of competing 
medicines. They are called by some originator companies "defensive patent 
strategies"
271. The inquiry unearthed a significant number of strategy documents 
confirming that originator companies engage in defensive patenting.  
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349.  The inquiry also found that originator companies engaged in litigation against other 
originator companies. 66 patent-related litigations were reported concerning 18 
medicines. In 64% of the cases, litigation was concluded by means of settlement 
agreements. 
Opposition and appeal before the EPO 
350.  Originator companies mainly opposed each other's secondary patents. The opposing 
originator companies were very successful when challenging the patents of other 
originator companies prevailing in nearly 70% of final decisions rendered by the 
EPO (including on appeal). In addition, the scope of the patents was reduced in 
another 19% of the cases. 
2.1.3.  Policy recommendations and the way forward 
351.  In the final report of the sector inquiry, the Commission invited all interested 
stakeholders to bring potential competition concerns to the attention of the 
competition authorities. 
352.  The Commission will address the issues identified in the course of the sector inquiry 
by applying increased scrutiny under EU competition law to the sector and by 
bringing specific cases, where appropriate. The first enforcement action is already 
under way
272. This case investigates amongst others patent settlement agreements 
concluded by Servier and a number of generic operators, which might be anti-
competitive. This investigation does not form part of the sector inquiry, but the 
knowledge acquired during the sector inquiry has allowed the Commission to draw 
conclusions on the areas where Commission action based on competition law could 
be appropriate and effective. 
353.  In addition a number of surprise inspections were carried out.  
354.  With regard to the regulatory framework, the Final Report highlights three main 
areas of concerns: patents, marketing authorisation and pricing and reimbursement. 
With respect to patents the Commission reaffirms – on the basis of its findings – the 
urgent need for the establishment of a Community patent and of a unified specialised 
patent litigation system in Europe. The sector inquiry also fully confirms the 
relevance of the recent initiatives of the European Patent Office to ensure a high 
quality standard of patents granted and to accelerate procedures ("raising the bar"). 
355.  With respect to marketing authorisation, the Commission will focus on the full 
implementation and effective enforcement of the regulatory framework, e.g. 
regarding the deadlines foreseen for marketing authorisation processes. Further 
analysis will be carried out looking into the cooperation between authorities and 
building up capacities/expertise throughout the EU. The Commission also reminded 
stakeholders of the prohibition of patent linkage and the need to stop unwarranted 
interventions.  
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356.  Concerning pricing and reimbursement, the Commission invites Member States to 
consider provisions that would grant pricing and reimbursement status to generic 
products automatically where the corresponding originator product already benefits 
from such a status and consider policies facilitating rapid generic uptake and/or 
generic competition. This might also include tender procedures, but stakeholders are 
reminded to consider not only the short term effects. Depending on the outcome of 
the various initiatives the Commission will examine the potential need for a review 
of existing EU rules in the area of pricing and reimbursement (Transparency 
Directive 89/105/EEC). 
357.  Based on the objectives outlined in this Communication, the Commission will 
continue to pursue a constructive dialogue with all stakeholders to ensure that the 
innovative potential of the Community's pharmaceutical industry can fully develop 
and that patients' benefit from better access to safe and innovative medicines at 
affordable prices without undue delays. 
2.2.  Developments on Parallel Trade 
358.  Parallel trade in medicines in the EU takes place because of the existing price 
differences between EU Member States. The long awaited judgment of the ECJ of 
6 October 2009 in the case Glaxo Wellcome (hereafter GSK) provides important 
clarifications on restrictions of parallel trade in the pharmaceutical sector, in 
particular regarding so called dual pricing systems
273. 
359.  The origin of the case is a Commission decision of 2001
274, rejecting GSK's request 
for exemption under Article 81(3) EC regarding its dual pricing policy in Spain. The 
Commission found that dual pricing mechanisms was a restriction of competition “by 
object” and maintained that GSK had not established the positive effects of its dual 
pricing scheme for consumers in order to benefit from an exemption under Article 
81(3) EC. 
360.  GSK lodged an appeal against the Commission decision before the CFI
275 which held 
in 2006 that the dual pricing agreement at stake was not a restriction by object, but 
“by effect”. The CFI annulled the Commission decision as the Commission had not 
taken into account all the factual arguments and relevant economic evidence 
submitted by GSK when evaluating whether the agreement could have benefited 
from an individual exemption. 
361.  In its judgment of 6 October 2009, following appeals by both GSK and the 
Commission, the ECJ held that the dual pricing scheme at stake is a "restriction by 
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object" which infringes Article 81(1) EC
276. However, the ECJ found no error in the 
assessment of the CFI regarding the loss in efficiency associated with parallel trade.. 
2.3.  Merger Cases in the Pharmaceutical Sector 
362.  In 2009 a number of large mergers in pharmaceuticals took place, confirming the 
trend of consolidation in the industry. Three categories of cases can be identified. 
Firstly, mergers between originator companies whereby the rationale for the 
acquisition of another originator company appears to lie particularly in the 
broadening of R&D activities into further therapeutic areas and in the filling up of 
the R&D pipeline
277. Secondly, mergers between generic companies
278, which are 
leading to very significant players in generics markets. Thirdly, mergers between 
originator and generic companies
279, whereby originators wish to pursue additionally 
a generics medicines business. All cases were cleared in the first phase either with or 
without commitments. Given that pharmaceutical companies are often active 
worldwide, the procedure involves cooperation with the US competition authority 
(the FTC) and other competition authorities outside Europe. 
363.  The assessment of pharmaceutical mergers has shown that animal health markets 
have generally become quite concentrated. Therefore, in order to allow the new entry 
of a purchaser into the field of animal health vaccines, the divestiture package in the 
Pfizer/Wyeth
280 case included for the first time a production facility. 
HEALTH CARE SERVICES 
1. OVERVIEW OF SECTOR  
364.  Health care is a very important economic sector, representing about 9% of GDP in 
the EU, within which health services
281 account for the largest share with 6.5% of 
GDP. Member States bear directly or indirectly the largest share of the costs for the 
provision of health care, whereas consumers/patients pay directly out of their pockets 
over 11% of the costs, equivalent to EUR 122 billion per annum
282. In addition, price 
increases for health services are often paid for directly by patients inter alia via 
higher co-payments. This has potentially negative effects on consumer welfare and 
even possibly health status, an issue which has triggered a number of NCA-led 
initiatives
283. 
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365.  The organisation of the health care sector is primarily the responsibility of Member 
States under Article 168 TFEU. However, to the extent that the activities in question 
involve offering goods and/or services on the market
284, the provision of health care 
services is generally subject to EU competition rules. 
366.  In its mid-term review of the Community Lisbon Programme
285, the Commission 
identified as a priority for action to ensure healthy and open competition in services 
markets alongside the need to modernize health care systems. The importance of 
effective competition in services markets with a view to strengthening the Single 
Market remains a key priority in the Community Lisbon Program for 2008-2010
286. 
2. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
367.  The provision of most health care services requires public support. Such support may 
not be considered State aid, provided that the strict conditions defined by the ECJ's 
case law are rigorously complied with
287. Furthermore, should such financial support 
measure nevertheless constitute State aid, they can be declared compatible with the 
Treaty if they are necessary and proportionate to fulfil an appropriately entrusted 
public service mission, under certain conditions
288. 
368.  In the field of State aid control regarding hospitals, compensations for SGEI are 
normally covered by the 2005 Commission Decision
289, exempting them from 
notification without any predetermined ceilings, other than the costs incurred. 
369.  It is clear both from the case-law of the Court and from Article 168(5) that 
Community law does not detract from the power of the Member States to organize 
their social security and health care systems and to adopt, in particular, legal 
requirements intended to govern the provision of health services and medical care. 
Pursuant to case law, Member States enjoy a wide margin of discretion not only 
regarding the definition and entrustment of SGEI, but also as regards the 
determination of the cost compensation.  
370.  Over the past year, the Commission has received a number of complaints from 
private hospitals against allegedly unfair treatment or excessive compensation 
towards publicly-owned hospitals in various Member States, the latter often being 
subject to allegations of cross-subsidizing commercial activities from public 
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financing. Regarding State aid, in the area of health services, most of the complaints 
concerning subsidies for hospitals came from Member States who have already 
opened up their markets to competition (e.g. Germany and Belgium). 
371.  The constant contacts and cooperation between the Commission and the Member 
States have shown that some of the main challenges for national authorities have 
been to establish transparent entrustment acts which precisely define public services 
and their public funding, and to design an accurate separation of accounts between 
public and commercial services in order to ensure that public funds are not used to 
cross-subsidize other commercial activities. 
372.  In particular, the Commission has recently finalised its examination in a complex 
case concerning Belgium, where two Belgian associations representing the leading 
private hospitals operating in the Brussels Region complained about State aid 
received by the public hospitals operating within the same region. These public funds 
were granted for the provision of health and social services identified as SGEIs by 
the Member State. Consequently, the Commission assessed whether the 
corresponding activities qualified as economic or non-economic, and examined the 
definition and entrustment of the respective public service missions and the necessity 
and proportionality of the compensation received by the concerned public hospitals 
in respect thereof, as well as the absence of cross-subsidisation and compliance with 
EU transparency requirements. On 28 October, the Commission concluded its 
examination by adopting a positive decision which found that the public financing 
granted in favour of the public hospitals concerned for the provision of the public 
service missions entrusted to them was in line with the requirements set out under 
Article 86(2) EC
290. 
373.  The Commission has also examined a case of particular interest in relation to State 
aid for health insurance in Ireland. The tax funded public health care system in 
Ireland has a very limited capacity and thus more than 50 % of the population has 
private medical insurance. Due to their importance in the overall health system, 
private insurers are subject to special regulation, which is designed to promote 
intergenerational solidarity
291. As insurers lack the ability to apply risk rated 
premiums, differences between their risk profiles can develop. Thus as a corollary to 
these regulations Ireland adopted the Risk Equalisation Scheme (RES), which 
involved financial transfers from insurers with a better risk profile to those with a 
worse one. The RES was authorised by the Commission under State aid rules
292, a 
decision upheld by the CFI in February 2008
293, but subsequently struck down by the 
Irish Supreme Court under national law. The Irish authorities then devised an interim 
scheme of levies and tax relief in the health insurance sector that worked in a similar 
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way to the RES. The objective of the scheme is to promote intergenerational 
solidarity by decreasing the risk differentials for health insurers between old and 
young customers. In its decision of 17 June the Commission approved the new 
scheme, concluding that the measure was in line with the EU Framework for State 
aid in the form of public service compensation and as such compatible with Article 
86(2) EC
294. 
374.  In the area of antitrust, in October the Commission adopted a SO for a suspected 
infringement of Article 81 EC by the French Association of Pharmacists (i.e., Ordre 
National des Pharmaciens, Conseil National de l'Ordre des Pharmaciens, Section G 
de l'Ordre National des Pharmaciens and Conseil Central de la Section G de l'Ordre 
des Pharmaciens)
295. In the SO, the Commission set out its preliminary conclusions 
concerning the market behaviour of ONP in the French market for clinical laboratory 
testing services, that may be contrary to EC Treaty competition rules. In particular, 
the Commission was concerned that ONP may be imposing minimum prices for 
clinical analysis and restricting the development of some market players with a view 
to protecting the economic interests of its members, the French pharmacists. The 
Commission considered that such behaviour may undermine competition and 
innovation in the provision of clinical analysis services to consumers. Moreover, 
ONP may be using the powers of public authority, delegated to it by the state for the 
supervision of professional deontology in the market, to champion private 
commercial interests. 
G– TRANSPORT  
1. OVERVIEW OF SECTOR 
375.  Transport is an essential component of the European economy. The transport 
industry as a whole accounts for 7% of GDP and for over 5% of total employment in 
the EU. Competition policy in the transport sector aims to ensure an efficient 
functioning of markets which have recently been liberalised or which are in the 
process of liberalisation. To this end, the regulatory framework continued to be 
modernised, bringing transport sector within the generally applicable competition 
rules. The regulatory work was complemented by investigation and enforcement 
actions.  
376.  The economic downturn in 2009 had a significant impact on almost all transport 
sectors, whether for freight or for passengers. Faced with the aftermath of the 
economic crisis, the airline industry continued to undergo a restructuring which 
included multiple mergers and financial difficulties/bankruptcies of both network and 
low-cost carriers. The Commission assessed a number of mergers and ensured that 
such consolidation was not to the detriment of consumers. Airport congestion also 
remained a critical issue. 
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377.  The maritime transport was also severely affected by the crisis, trying to cope with 
overcapacity, falling demand and tight credit leading to sharp decreases in rates. The 
Commission remained vigilant to any signs of crisis cartels, protectionist measures or 
other forms of anticompetitive behaviour.  
378.  The Commission's enforcement activity was also complemented by that of NCAs, in 
particular in areas where an investigation at national level is appropriate, such as in 
the case of airport infrastructure (degree of concentration with regard to London 
airports for instance). 
2. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
2.1. Road  Transport 
379.  The new Regulation on public passenger transport services
296 entered into force on 
3 December. The regulation lays down the rules applicable to the compensation of 
public service obligations in inland traffic. Until the entering into force of the new 
rules, the Commission has continued to apply the existing State aid rules to public 
service contracts and public service obligations, clarified in the Altmark Judgment
297. 
380.  On the basis of these rules, the Commission concluded that the new Danish system of 
reduced tariffs in favour of certain categories of passengers travelling in long-
distance bus services involved State aid, compatible with the common market
298. The 
aim of the scheme is to ensure adequate transport services to low-income groups of 
the population and overall to boost public transport. The scheme will also help to 
create harmonised conditions for competition between railway undertakings, which 
already receive compensation for giving similar or higher discounts, and long-
distance bus operators. 
381.  As in previous years, the Commission received several notifications of subsidised 
regional bus services. In conformity with the Altmark ruling, the Commission 
declared as non-aid the compensations granted by Landkreis Sachsen-Anhalt in 
Germany for the public bus transport
299. Similarly, the Commission concluded that 
the extension of the compensation for public services in the district of Wittenberg 
linked to supplementing the existing bus lines did not constitute State aid
300.  
382.  The in-depth assessment started in March 2005 in relation to the restructuring aid in 
the form of capital injections granted to the Danish bus transport company Combus 
was concluded. Following the CFI's partial annulment in March 2004
301 of its 
previous decision adopted in March 2001, the Commission concluded that the aid 
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was incompatible with the common market and should be recovered from the 
company which received it
302. 
383.  In the field of urban transport, the Commission closed the formal investigation 
procedure regarding the State aid for reform of the financing method for the special 
pension scheme for the staff of the French public transport company RATP. The 
Commission considered that the reform notified by the French authorities constituted 
State aid benefiting the RATP but concluded that this reform was necessary to create 
equal conditions with regard to contributions for compulsory old-age pension 
insurance and to place the Ile-de-France transport company on an equal footing with 
its competitors
303. 
384.  In line with the wider Community objectives of the common transport policy and 
environmental protection, the Commission authorised a regime promoting the 
purchase of more environmentally-friendly heavy goods vehicles in Slovenia
304. 
Such vehicles use exhaust emission control equipment in anticipation of the deadline 
for the start of its mandatory use. As such, the Commission concluded that the 
measure was in line with the Environmental Guidelines. The Commission also 
authorised a German aid scheme aiming at supporting market acceptance of available 
highly efficient vehicle technologies
305 and an aid scheme supporting the purchase of 
low-carbon buses in England. The main objective of the UK scheme is to reduce the 
CO2 emissions produced by public buses through the introduction of a 'Green Bus 
Fund'
306. 
385.  As regards the improvement of the public transport infrastructure, the Commission 
authorised several major projects. Among these, it declared the public financing of 
the construction and maintenance of the motorway A1
307 and A2
308 in Poland to be 
compatible State aid. 
386.  The Commission also adopted a non-aid decision concerning the financing of the 
planning phase of the Fehmarn Belt fixed link
309. The Fehmarn Belt fixed link 
project will involve the construction and the exploitation of either a bridge or a 
tunnel to form a fixed road and rail link spanning the 19 km-wide Fehmarn Strait 
between the north of Germany and the south of Denmark. It is considered a key 
element for the completion of the main North-South route connecting central Europe 
and the Nordic countries and is regarded as contributing to the development of the 
trans-European transport network. 
387.  Finally, the Commission authorised the prolongation by one year of certain 
motorway concession contracts in France
310. 
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2.2.  Rail Transport and Combined Transport 
388.  Despite full liberalisation in 2007, European rail freight transport markets are still 
characterised by limited competition and strong incumbents co-operating for cross-
border rail freight transport. Since 2007, the Commission has assessed a number of 
merger cases in the railway sector. On 12 June, the Commission approved the 
acquisition of the Polish railway company PCC Logistics by Deutsche Bahn AG
311. 
It is the Commission's policy to ensure that in line with the ECMR, mergers in the 
rail sector do not lead to a weakening of competitive constraints, for example, by 
reducing potential competition. 
389.  International rail passenger transport will be liberalised only as of 1 January 2010. In 
October, the Commission referred to France the assessment of a concentration by 
which SNCF would notably take joint control of Keolis, an undertaking active in 
passenger public transport
312. 
390.  As in previous years, the Commission adopted several aid decisions to promote rail 
transport and combined transport. The Commission authorised the public funding for 
the construction and the upgrading of private sidings in order to increase rail freight 
traffic in Germany
313 and the prolongation of an aid scheme to support the costs 
associated with the installation of the European Train Control System (ETCS) on the 
railway line connecting the port of Rotterdam and Germany, exclusively used for 
freight transport
314.  
391.  Further aid measures were approved for the acquisition and modernisation of rolling 
stock in Bulgaria
315 and the Czech Republic
316. The Commission authorised a Czech 
regime aiming to ensure a gradual technical and operational interconnection of the 
Czech and the neighbouring railway systems, as well as amongst the individual 
entities involved in railway transport
317. The Commission also approved a German 
scheme providing for public funding for measures of noise reduction for existing 
railway freight wagons under the framework of the pilot project "Silent Rhein". The 
retrofitting of railway freight wagons which are mainly used in the Rhine valley with 
less noisy brake systems is envisaged in order to enhance noise-reduction
318. 
392.  The Commission also approved State aid for the high-speed rail link service between 
London and the Channel Tunnel as well as the restructuring of Eurostar (UK)
319. The 
measure was approved as restructuring aid and aid to promote a project of significant 
European interest. 
393.  In addition, the Commission authorised the prolongation or the setting up of several 
aid measures to promote combined transport and to achieve a traffic shift of freight 
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394.  A positive decision was adopted concerning an amendment to a Dutch regime for the 
construction of inland transhipment terminals in order to shift more freight traffic 
from road to inland waterway and rail transport
327. Along the same lines, the 
Commission authorised a State aid measure designed to shift traffic from road and 
increasing the efficiency and safety of freight transport by means of establishing a 
rail based combined transport between the Port of Naples and the Interporto di 
Nola
328.  
395.  The Commission also authorised a Dutch aid scheme entailing the development and 
application of environmentally friendly techniques in the field of traffic and water 
management
329.  
2.3. Inland  Navigation 
396.  In February, the Council adopted a codified version of the 1968 Regulation applying 
competition rules to transport by rail, road and inland waterway alike
330. 
2.4. Maritime  Transport 
2.4.1. Policy  developments 
397.  In June a Communication on State aid to ship management companies
331 was 
adopted. The Communication lays down the criteria for eligibility of ship 
management companies for the reduction of corporate tax or the application of the 
tonnage tax under the Guidelines on State aid to maritime transport
332. 
398.  On 28 September the Commission adopted Commission Regulation (EC) No 
906/2009 on the application of Article 81(3) EC to certain categories of agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices between liner shipping companies (consortia)
333. 
The revised consortia block exemption regulation will enter into force on 25 April 
2010 and is part of the European Commission's effort to review transport regulations 
for the maritime transport sector (see section I.B.1.4.5). 
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399.  The abolition of the liner conference block exemption in 2008 forced major container 
shipping firms to adjust to the new regime. In non-containerised markets, the world's 
largest shipping conglomerate, Maersk, acquired Broström
334 in 2009. 
2.4.2.  State aid cases 




401.  The Commission concluded the formal procedure opened in 2007 regarding the 
extension to dredging and cable-laying activities of the regime exempting maritime 
transport companies from the payment of the income tax and social contributions of 
seafarers ("DIS regime") in Denmark. The Commission had expressed doubts 
whether such activities constituted or could be assimilated to maritime transport. In 
the end, the Commission concluded that all dredging activities can be assimilated to 
maritime transport except for sailing at the places of extraction. In addition, it 
accepted the extension of the DIS regime to cable-laying vessels by applying by 
analogy the Maritime Guidelines
337. 
402.  In addition, the Commission concluded several investigation procedures regarding 
tonnage tax schemes. Firstly, it finalised the in-depth assessment initiated in 2008 
regarding amendments to the Irish tonnage tax scheme. In the opening decision, the 
Commission expressed doubts as to the removal of the time charter limit. The 
Commission concluded in the final decision that such amendments can contribute to 
the Community's interests in the field of maritime policy when, for a given tonnage 
tax company, each of the chartered-in vessels is either registered in a Community or 
EEA maritime register or its crew and technical management are carried out on the 
territory of the Community or the EEA
338. 
403.  Moreover, the Commission concluded the investigation procedure initiated in 2007 
regarding amendments to the Danish tonnage tax scheme. In line with the doubts 
expressed in the opening decision, the Commission found that the alleviation of 
information obligation for tonnage tax companies which carry out transactions with 
foreign (non-Danish) affiliates was not compatible with the common market. It was 
therefore not authorised
339. 
404.  The Commission also approved an amendment to the Dutch tonnage tax scheme 
which reduces the tonnage tax base for large vessels and to ship management 
companies which exercise simultaneously crew management and technical 
management of vessels
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405.  As regards port infrastructure development projects, the Commission authorised the 
co-financing of the construction of a pedestrian bridge and of jetties in the passenger 
section of the Port of Piraeus. However, it expressed doubts regarding the public 
funding of the construction of a jetty and the acquisition of different types of 
equipment in the container terminal section of the same port, and opened the formal 
investigation procedure in their respect
343. 
406.  The Commission subsequently separated its assessment of the public financing of the 
construction of the jetty from the acquisition of equipment elements and decided that 
the public financing for the construction of the jetty is compatible with State aid 
rules
344.  
407.  The Commission also raised doubts as to whether the granting of the 35-year 
concession for the operation of a dry bulk terminal and two berths in Ventspils port 
involves aid at the level of the concession holders. The concession fees to be paid by 
the respective port service providers have been established on the basis of an 
independent valuation. The Commission has doubts that in this case the concession 
fee represents a market price
345.  
408.  The Commission initiated a formal investigation procedure regarding certain fiscal 
measures in favour of the port sector in France
346. The Commission also confirmed 
its view that, in the lack of an open, transparent and non discriminatory tendering 
procedure, a sale transaction carried out by the State does not involve aid elements to 
the buyer only if the market price is paid for the assets acquired thereafter.  
409.  The Commission concluded the formal investigation procedure initiated in 2008 
regarding the public financing of ferry shipping services between the Scottish 
mainland and the islands off the west and north coasts of Scotland
347. With the 
exception of one route in the western islands, these services are currently provided 
under public service contracts, which followed open public tender procedures. After 
an in-depth investigation, the Commission confirmed that the public service 
obligations for the western and northern islands were legitimately defined and 
entrusted on the operators, with the exception of the Gourock-Dunoon route. In the 
case of this route, the national authorities have committed to take the necessary steps 
to launch a public tender for its operation before the end of 2009. On the basis of the 
commitment from the national authorities to launch a public tender for the operation 
of the Gourock-Dunoon route, the Commission decided to close the procedure with a 
positive decision.  
410.  In line with the wider community objectives in the field of transport, the Commission 
authorised the prolongation of a UK aid scheme supporting the modal shift of freight 
from road to water by means of granting support to costal and short sea shipping 
services on condition that they avoid journeys by lorry and they generate 
environmental benefits within the UK
348. 
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2.5. Aviation 
2.5.1. Policy  developments 
411.  The Regulation on computer reservation systems (CRS)
349 entered into force on 29 
March. The new rules aim to increase competition in the field of airline ticket 
distribution by reducing booking fees and allowing airlines to provide more travel 
options via the CRSs. 
412.  The new Directive on airport charges entered into force in March
350. It applies to EU 
airports that are above a minimum size and establishes a common framework of 
airport charging thereby setting common principles to be observed by EU airports 
when determining the level of the charges in order to ensure that airport charges do 
not discriminate among airport users. The Directive sets forth a compulsory 
procedure for regular consultation between airport managing bodies and airport 
users, with the possibility for either party to have recourse to an independent 
supervisory authority whenever a decision on airport charges or the modification of 
the charging system is contested by airport users.  
413.  On 18 June the Council and the European Parliament approved an amendment to the 
existing rules
351, aiming at bringing more flexibility in slot allocation in order to 
counteract the impact of the crisis on air transport. The measure temporarily freezes 
the "use it or lose it" rule during the 2009 summer season and allows airlines to keep 
their rights over slots.  
414.  On April 8 the Commission decided to open two formal proceedings in its 
investigations of the airline cooperation on transatlantic flights
352. One case concerns 
the cooperation agreements concluded between three members of the oneworld 
airline alliance – British Airways, American Airlines and Iberia. The second 
proceedings relate to separate cooperation agreements entered into by four airlines of 
the Star Alliance – Lufthansa, United, Continental and Air Canada. In both cases the 
agreements provide for extensive cooperation between the parties, including revenue 
sharing, joint price-setting and coordination of capacity and schedules on 
transatlantic flights between Europe and North America. In the oneworld case, on 
September 30, the Commission sent a SO to British Airways, American Airlines and 
Iberia
353. The Commission expressed concerns that the parties' agreements would 
have adverse effects for passengers on several transatlantic routes where British 
Airways, American Airlines and Iberia enjoy a strong market position and where 
barriers to entry are significant. 
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415.  The airline industry faced significant turbulence in 2009. Following 2008's peak in 
fuel prices, the fall in passenger and cargo demand in 2009, in particular at the 
premium end of the fare scale, resulted in significant losses for many carriers. Both 
phenomena gave impetus to the pre-existing trend towards restructuring and 
consolidation in the sector. Given the legal framework applicable to transatlantic 
mergers, the restructuring took the form of intensified cooperation within global 
airline alliances resulting in joint venture agreements covering transatlantic routes. 
The European airline industry, on the other hand, went through a process of 
consolidation with mergers of both network and low-cost carriers
354 taking place. 
Some large network carriers, in particular Lufthansa, seized this opportunity to 
expand via acquisitions of smaller regional players, namely Brussels Airlines
355, 
Bmi
356 and Austrian airlines
357.  
416.  While the Commission encourages airline consolidation in Europe, it has to make 
sure that the latter does not take place to the detriment of consumers. It is in this 
context that in 2009 the Commission conducted several thorough first phase and two 
second phase market investigations. The 2009 airline merger wave also highlighted 
some policy issues, in particular as concerns the treatment of pre-existing agreements 
between the parties and remedies in the airline sector. 
417.  Pre-merger competition between the merging parties is often characterized by a 
network of pre-existing cooperation agreements ranging from simple code-sharing 
agreements to cost and revenue sharing joint ventures. These agreements have to be 
analyzed in order to determine the relevant counterfactual for the assessment of the 
effects of each transaction. Pre-merger cooperation that is contrary to Article 101 TFEU 
cannot be considered as a relevant counterfactual. In the context of merger control, if 
the illegality of a pre-merger agreement between the parties were not taken into 
account, the parties could argue that there would only be a small reduction or even 
no reduction of competition as a result of the merger. A merger decision in such 
circumstances would effectively incorporate and perpetuate the pre-merger illegality, 
since mergers that are approved under the ECMR are no longer challengeable under 
Article 101 TFEU. The Commission analyzed on a case-by-case basis the specific 
effects of the creation of a permanent structural link (as opposed to a contractual 
link) between the parties in order to assess the extent to which competition may be 
affected post-merger. 
418.  As concerns airline remedy policy, the Commission, in order to ensure the 
effectiveness of the slot remedies offered in appropriate airline cases, agreed 
remedies with the potential to foster entry at concerned airports by incentivising new 
entrants to create a base
358. In addition, the Commission improved and substantially 
simplified the procedure for slot application for new entrants so as to provide 
additional incentives to new entrants to take up slots offered by the parties and thus 
further foster the effectiveness of the remedies. 
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2.5.2.  State aid cases 
419.  The economic and financial crisis has had a significant effect on the airline sector. 
The Commission authorised the rescue aid granted to the Austrian Airlines Group in 
the form of a loan guarantee
359.  
420.  During 2009, the Commission also opened and subsequently closed the formal 
investigation procedure into the privatisation and restructuring of Austrian Airlines. 
The Commission had doubts whether sufficient compensatory measures had been 
proposed by the Austrian authorities to address the resulting market distortions
360. In 
addition, the Commission could not conclude whether the amount of the aid element 
of the restructuring plan had been kept to a minimum nor whether the level of own 
contribution could be considered appropriate under the 2004 Guidelines. 
421.  In the final decision
361, the Commission concluded that, since the insolvency of the 
airline would have been a cheaper option for the State, the decision of Austria to 
accept a negative price amounted to a grant of State aid. After assessing the 
restructuring plan, the Commission concluded that this plan was in conformity with 
the applicable Community rules.  
422.  The Commission decided on certain changes envisaged by the Greek authorities in 
connection with the sales processes of Olympic Airlines, as authorised in 2008
362. 
The Greek authorities carried out a tender procedure in conformity with the 
Commission decision. However, no valid offers were received. Thus, the Greek 
authorities informed the Commission on their intention to carry out the sales by 
direct negotiation with interested parties. The Commission concluded that, given the 
specific circumstances of this case, and taking into account the financial turmoil, the 
direct sale solution was the most likely to maximise the value of the two companies 
and consequently the State aid to be recovered. However, the acceptance by the 
Commission of such amendment to the sale processes has been made subject to 
observance of several conditions
363. 
423.  The Commission also approved the intention of the Greek authorities to cover part of 
the costs of the voluntary redundancy scheme to be implemented by Olympic 
Catering SA in respect of certain of its staff. The Commission considered that the 
measure, which pays part of the abnormal costs of the scheme, can be considered 
compatible with the common market. The abnormal costs in question result from 
certain Olympic Catering staff taking part in an early retirement voluntary 
redundancy scheme. These staff members enjoy a permanent status and salaries 
which were negotiated when the company was a state-owned undertaking and are 
therefore not comparable to normal market conditions
364. 
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424.  Several State aids for investments in airport infrastructure were approved at airports 
in Italy (Falconara airport and Tuscan airports)
365, Germany (Berlin Brandenburg 
International Airport, Kassel-Calden airport, Dresden airport, Münster/Osnabrück 
airport)
366, UK (Newquay Cornwall Airport)
367, Poland (Lublin-Świdnik, Modlin, 
Podlaskie, Olsztyn/Szymany, Zegrze Pomorskie, Łódź, Bydgoszcz, Rzeszów-
Jasionka, Poznań-Ławica, Kraków-Balice, Warszawa–Okęcie, Katowice–Pyrzowice, 
Wrocław–Strachowice, Gdańsk–Rębiechowo, Szczecin–Goleniów airports)
368, 
Lithuania (Vilnius, Kaunas and Palanga International Airports)
369 and the 
Netherlands
370. The Commission concluded that the measures were not prejudicial to 
the common interest as they could be deemed necessary and proportionate to reach 
objectives of Community interest. The Commission also authorised the co-financing 
of the apron-related equipment and other equipment necessary for the management 
of the Ostrava airport
371.  
425.  The Commission also authorised a regime put in place by the Flemish authorities 
intended, through the grant of "start-up" aid, at the creation of new air routes from 
Ostend-Bruges International Airport to other EU airports
372. 
426.  Finally, the Commission accepted the measures taken by France in view of bringing 
to an end the differentiation in passenger charges amongst national and EU flights, 
which in fact granted an advantage to airlines operating internal flights
373. 
2.6. Ship  Classification 
427.  In 2008, the Commission started investigations into the worldwide ship classification 
market
374 concerning the treatment by the International Association of Classification 
Societies (IACS) of third party classification societies which are not members of 
IACS. 
428.  In its preliminary assessment, the Commission took the preliminary view that IACS 
may have reduced the level of competition in the ship classification market, notably 
by decisions preventing classification societies which are not already members of 
IACS from joining IACS, from participating in IACS' technical working groups 
(which develop IACS' technical resolutions that lay down requirements and 
interpretations to be incorporated into the classification rules and procedures of 
individual classification societies) and from accessing to technical background 
documents which relate to IACS' technical resolutions and which are necessary to 
understand and apply these resolutions. Given the Commission's preliminary view 
that the ten members of IACS have a strong position on the market and that 
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classification societies which are not members of IACS may face significant 
competitive disadvantages, the Commission's preliminary assessment was that these 
decisions therefore raised concerns as to their compatibility with Article 81(1) EC 
and Article 53(1) EEA Agreement. Moreover, the Commission's preliminary view 
was that these decisions did not appear to fulfil the cumulative requirements for 
exemption under Article 81(3) EC and Article 53(3) EEA Agreement. 
429.  To address the Commission's competition concerns, IACS offered the following 
commitments: 
•  To set up objective and transparent membership criteria and to apply them in a 
uniform and non-discriminatory manner. The commitments foresee detailed rules, 
including clear deadlines, for the different steps of the membership application, 
suspension and withdrawal procedure. 
•  To ensure that classification societies which are not members of IACS will 
nonetheless be able to participate in IACS' technical working groups. 
•  To put all current and future IACS resolutions and their related technical 
background documents into the public domain at the same time and in the same 
way as they are made available to IACS members.  
•  To set up an independent appeal board to settle possible disputes about access to, 
suspension or withdrawal of membership of IACS, participation in IACS' 
technical working groups and access to IACS' resolutions and to their technical 
background documents. 
430.  Between 10 June and 10 July 2009, the Commission consulted interested parties on 
the commitments proposed by IACS
375. The results of that consultation confirmed 
that the commitments were necessary and proportionate to remedy the concerns. As a 
result, the Commission adopted a decision on 14 October rendering the commitments 
offered by IACS legally binding, and closed its investigation
376. 
2.7.  International aviation policy – EU-US cooperation 
431.  Under the framework of cooperation set up by Annex 2 of the EU-US Air Transport 
agreement, the Commission and the US Department of Transportation (DOT) 
continued their joint work on the research project on airline alliances
377. The project 
has a quantitative and a qualitative part. The quantitative part of the project – 
analysis of the impact of alliances on fares and number of passengers – has been 
finalised resulting in a detailed report by the external consultant. A brief final report 
outlying the main qualitative findings is scheduled for publication early next year. 
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H – POSTAL SERVICES  
1. OVERVIEW OF SECTOR 
432.  The postal sector is of great significance for the economy of the EU, generating 
about 1% of EU GDP
378. Virtually all Universal Service Providers (USP) in the EU 
are public undertakings controlled by the Member States. 
433.  Postal services are an essential vehicle of communication and trade, and they are also 
vital for many economic and social activities. Many key sectors, such as e-
commerce, publishing, mail order, insurance, banking and advertising, depend on the 
postal infrastructure. Postal services bring social benefits which cannot always be 
qualified in economic terms. Postal services are labour intensive and are also one of 
the principal public employers in Europe. Employment in the sector is principally 
provided by USP and is fairly stable, with about 1.6 million persons employed
351. 
434.  Postal services are evolving substantially. Postal operators are facing fierce 
competition from electronic means of communication. This is in turn forcing them to 
adapt their businesses to better respond to customers' needs and to improve 
efficiency. The latter was also used as the main tool by USP to face the increasing 
number of postal competitors. In addition, physical mail is increasingly being 
supplemented by multi-channel delivery and tailor-made solutions for customers, for 
example via hybrid mail services. 
435.  Many postal operators are entering adjacent markets through developing IT services 
for their customers or other new or value-added services. 
436.  Despite the progress to-date, genuine competition is only just beginning to emerge 
even in cases where the monopoly has been completely abolished or substantially 
reduced. In the letter post segment, market shares of competitors, although 
increasing, remain at a low level even in Member States that have fully liberalised 
their postal markets. Estimated market shares of competitors in these Member States 
ranged from around 8% to 14% in 2007
351. Apart from the issue of the reserved area, 
other legal and strategic market entry barriers still persist. 
2. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
437.  Under the third postal Directive
379, most Member States, will have to accomplish full 
market opening by 31 December 2010 with a further two years allowed for eleven 
Member States
380. The Directive provides in particular for the abolition of the 
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reserved area in all Member States, the confirmation of the scope and standard of 
postal universal service and the upgrading of the role of national regulatory 
authorities. The Directive also offers a variety of measures that Member States may 
take to safeguard and finance the universal service, if this proves to be necessary. 
2.1. State  aid 
438.  Within the postal sector, the State aid assessment carried out by the Commission 
includes a verification of the amount of compensation granted to postal operators in 
order to ensure that these compensations do not exceed what is necessary to cover 
the costs incurred in discharging the public service obligations, taking into account 
the relevant receipts and reasonable profit, and that commercial activities outside the 
SGEI are not cross-subsidised. The compatibility principles the Commission applies 
in its assessment are contained in the Community framework for State aid in the 
form of public service compensation (the Framework)
381. However, the new Postal 
Directive provides for a new method of calculating the net costs of postal universal 
services
382, which departs from the mere accounting approach of actual loss 
compensation embodied in the Framework. The possible implications of this method 
will have to be reflected in the future compensation mechanisms. 
2.1.1. Deutsche  Post 
439.  The Commission currently continues its investigation into the alleged 
overcompensation of Deutsche Post AG
383 for carrying out its universal service 
obligations from 1989 to 2007. The main focus is on two public measures concerning 
the subsidy which Deutsche Post received from its affiliate Deutsche Telekom 
between 1990 and 1995 to cover its losses and the public financing which Deutsche 
Post has received since 1995 in order to finance the pension of its civil servants. It is 
important to note that the CFI annulled
384 the 2002 Commission decision which had 
already found certain aid measures for Deutsche Post AG as incompatible. The 
Commission appealed this judgment
385. 
440.  Following considerable delays incurred due to an initial refusal of Germany to 
provide all necessary accounting data for the period after 1995, the investigation was 
eventually continued based on accounting information for the whole period until 
2007 which Germany submitted further to the issuance of an information injunction 
on 30 October 2008. The Commission has recently received the formal submission of 
the expert's final report aiming to quantify the possible amount of overcompensation; 
on that basis and the comments of the German authorities a final decision can be 
anticipated for the beginning of the year 2010. 
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2.1.2. Belgian  Post 
441.  The European Commission has opened a formal investigation procedure to examine 
whether measures in favour of La Poste, the Belgian postal operator, in particular the 
yearly compensation for public service obligations, are in line with EU State aid 
rules
386. 
442.  The Commission's initial approval of a series of measures in favour of La Poste in 
2003 was overturned by the CFI on 10 February, who found that a formal 
investigation procedure was required in order to guarantee the possibility for 
competitors to submit their views to the Commission. The Commission's current 
investigation, opened on 13 July, aims to establish in a comprehensive way whether 
the totality of the measures in favour of La Poste since its incorporation can be 
considered compatible with the Single Market. The investigation concerns a large 
number of measures, including the yearly compensation granted by Belgium for 
public service tasks, capital injections, relief of pension liabilities, transfer of 
buildings and tax exemptions. The investigation is progressing swiftly with active 
cooperation of the Belgian authorities. 
2.1.3. Royal  Mail 
443.  The European Commission has decided that four state measures granted in favour of 
the UK postal incumbent Royal Mail between 2001 and 2007 are in line with EU 
State aid rules
387. 
444.  Further to a State aid investigation opened in 2007 following complaints by 
competitors, the Commission concluded that three loan measures granted in 2001-
2007 did not contain State aid because they were granted under market conditions. 
The Commission authorised a fourth measure concerning Royal Mail's pension 
liabilities under EC Treaty rules allowing State aid to facilitate certain economic 
activities (Article 87(3)(c) EC) because it covered abnormal costs which had arisen 
from the previous period when Royal Mail had a monopoly over the letters market. 
None of the measures had been notified, because the UK had contended that they did 
not constitute State aid. 
445.  The decision adopted on 8 April does not cover measures initially announced by the 
UK authorities in December 2008 in response to the recommendations of the Hooper 
report, and currently still under discussion in the UK. This decision does not concern 
either the separate measures in favour of Royal Mail's subsidiary, Post Office 
Limited, which runs the network of post offices
388. 
2.1.4.  Unlimited guarantee to the French La Poste 
446.  In 2007 the Commission opened the formal procedure to investigate the unlimited 
State guarantee resulting from the public-law status of the French La Poste
389. The 
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investigation includes an expert study that has concluded that La Poste indeed enjoys 
an unlimited guarantee due to its public-law status. In July, the French government 
adopted a bill of law providing for the incorporation of La Poste as a société 
anonyme, which would put an end to the guarantee. The law should be adopted early 
2010. In consideration of the above, the Commission is currently finalising its 
decision. 
2.2. Infringement  procedures 
447.  The European Commission pursued an infringement proceeding under Article 258 
TFEU against the Slovak Republic for the non-implementation of the 2008 
Commission decision on the Slovakian postal Law
390. 
448.  In its decision, the Commission found the re-monopolisation of the hybrid mail 
sector to the benefit of the postal incumbent Slovak Post to be in breach of 
competition rules. Hybrid mail is a service whereby the content of a communication 
is electronically transmitted from the sender to the service provider, which then 
prints, envelopes, processes and delivers the postal item to the final addressee. As a 
result of the Slovak postal law amendment, alternative postal operators were no 
longer allowed to deliver hybrid mail items, an activity previously open to 
competition. 
449.  Following the Commission´s decision, Slovakia did not inform the Commission of 
any measures which would have put an end to the infringement. As a result, the 
Commission opened infringement proceedings and on 29 October issued a reasoned 
opinion in this case
391. Slovakia has an obligation to comply with the Commission's 
decision, failing which the Commission may bring the matter to the ECJ In the 
meantime, the alternative operators may rely on the Commission's decision. 
2.3. Merger  control 
450.  On 21  April, the Commission cleared the first merger between incumbent postal 
operators, Posten (of Sweden) and Post Danmark
392. The transaction was cleared 
subject to conditions relating to parcel delivery services. The Commission's 
investigation showed that liberalisation of the Danish mail market (scheduled to take 
place before 2011) is not at risk, as the proposed merger was unlikely to increase 
barriers to entry or expansion, or impede competition in the Danish mail market. 
I – AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY  
1. OVERVIEW OF SECTOR 
451.  The motor vehicles sector was hit particularly hard by the economic crisis. Although 
world demand for cars in 2009 fell only by 2.4% compared to 2008 thanks to strong 
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demand in China
393, car sales (passenger cars and light commercial vehicles up to 
3.5to) in the EU decreased by 4.6% compared to 2008 and 12.5% compared to 
2007
394. In 2009, scrapping schemes were introduced in twelve Member States; they 
had a positive impact on sales in the short term, in particular in Germany, where the 
scheme had a significant budget (EUR 5 billion). On the basis of the information 
mechanism set up by Directive 98/34/EC, the national scrapping schemes containing 
in addition technical regulations were notified before adoption to the Commission 
and the Member States, which guaranteed transparency, exchange of information and 
the prevention of obstacles to the single market. 
452.  Falling demand and world overcapacity which have characterised the sector for some 
years resulted in bankruptcy proceedings of several major automotive suppliers, most 
notably the two US suppliers General Motors and Chrysler. As a consequence, two 
of GM's European operations, Opel/Vauxhall and Saab, where put up for sale and, in 
the case of Opel, required state loans to continue operations. 
453.  The second challenge the sector is currently facing is the transition towards greener 
cars. Increasing demand by customers for low emission cars and a tightening 
regulatory environment requires large scale investments for the development of 
vehicles which meet the standards of the future. The Commission authorised several 
State aid schemes in this respect. At the same time, the sector benefited from eased 
access to finance through loans and guarantees.  
2. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
2.1.  Antitrust and Advocacy 
454.  The current Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation (1400/2002) expires on 31 
May 2010. The Commission carried out a review of the Regulation, and on 22 July it 
adopted a Communication on the future competition policy orientations for the 
sector. On the basis of those policy orientations the Commission adopted on 28 
October a preliminary draft of a new Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation 
and accompanying guidelines which where, after consultation with the Member 
States, published for public consultation on 21 December. 
455.  The Commission concluded that the markets for vehicle sales are competitive, due to 
a number of external factors such as structural overcapacities and technological 
innovation. As a consequence, real car prices, i.e. adjusted for inflation and quality 
improvements, have been falling for years leading to highly competitive price levels. 
456.  On the other hand, competition on the markets for vehicle repair and spare part 
distribution is much more limited, because there is a specific aftermarket for each 
brand of vehicle on which the car manufacturers enjoy a high market share. Vehicle 
repair is important for buyers, as it accounts for a significant portion of the lifetime 
cost of owning and running a vehicle. Therefore, the Commission distinguished in its 
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Communication of 22 July between the markets for the sales of new motor vehicles 
and the repair and maintenance markets. 
457.  As it does not appear justified to treat the competitive vehicle sales markets any 
differently from other sectors, the Commission has proposed to remove the sector 
specific rules applying to the market for vehicle sales laid down in the current Motor 
Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation and apply the general competition rules on 
vertical agreements together with sector-specific guidelines. In order to give dealers 
time to adapt to the new rules, the Commission envisages prolonging the current 
rules regarding markets for new vehicle sales for three years. 
458.  With regard to the aftermarkets, the Commission has proposed to retain sector 
specific provisions, in the form of a focused block exemption in combination with 
guidelines. These sector specific provisions are designed to address efficiently, 
serious competition concerns, including the issue of independent operators' access to 
technical information, the free access to competing spare parts and the misuse of 
warranties. 
459.  These measures are fully coherent with initiatives taken by the EU institutions in 
other policy areas such as the proposal for liberalisation of the rules on design rights 
for replacement parts. In addition, very specific conditions for access to repair and 
maintenance information for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles have been 
set out in the legislation governing light duty vehicle emissions (Euro 5 and Euro 6 
limit values)
395.  
2.2.  State aid to the car sector 
Temporary Framework 
460.  The Temporary Framework for State aid
396  was widely used to support the car 
industry. For example, it allows financing of projects for the development of low 
emission vehicles. The Commission approved aid schemes for green products, i.e. 
"green cars", notified by France, UK, Spain, Germany and Italy
397. Furthermore, the 
Commission approved several guarantee and/or loan schemes for a number of 
Member States, such as France, UK, Germany, Belgium (Flemish region), Sweden 
and Romania among others
398. 
461.  In all cases of State aid to the car sector, the Commission continued to enforce a 
strict policy line. In particular, the Commission consistently indicated that it would 
not accept that State aid granted under schemes approved on the basis of the 
Temporary Framework would be subject – de jure or de facto – to protectionist 
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conditions, such as conditions concerning the geographic location of investments. 
The Commission carefully examined each case that raised this type of protectionist 
concerns, ensuring that the aid was not biased by unjustified non-commercial 
considerations and that it contributed to the future viability of the car industry. 
462.  This approach was followed when early in 2009 France announced its intention to 
grant State aid to its national car producers on the basis of a scheme approved under 
the Temporary Framework
399. Following extensive contacts between the 
Commission and the French authorities, the French authorities eventually made 
undertakings to the effect that the loan agreements intended for the car manufacturers 
would not contain any condition regarding either the location of their activities or a 
preference for France-based suppliers. A similar issue was raised in the context of 
State aid that Germany intended to grant to Adam Opel GmbH under an approved 
Temporary Framework scheme
400, in connection with a sale by General Motors of its 
Opel/Vauxhall European operations to an investor. Eventually, General Motors 
reversed its decision to sell Opel and the investor's process was terminated. 
463.  As regards notified aid to the car industry, on 13 May the Commission authorised a 
EUR 11 million training aid for staff at the truck maker Scania's plants in Sweden
401. 
The training programme, that will increase the skills and problem-solving ability of 
blue-collar workers, was found compatible with Article 87(3) EC.  
464.  On 13 November, the Commission authorised a state guarantee from the Romanian 
State to Ford Romania SA
402. The Commission also authorised, on 2 December, a 
EUR 57 million training aid to Ford Romania SA, thus closing the investigation 
procedure on this case
403. 
465.  On 5 June the Commission authorised state guarantees from the Swedish state to 
Volvo Personvagnar (Volvo PV)
404. The guarantees will allow Volvo PV to access 
loans from the European Investment Bank to co-finance the development of 
environment-friendly cars. The Commission found that 90% of the guarantees met 
the conditions of the Temporary Framework, in particular as Volvo PV would pay an 
adequate remuneration for the guarantee and provide sufficient securities in case the 
guarantee would be drawn. The remaining 10% of the guarantees would be provided 
on market conditions and therefore do not constitute State aid. 
Regional aids 
466.  The Commission authorised on 29 April regional investment aid for EUR 46 million, 
which the Italian authorities intended to grant to Fiat Group for a large investment 
project for the production of a new car model in Sicily
405. Sicily is an area eligible 
for regional aid under Article 107(3)(a) TFEU, as a region with an abnormally low 
standard of living and high unemployment. The project aimed at the extension of the 
existing plant of Fiat in Termini Imerese in order to change the production process 
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and to diversify its production, more specifically to produce a new passenger car 
under the Lancia brand to replace the existing small car model Lancia Ypsilon. The 
investment was expected to maintain existing jobs in the region. The Commission 
found the measure to be compatible with the requirements of the Regional Aid 
Guidelines 2007-2013 and in particular with the rules on large investment projects, 
because Fiat would not increase significantly its capacity. 
467.  On 29 October the Commission opened the formal investigation against Hungarian 
regional aid of some EUR 50 million for a large investment project of Audi Hungaria 
Motor Kft. in its existing plant in Györ
406, since the 25% market share threshold 
applicable under the relevant regional aid rules for large investment projects was 
exceeded. Hungary intends to subsidise the installation of new high-tech engine 
production lines for new generation engines and engine components for a wide range 
of passenger car models of the Volkswagen-Porsche Group. The aid would take the 
form of a direct grant and a corporate tax allowance. In the preliminary investigation, 
the Commission carried out the "market share"-test under point 68(a) of the Regional 
Aid Guidelines regarding all individual passenger car segments. For several 
segments, both at EEA and global level, the 25% threshold set by the guidelines was 
exceeded.  
468.  On 13 July the European Commission authorised, under EC Treaty State aid rules, 
EUR 111.5 million of aid, which the Hungarian authorities intend to grant to 
Mercedes-Benz Hungary
407, owned by Daimler AG, for the construction of a new car 
manufacturing plant in the region of Dél-Alföld. The investment project aimed at 
installing new machinery and equipment for the manufacture of two new passenger 
car models. The project involved investments eligible for the calculation of the aid of 
EUR 548.4 million and an aid amount of EUR 111.5 million in the form of a cash 
grant and a corporate tax allowance. In addition, Mercedes-Benz Hungary will 
receive financial support for railway access to the public railway network which 
amounts to some HUF 214 million (EUR 0.8 million). Mercedes-Benz Hungary will 
finance the project using own equity and bank loans. The measures are in line with 
the requirements of the Regional Aid Guidelines 2007-2013. In particular, the project 
will significantly contribute to the development of the region's economy, including 
the creation of 2  500 direct jobs, and respects the market share and capacity 
thresholds of the Regional Aid Guidelines 
469.  On 17 June, the Commission authorised EUR 51.9 million of aid, which the Spanish 
authorities intend to grant to Ford España
408, part of the Ford Motor Company, for a 
radical transformation of the existing plant on Almussafes, in the Valencia region. 
The Commission's assessment found the measure to be compatible with the 
requirements of the regional Aid Guidelines 2007-2013. The investment guarantees 
the continuity of activity at the Almussafes plant and will maintain some 5 000 direct 
jobs at the plant. Ford's investment project is aimed at dismantling existing 
production lines and installing new machinery and equipment for the manufacture of 
three new passenger car models. The investment project involves costs eligible for 
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the calculation of the public support of EUR 493.6 million and an aid amount of 
EUR 51.9 million. Ford is financing the bulk of the project through its own 
resources. 
J – FOOD INDUSTRY  
1. OVERVIEW OF SECTOR 
470.  The food supply chain brings together the agricultural sector, the food processing 
industry and the distribution sector, altogether accounting for 6% of the EU added 
value and 12% of EU employment. 
471.  Reversing the trend of three decades of declining agricultural prices, in 2006 the 
prices of a number of commodities started to follow a steady upward course. Prices 
increased dramatically in the second half of 2007 and reached peak levels in the first 
months of 2008. Between September 2006 and February 2008, world agricultural 
commodity prices rose by 70% in dollar terms. In the EU, these price hikes caused a 
rapid increase in consumer food prices, which reduced household purchasing power. 
The extent of the price increases differed widely between Member States. 
472.  In 2008 the Commission initiated a process to provide both an immediate and a long-
term response to the surge in food prices and to mitigate the impact on final 
consumers. In line with the Communication on "Tackling the challenge of rising food 
prices; Directions for EU action" of May 2008
409, an inter-service Task Force was set 
up to examine the functioning of the food supply chain. 
473.  The Task Force produced a first report on the situation in a second Communication 
on "Food Prices in Europe" adopted on 10 December 2008
410. It proposed a roadmap 
to improve the functioning of the food supply chain. In terms of competition policy, 
it called for ensuring a vigorous and coherent enforcement of competition rules in the 
food supply markets by the Commission and NCAs. Given the difficult situation 
faced by the dairy sector, the Commission also adopted a "Report on the dairy market 
situation" in July 2009
411. 
2. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
474.  The Commission continued enforcing competition rules on food markets through the 
active monitoring of existing commitment decisions and pursued the assessment of 
cases in which inspections were carried out in 2008. The work of the Commission 
Food Task Force continued in 2009. In this context, the Commission undertook a 
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focused fact-finding exercise, holding a set of bilateral meetings with a number of 
European associations representing different players active in the food supply chain. 
The objective of these meetings was to obtain insights into the specific 
characteristics of food markets, in the light of the most recent economic 
developments. This exercise further aimed at identifying potential competition-
related concerns that may affect the functioning of the food sector. Apart from 
hardcore restrictions on competition, this exercise identified some other practices as 
potentially harmful for competition. Such practices, which may merit a closer 
assessment by Competition Authorities, always on a case-by-case basis, relate to 
joint purchasing agreements ("buying alliances"); joint selling agreements; tying and 
bundling obligations; and the increased use of private labels. The results of this fact 
finding exercise were shared with NCAs and incorporated into a Communication on 
"A better functioning of the food supply chain", adopted by the Commission on 28 
October
412. 
475.  Given that food markets are often national/regional in scope, it is crucial for 
Competition Authorities to address potential malfunctioning within the food supply 
chain through a coherent and coordinated approach. To this end, in 2009, the 
European Competition Network has served as a forum for discussion and exchange 
of best practice on issues related to food markets. In this context, the Commission 
has organised two meetings of the ECN Food Subgroup in July and November..  
476.  The dairy sector is one of the sectors that have faced most difficulties in 2009. In 
view of these difficulties, the Commission adopted in July a "Report on the dairy 
market situation"
413. A High Level Group on Milk bringing together national 
agriculture experts was also set up and its work is ongoing. The Commission's 
dialogue with NCAs regarding the milk sector has also intensified through the 
creation of an ECN Joint Working Team on Milk whose work will continue 
throughout 2010. 
477.  At national level, as evidenced by the significant efforts deployed over the last two 
years by NCAs and which continued in 2009, ECN members have attached due 
priority to case-by-case investigations, as well as to broader inquiries regarding food 
markets, leading to the finding of an appreciable number of serious infringements, 
such as cartels and resale price maintenance cases. These infringements were swiftly 
remedied through cease-and-desist orders, accompanied where appropriate by 
substantial fines. Such cases spanned a variety of product markets, such as the dairy, 
milk, flour, bakery, pasta, eggs, poultry, beef, vegetables, fruit, olive oil, chocolate 
and herbs markets. 
III – Consumer activities 
1. KEY ACTIONS 
478.  The Consumer Liaison Unit has been in place and operational for over a year, 
pursuing the objectives of deepening DG Competition's engagement with consumer 
                                                 
412 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication16061_en.pdf 
413 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/markets/milk/report2009/index_en.htm EN  113     EN 
representatives and developing new ways of communicating directly with the 
broader public. 
479.  In 2003 the Commission created the European Consumer Consultative Group 
(ECCG) as the Commission's main forum for engaging with consumer 
organisations
414. The ECCG constitutes a platform for general discussions on issues 
relating to consumer interests; it gives an opinion on Community matters affecting 
the protection of consumer interests and advises the Commission when it outlines 
policies and activities having an effect on consumers. The ECCG has set up a 
Subgroup on competition that now meets twice a year in Brussels. Subgroup 
meetings provide the opportunity to discuss, from a consumer point of view, 
Commission decisions and policy actions in the field of competition, thus matching 
consumer bodies' demands for a more practical approach to competition issues.  
480.  The ECCG Competition Subgroup consists of one national consumer organisation 
representative per EU Member State, plus one representative from BEUC and two 
from EEA observers (Iceland and Norway). The Commission provides the secretariat 
for the Subgroup. 
481.  In 2009 the themes discussed during Subgroup meetings reflected the importance of 
the economic and financial crisis. State aid measures, which could a priori seem 
remote for consumers, have raised strong interest among Subgroup members, who 
are fully aware that State aid is about taxpayers' money. The Commission's 
presentation on the economic and financial crisis and State aid led to fruitful 
discussions on the structure of the banking sector and its incentives to fulfil its role of 
financing the real economy. Particular emphasis was put on the passing-on of lower 
interest rates to consumers and the possible reinforcement of 'too-big-to-fail' banks 
through state support. 
482.  Another illustration of the potential impact of State aid on consumers' every day life 
came from the Commission's public consultation on digital cinema. It was underlined 
that conversion costs to a new technology could threaten the very existence of a large 
proportion of cinemas across Europe, especially smaller art houses. Consumers' 
representatives were therefore interested in raising the issues related to this matter 
(notably cultural diversity) back in their respective countries, so as to be better able 
to inform the Commission of which type of cinemas consumers think should be 
supported by public funding. 
483.  Other topics such as the Intel decision and the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry were on 
the agenda of the ECCG Competition Subgroup. 
484.  On 21 October, the Commission hosted a public event on "Competition and 
Consumers in the 21
st century", bringing together consumer organisations, business 
representatives and academics as well as Member State judges and officials, to 
underline the impact of competition policy on European consumers' welfare and its 
synergies with consumer protection policy. In the opening speech, the Commissioner 
for Competition stressed the need for existing public enforcement to be 
complemented by effective damages action mechanisms at national level, in order to 
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allow consumers to be compensated for the harm suffered as a result of a breach of 
competition law. 
485.  Reaching out to consumers is not merely a question of explaining and discussing EU 
competition policy principles and achievements. It is also about empowering 
consumers; for if they understand better the mechanics of a competitive economy, 
they will play a more active role on the market by rewarding those suppliers that 
operate fairly and best respond to consumers’ needs, thus ensuring that their voice be 
heard by businesses. 
486.  Much effort has been devoted to following a user-friendly approach in updating the 
consumer pages of the competition website by making use of different methods of 
communication. The explanatory pages now include a short video presenting the 
benefits of competition in consumers' everyday life. They also contain an interactive 
animation where visitors can see how actions by the Commission relate directly to 
everyday products.  
487.  Raising the public's awareness on competition issues is not only key to having 
consumers fully exerting their power of choice; it should also allow further 
improving the input they may give to the Commission. 
IV – The European Competition Network and cooperation with 
National Courts – Overview of cooperation  
A – GENERAL OVERVIEW 
488.  In 2009, the European Competition Network (ECN), i.e. the network for cooperation 
of the Member States' NCAs and the Commission for the enforcement of EU 
antitrust rules, continued to be a very active forum for discussion and exchange on 
good practices. As in previous years, it performed well under the mechanisms laid 
down in Regulation 1/2003, with a view to ensure the efficient and consistent 
enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
1. COOPERATION ON POLICY ISSUES 
489.  The ECN provides a platform for EU competition authorities to constructively 
coordinate enforcement action, ensure consistency and discuss policy issues of 
common interest. During 2009, the ECN met in the following fora. 
•  The annual meeting of the Director General of DG Competition and the heads of 
all NCAs took place on 13 October. For the first time the meeting was organised 
to include break-out sessions which allowed a more in-depth discussion. The 
sessions focussed on challenges in competition enforcement for all ECN 
members: priority setting, convergence/transparency of procedures, sanctions and 
criminalisation, cooperation in mergers. The meeting also addressed the 
Commission's actions in the financial crisis and endorsed unanimously the report 
on leniency convergence under the ECN Model Leniency Programme (see 1.1. 
below).  EN  115     EN 
•  Four ECN plenary meetings served as an important tool for debates about general 
issues of common interest and exchange of experiences and know-how. The 
plenary took part in the preparatory fact-finding work for the Report on the 
functioning of Regulation 1/2003, which the Commission issued on 29 April
415 
(see section I.B.1.1.). Furthermore, the plenary participated in the preparation of 
the report on leniency convergence under the ECN Model Leniency Programme 
(see 1.1. below).  
•  Two working groups dealt with specific issues such as enhancing cooperation 
within the ECN. These working groups provided an excellent forum for sharing 
experiences on concrete issues and exchanging good practices. Two additional 
ECN working groups provided fora for discussions concerning the review of the 
Commission's policy on horizontal agreements and on vertical restraints. They 
explored the case experience in these fields and provided input for the 
Commission's review of the existing Block Exemption Regulations, and 
accompanying Guidelines, which are due to expire in 2010. Furthermore, the chief 
economists of the NCAs and DG Competition met for exchanges on matters 
within their area of expertise. 
•  Moreover, several ECN subgroups dedicated to particular sectors addressed 
sector-specific issues and engaged in a useful exchange of experience and best 
practices. For example, the subgroup on pharmaceuticals dealt with the results and 
follow-up to the Pharma Sector Inquiry (see II.F. above) and the Banking 
subgroup (see II.A. above) concentrated on further guidance in the area of MIFs 
and SEPA. 
1.1.  Convergence of ECN leniency programmes 
490.  During 2009, the ECN assessed the state of convergence in the field of leniency. On 
13 October, the heads of the ECN authorities endorsed a report which reviews the 
state of convergence of the leniency programmes of the ECN members with regard to 
the provisions of the ECN Model Leniency Programme
416. The report is based on 
information from the competition authorities and covers developments up to 
1 October. An annex to the report lists applicable leniency programmes.  
491.  The report concludes that the work within the ECN was a major catalyst in 
encouraging Member States to introduce leniency programmes and in promoting 
convergence between them. At the date of the report, twenty five Member States (all 
except Malta and Slovenia) and the European Commission operated leniency 
programmes. The first Slovenian leniency programme comes into force on 1 January 
2010; the Maltese competition authority considers introducing a leniency programme 
in the near future. Reforms of existing leniency programmes were pending in five 
Member States. Hence, the convergence process is still on-going. 
492.  The ECN Model Leniency Programme
417 was endorsed by the ECN members on 29 
September 2006. Just three years after its endorsement, most Member States revised 
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their existing programmes or adopted new ones to align with the ECN Model 
Leniency Programme. In the revision process, the ECN members essentially 
followed the key features of the Model Programme. The report also finds that full 
convergence has not yet occurred in all areas.  
493.  The purpose of the ECN Model Leniency Programme is to provide a basis for the 
soft harmonisation of the leniency programmes of the ECN members, setting out 
provisions that the ECN members believed every leniency programme should 
contain. It also introduced a model for a uniform summary application system at 
national level for immunity applications in cases where the Commission is 
particularly well placed to deal with the case
418. The report reviews in detail the 
textual convergence in areas such as the scope of leniency programmes, the types of 
applicants excluded from immunity, the marker system, the possibility of summary 
applications and of oral submissions, and the conditions for leniency.  
1.2.  Cooperation in individual cases 
494.  Cooperation between the ECN members in individual cases is organised around two 
principal obligations on the NCAs under Regulation 1/2003, namely to inform the 
Commission when new cases are opened (Article 11(3)) and before the final 
enforcement decision is taken (Article 11(4)). Informing the Commission and the 
Network about new cases facilitates swift reallocation of cases on a few occasions 
where it appears necessary and promotes enhanced and effective enforcement. The 
second requirement contributes to the coherent application of EU law. 
1.2.1. Case  allocation 
495.  The Commission was informed under Article 11(3) of the Regulation of 129 new 
case investigations launched by NCAs in 2009. Amongst the new cases, 62% 
concerned the application of Article 101 TFEU, 29% concerned the application of 
Article 102 TFEU and the remainder concerned the application of both Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU. The figure for Article 101 TFEU cases includes notably the 
enforcement action of the NCAs in the area of cartels. Large numbers of cases could 
be observed inter alia in the energy, media, telecom, transport and financial services' 
sectors. 
496.  With regard to work-sharing within the Network, the flexible and pragmatic 
approach introduced by the Regulation and the Network Notice continued to function 
very well in practice. As in previous years, in 2009 there were very few instances 
where case-allocation discussions took place, and even fewer occasions where a case 
changed hands. The situations where work-sharing plays a role typically occur when 
a complainant or a leniency applicant chooses to contact both the Commission and 
one or more NCAs. In 2009, a small number of complaints were re-allocated from 
the Commission to NCAs that were willing to follow up the matters raised. 
Furthermore, in a limited number of instances, the Commission and NCAs agreed on 
a way of dividing work on a case-by-case basis. 
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1.2.2.  Coherent application of the rules 
497.  The Commission services reviewed 69 envisaged decisions under Article 11(4) of 
Regulation 1/2003, as well as advised on informal requests and queries from NCAs. 
The number of envisaged decisions went up by 15% compared with 2008. The 
envisaged decisions submitted to the Commission related to a broad range of 
infringements in different sectors of the economy. 
498.  To date, the Commission has not initiated proceedings with the view to ensure 
decision-making coherency as foreseen by Article 11(6) of Regulation 1/2003. 
2. APPLICATION OF EU  COMPETITION RULES BY NATIONAL  COURTS IN THE EU: 
REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 15 OF REGULATION 1/2003 
2.1.  Assistance in the form of information or in the form of an opinion 
499.  Article 15(1) of Regulation 1/2003 allows national judges to ask the Commission for 
information in its possession or for an opinion on questions concerning the 
application of the EU competition rules. In 2009, the Commission issued five 
opinions: one in reply to a request from a Belgian court, one to a Lithuanian court 
and three to Spanish courts. 
2.1.1.  The opinion requested by a Belgian court 
500.  On 2 February, the Commission received a request for an opinion from the 
Rechtbank van Koophandel te Dendermonde in the context of an action brought by 
BVBA DD Bikes (DD Bikes), a former authorised dealer and repairer for Ducati 
Motorbikes against BV Ducati North Europe (Ducati) for failure to be admitted to 
the Ducati authorised repair network.  
501.  In terms of whether the distribution system implemented by Ducati could benefit 
from the exemption provided by Regulation 2790/1999 on Vertical Restraints
419, it is 
noted in the opinion that it is first necessary to establish whether there is a separate 
market for the repair and maintenance of Ducati bikes and if so, the market share of 
Ducati as supplier of the spare parts is relevant. If Ducati's market share were to 
exceed 30% (subject to the two year grace period if the market share goes up to 35% 
or subject to one year if it rises above 35% according to Article 9 of Regulation 
2790/1999) its agreements with its authorised repairers would not be able to benefit 
from the exemption provided by Regulation 2790/1999, but could still benefit from 
individual exemption depending on the competitive strength of the authorised 
dealers. If however, the national court did not find that there are separate markets for 
the sale of new motor bikes and their repair and maintenance respectively, the market 
share of Ducati on the primary market for the sale of new motor bikes is likely to be 
below 30%, and its agreements with its authorised repairers would prima facie be 
covered by Regulation 2790/1999.  
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2.1.2  The opinion requested by a Lithuanian court 
502.  The Commission replied to the request for an opinion by the Supreme Administrative 
Court of Lithuania, concerning the assessment of an agreement on information 
exchange. The affected markets were Lithuanian paper wholesale markets. The 
Commission observed that the assessment of a practice concerning the disclosure of 
information among competitors depends on whether it concerns an infringement by 
object or an infringement by effect. Insofar as the assessment of likely effects is 
concerned, the market structure is one of the factors to be taken into account. With 
reference to the case-law of the Community Courts, the Commission explained that it 
is necessary that the market structure is not "fragmented" or "atomised"; however, it 
does not follow that both elements of there being a "highly concentrated market" and 
the affected markets being "oligopolistic" in nature need to be established in every 
case for the purpose of establishing an infringement by effect. The Commission then 
examined (taking into account the nature of information) the criteria relevant for the 
assessment of the market structure in information exchange cases, where the assessed 
infringement is an infringement by effect. As whether the agreement in question 
constituted an infringement of Article 81 EC and whether it had appreciable effects 
on trade between Member States, the Commission concluded that the assessment 
depended on case-specific elements which were for the national court to assess.  
2.1.3.  The opinions requested by Spanish courts 
503.  Firstly, on 24 March, the Juzgado de lo Mercantil n°2 of Barcelona requested an 
opinion regarding the application of Article 81 EC in the context of litigation 
between Bright Service S.A. and REPSOL C.P.P., one of the largest suppliers on the 
Spanish wholesale market for petroleum products. The questions raised by the 
national court mainly concern the implications of a Commission decision of 
12/04/2006
420 (the REPSOL Decision) and whether it precludes national courts and 
competition authorities from assessing whether an exclusive supply agreement which 
is part of the commercial REPSOL network is harming or has infringed the 
competition rules. The opinion specifies that commitment decisions adopted by the 
Commission on the basis of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 do not conclude as to 
whether or not there has been or still is an infringement. Notwithstanding this, a 
national court cannot take a decision which would run counter to the operative part 
of the Commission's decision, i.e. which would conflict with the implementation of 
the commitments which were made binding by the REPSOL Decision.  
504.  Secondly, the Commission replied to a request from the Juzgado de lo Mercantil n°1 
of Madrid in the context of litigation following the acquisition of Dalphi Metal 
España's (DME) car airbag and steering wheel business by TRW Automotive 
(TRW), a US automotive component manufacturer. This acquisition was approved 
by the Commission in 2005 under the EU Merger Regulation
421. This decision took 
into account the fact that at the time Takata-Petri (Takata), which is also a 
manufacturer of car airbags and steering wheels, held a minority stake in DME 
(21.6%) and had a shareholding of 49% in each of three DME production joint 
ventures. The Commission considered that this could not give rise to a risk of 
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coordination between TRW and Takata on the markets for airbags and steering 
wheels.  
505.  Takata subsequently brought proceedings against some decisions taken by the Board 
of Directors of DME's production companies, in particular, against its refusal to give 
Takata access to the transfer prices charged to DME for certain products 
manufactured by DME's production companies on the grounds that this would 
infringe Article 81 EC. The questions raised by the court are addressed in the opinion 
as follows. Firstly, in terms of whether the "unilateral" provision of information by 
an undertaking to a competitor could constitute an exchange of information contrary 
to Article 81 EC, it is specified that the mere receipt of information by an 
undertaking could be anti-competitive because it could eliminate uncertainty about 
the future conduct of competitors and allow this undertaking to take into account this 
information in order to determine its policy on the market, although a case-by-case 
analysis of this is needed. Secondly, the exchange of historical data does not 
influence market conditions and therefore does not constitute an infringement of 
Article 81 EC. On the basis of Commission practice, information which is more than 
one year old can generally be regarded as "historical", however this has to be 
assessed taking into account the extent to which data becomes obsolete on the market 
concerned, and depending on the market structure in the case at hand.  
506.  The third opinion was requested by the Juzgado de lo Mercantil n°5 of Madrid 
regarding the application of Article 81 EC in the context of litigation between 
PETROCAT, a supplier on the Spanish wholesale market for petroleum products and 
two operators of service stations, CANALS y FILS S.L. and ZERO SETS S.L. With 
regard to the first question concerning whether a long term exclusive supply contract 
(of a duration of 27 years or more) can result in a significant restriction of 
competition contrary to Article 81 EC, the opinion specifies that the assessment of 
whether there is foreclosure has to be examined in the context of the overall 
competitive situation and existing economic and legal links (see the REPSOL 
Decision and the decision adopted by the Spanish Competition Authority in the 
CEPSA case). With regard to clauses in long term exclusive supply contracts which 
set the retail price, the opinion distinguishes between different types of contracts 
entered into between wholesaler distributor and service stations, according to the 
ownership and degree of risk involved in order to assist the national court in 
identifying whether the service station is ultimately an agent. If it is not a genuine 
agent, such a clause would violate Article 81(1) EC. The opinion also clarifies that in 
accordance with Article 5(a) of Regulation 2790/1999 on Vertical Restraints, 
exclusivity clauses of such long duration can only be exempted from the prohibition 
in Article 81(1) EC if the market share of the supplier is less than 30% and, if on 1 
January 2003, the remaining duration of the contract would be less than five years or 
if the contractual goods or services are sold by the buyer from premises and land 
owned by the supplier or are rented by the supplier to third parties not connected 
with the buyer. It is noted in the opinion that these conditions should be interpreted 
restrictively and do not appear to be met in this case.  
2.2.  Amicus curiae interventions under Article 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003 
507.  Article 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003 provides that where the coherent application of 
Articles 101 or 102 TFEU so requires, the Commission, acting on its own initiative, EN  120     EN 
may submit written observations to courts of the Member States, and may also make 
oral observations with the permission of the court in question.  
508.  In 2009, the Commission submitted written observations in one case before the Paris 
Court of Appeal, relating to a restriction of on-line sales in selective distribution 
agreements
422.  
509.  The Commission observed that a general prohibition of on-line sales imposed by the 
supplier on its selected distributors is an infringement by object under Article 81(1) 
EC, which is not block-exempted under Regulation 2790/1999. Moreover, the 
Commission observed that the notion of "objective justification", mentioned in point 
51 of the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, should be interpreted strictly and shall 
not replace the analysis of efficiencies under Article 81(3) EC. In general, only 
exceptional circumstances, external to the parties, may be considered as an objective 
justification for restrictions by object. If however the supplier proves that the 
conditions of Article 81(3) EC are fulfilled, the agreement may be individually 
exempted under that Article. On 29 October, the Paris Court of Appeal referred to 
the ECJ a question for preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC
423. 
510.  Furthermore, the Commission's powers to submit written observations as amicus 
curiae in national court proceedings were addressed in the judgment of the ECJ of 11 
June, in case C-429/07, Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst v X BV. In this judgment, 
the ECJ gave a broad interpretation of the condition of "coherent application of 
Articles 81 and 82 EC" as laid down in Article 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003 (see 
paragraph 153 above). Following the ECJ ruling, the Commission submitted its 
observations opposing tax deductibility of fines. 
2.3.  Financing the training of national judges in EU competition law 
511.  Continuous availability of training programmes for national judges in EU 
competition law contributes to the effective and coherent application of those rules. 
In 2009, 10 grant agreements were concluded for training of judges' programmes in 
various Member States. 
V – International activities  
512.  In an increasingly globalised world economy, competition policy must also adopt a 
global outlook. The Commission is responding to this challenge by reinforcing and 
extending its relations with partners all over the world in both bilateral and 
multilateral  fora. The Commission attaches the highest importance to effective 
international cooperation in the area of competition. Bilateral meetings between the 
Commissioner for Competition with counterparts in the United States, Brazil, 
Canada, Japan and China, as well as participation by the Commissioner for 
                                                 
422  Case at Paris Court of Appeal, No RG 2008/23812, Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique. 
423 Case  C-439/09,  Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique. The referred question is whether a general and 
absolute prohibition to sell contract goods to end users via the Internet, imposed on authorised 
distributors within the framework of a selective distribution network, constitutes an infringement of 
Article 81(1) EC, which is not exempted under Regulation No 2790/1999, however could possibly 
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Commission in the February meeting of the OECD Competition Committee 
demonstrate this commitment. 
A – MULTILATERAL COOPERATION 
1. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK 
513.  DG Competition continued to play a leading role in the ICN. More specifically, DG 
Competition is a member of the Steering Group, co-chair of the cartels Working 
Group and an active member of the other Working Groups (on mergers, agency 
effectiveness, unilateral conduct and advocacy). 
514.  DG Competition hosted on 22 and 23 January in Brussels a "Seminar on Competition 
Agency Effectiveness", the first such event of its type. The seminar addressed issues 
that are of central importance to the effectiveness of implementation of competition 
policies such as strategic planning of agency activities and prioritisation of actions, 
effective project delivery, evaluation and accountability and communication. 
Representatives of 47 competition agencies participated in the seminar, most of them 
heads of agencies or senior staff responsible for the planning of agency operations. 
515.  The 8
th Annual Conference took place in Zürich (Switzerland) from 3 to 5 May. 
516.  The Merger Working Group continued its work to draft Recommended Practices in 
several areas of substantive merger analysis and presented them at the Annual 
Conference on Recommended Practices on competitive effects in horizontal merger 
review, on unilateral effects and on coordinated effects. 
517.  The Unilateral Conduct Working Group, which was set up in 2006, presented two 
reports on tying, bundled discounting and loyalty rebates. The Working Group also 
started preparations for a report on refusals to supply. In March the ICN held a 
workshop on Unilateral Conduct in Washington. 
518.  The Cartels Working Group, co-chaired by DG Competition, continued its work on 
the Anti-Cartel Enforcement Manual, in particular on searches and inspections and 
on developing an effective leniency program. The 2009 ICN Cartels workshop was 
held in Cairo (Egypt) from 27 to 29 October. 
2. OECD 
519.  The Commission continued to contribute actively to the work of the OECD 
Competition Committee and participated in each of the three sessions held by the 
Committee in 2009. It submitted contributions to most roundtables on competition 
policy, including on the role of competition law in times of crises, the standard of 
merger review, two-sided markets, competition, patents and innovation, margin 
squeeze, state-owned companies and failing firm defence. The Commissioner for 
Competition made a speech on the "Road to recovery" in the context of the OECD 
session dedicated to the financial crisis. EN  122     EN 
3. UNCTAD 
520.  The Commission participated at the 10
th annual conference of the Intergovernmental 
Group of Experts (IGE) on Competition Law and Policy of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It submitted contributions to 
most roundtable discussions, such as the one on the relationship between competition 
and industrial policies in promoting economic development, the one on public 
monopolies, concessions, competition law and policy as well as the one on the role 
of economic analysis in competition cases. 
B – BILATERAL COOPERATION 
521.  The Commission cooperates with numerous competition authorities on a bilateral 
basis and, in particular, with the authorities of the European Union's major trading 
partners. The European Union has entered into dedicated cooperation agreements in 
competition matters with the United States, Canada and Japan. 
1. AGREEMENTS WITH THE USA, CANADA, JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA 
522.  As in previous years, cooperation with the United States of America was intense. 
Based on two dedicated competition cooperation agreements
424, contacts between 
DG Competition and the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice (DoJ) 
and the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) were frequent. These contacts ranged 
from cooperation in individual cases to more general matters related to competition 
policy. Numerous meetings and video- or telephone-conferences took place to 
discuss issues such as cooperation in cartel investigations, abuse of dominance or the 
application of the competition rules in particular sectors. The Commissioner for 
Competition met her US counterparts, Chairman Jon Leibowitz of the FTC and 
Christine Varney, the Assistant Attorney General, at several occasions.  
523.  In case-related contacts, case teams regularly updated each other on the state of 
investigations (within the limits of the above-mentioned agreements). Merger 
control, in particular, requires good coordination with the DoJ and the FTC. The 
2002 EU-US Best Practices on cooperation in reviewing mergers provided a useful 
framework for cooperation, especially by indicating critical points in the procedure 
where cooperation could be particularly useful. The Pfizer/Wyeth and 
Panasonic/Sanyo cases can be cited as examples of good cooperation between the 
EU and US agencies. 
524.  Cooperation with the Canadian Competition Bureau is based on the EU/Canada 
Competition Cooperation Agreement which was signed in 1999
425. Contacts between 
the Commission and the Bureau have been frequent and fruitful. Case-related contact 
concerned mainly merger and cartel investigations. In the area of cartel cases this 
                                                 
424  Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America 
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the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America on the application of 
positive comity principles in the enforcement of their competition laws (OJ L 173, 18.6.1998, p. 26). 
425  Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of Canada regarding the 
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also included the coordination of investigative measures and, in the area of mergers, 
the discussion of possible remedies. The Commission and the Canadian Competition 
Bureau continued their dialogue on general competition issues of common concern. 
The Commissioner for Competition met the Head of the Canadian Competition 
Bureau, Melanie Aitken, at the annual bilateral high level meeting on 30 March in 
Toronto and officials from both sides conducted other reciprocal visits. 
525.  Cooperation with the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) is based on the 2003 
Cooperation Agreement
426. The Commissioner for Competition met with JFTC 
Chairman Takeshima during the EU-Japan High Level meeting on competition 
policy  on 10 September in Brussels. At the centre of discussions were policy 
initiatives on both sides (especially merger remedies and the JFTC's draft guidance 
on unilateral conduct), as well as recent enforcement actions. In addition to contacts 
on individual cases, the Commission and the JFTC continued their ongoing dialogue 
on general competition issues of common concern. 
526.  On 23 May, the European Community and South Korea signed a bilateral 
cooperation agreement in the field of competition, which entered into force on 1 July 
2009
427. This agreement contained provisions on enforcement cooperation, 
notification, consultation and exchange of non-confidential information. The 
agreement supersedes the Memorandum of Understanding
428 between DG 
Competition and the KFTC. 
2. COOPERATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND REGIONS 
527.  The European Commission continued its close cooperation with the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) Surveillance Authority in enforcing the Agreement on the 
European Economic Area (EEA). 
528.  Relations with Brazil have intensified with cooperation on cases and DG 
Competition hosting a visitor from CADE, the Brazilian decision-making 
competition authority, for a 3 month period. They reached a new level on 8 October 
when The Commissioner for Competition signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) with the Brazilian Ministry of Justice and the heads of the Brazilian 
Competition Authorities in order to ensure a closer cooperation between DG 
Competition and its Brazilian counterparts. This MoU reflects the importance of 
Brazil as a trading partner for the EU and the maturity of its competition enforcement 
authorities. 
529.  Cooperation with China under the EU-China competition policy dialogue
429 
remained a priority in 2009 with the annual competition dialogue being held in 
Brussels on 22-23 June. In addition, contacts between DG Competition and the 
Chinese administration were intensive and dealt mainly with questions concerning 
                                                 
426  Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Japan concerning cooperation on 
anti-competitive activities (OJ L 183, 22.7.2003, p. 12). 
427  Agreement between the European Community and the Government of the Republic of Korea 
concerning cooperation on anti-competitive activities (OJ L 202, 4.8.2009, p. 36). 
428  Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation between the Fair Trade Commission of the Republic of 
Korea and the Competition Directorate-General of the European Commission (October 2004). 
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the recently adopted anti-monopoly law and the implementing legislation which is 
being elaborated. Together with the Chinese Anti Monopoly Enforcements 
Authorities, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the State 
Administration of Commerce and Industry (SAIC) and Ministry of Commerce 
(Mofcom), DG Competition co-hosted several workshops in Beijing as well as the 
Competition Weeks in the provinces on EU merger control and antitrust issues for 
high-level representatives from the Anti Monopoly Enforcements Authorities. 
Moreover, high-level representatives visited the Anti Monopoly Enforcements 
Authorities in Beijing to discuss technical and enforcement cooperation. DG 
Competition is furthermore actively negotiating a competition chapter to be part of 
the 1985 upgrade agreement/Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. 
530.  Cooperation with India intensified during 2009 as India has appointed seven 
Commissioners to constitute the Competition Commission of India (CCI) which is 
entrusted with the enforcement of the 2002 Competition Act. India moreover notified 
the operative parts of the 2002 Competition Act regarding restrictive agreements, 
abuse of dominance and merger control, which is a pre-requisite for their 
enforcement. Consequently, a number of meetings between the CCI and high level 
DG Competition officials took place throughout 2009 and the Commissioner for 
Competition also paid a visit to the CCI in November. DG Competition is moreover 
engaged in technical cooperation with the CCI and it welcomed 6 high level CCI 
officials in September for discussions on the most efficient ways to combat cartels. 
531.  DG Competition played an active role in the ongoing negotiations on Free Trade 
Agreements (FTA) with India, Ukraine, India, South Korea, Andean Countries 
(Colombia and Peru) and Canada, and on the trade part of the Association 
Agreement with Central America, with a view to ensuring that anti-competitive 
practices (including State aid) do not erode the trade and other economic benefits 
sought through those agreements. DG Competition continued to play an active role in 
the negotiation of the competition chapter of Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) with five groupings of former ACP countries, (four in Africa and one in the 
Pacific). The FTA with South Korea was initialled on 15 October 2009 and is 
expected to be signed and enter into force during the course of 2010. It is the first 
time that an FTA contains a prohibition on certain types of subsidies. Moreover, DG 
Competition is negotiating competition provisions in a number of Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements with Mongolia and certain ASEAN countries and in 
particular Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Brunei, Singapore and Malaysia. 
C – ENLARGEMENT 
532.  In the context of enlargement, candidate countries must fulfil a number of 
requirements in the field of competition policy as a condition for joining the 
European Union. Candidate countries must adopt national legislation compatible 
with the EU acquis. They must also put in place the necessary administrative 
capacity and demonstrate a credible enforcement record. DG Competition provides 
technical assistance and support to help the candidate countries fulfil these 
requirements and it continuously monitors the extent to which the candidate 
countries are prepared for accession. EN  125     EN 
533.  During 2009, there was particularly close cooperation with Croatia and Turkey. 
These two candidate countries have to fulfil "opening benchmarks" before accession 
negotiations on the competition chapter can start. Croatia made important progress in 
meeting these opening benchmarks, including on the remaining important issue of 
the restructuring of its shipyards. Turkey has yet to introduce a system for the control 
and monitoring of State aid. 
534.  DG Competition assisted the Western Balkan countries in further aligning their 
competition rules with EU law. This included, among others, help in drafting laws on 
competition and State aid and advice on setting up the necessary institutions to 
enforce these rules. DG Competition continued to help Macedonia improve the 
compliance of its fiscal legislation with Community rules on State aid. 
535.  DG Competition also took part in the preliminary discussions on Iceland's EU 
membership prospect. 
536.  In the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), DG Competition 
monitored the implementation of the competition-related priorities in the bilateral 
action plans agreed between the EU and ENP countries, which set out an agenda of 
political and economic reforms in the short and medium term. It also organised a 
certain number of seminars financed by the TAIEX program on competition-related 
issues for these countries. 
VI – Interinstitutional cooperation 
537.  In 2009, the Commission continued its cooperation with the other institutions of the 
European Union in accordance with the respective agreements or protocols entered 
into by the relevant institutions
430. 
538.  The Commission cooperates closely with the European Parliament (EP). In 2009, the 
EP adopted two resolutions on competition policy issues: a resolution on the White 
paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, and on the Annual 
Competition Reports for 2006 and 2007. In addition to the regular dialogue between 
the Commissioner for Competition and the ECON committee, the Commission 
participated in discussions held in other Parliamentary committees, and on a range of 
subjects including the Annual Competition Report, the White Paper on Damages 
Actions, the Broadcasting Communication, State aid and the financial crisis, the 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry and the Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation. 
Bilateral meetings with MEPs were held on these and on a range of other issues, 
including the Insurance Block Exemption Regulation. 
539.  The Commission also cooperates closely with both the European Ombudsman and 
Members of the EP by replying to Parliamentary Questions and Petitions. In 2009, 
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the Commission responded to 446 written questions, 38 oral questions and 43 
petitions involving matters of competition policy
431. 
540.  The Commission cooperates closely with the Council by informing it of important 
policy initiatives in the field of competition, such as on State aid measures and 
guidelines for the banking industry and other additional State aid measures in the 
context of the financial and economic crisis. The Economic and Financial Committee 
(EFC), has been consulted on the Banking, Recapitalisation, Impaired Assets and 
Restructuring Communications, and on a review of guarantee and recapitalisation 
schemes. The EFC prepares the work for the Economic and Financial Affairs 
Council (ECOFIN) and includes a European Central Bank representative. 
541.  The Commission made contributions on competition policy in respect of conclusions 
adopted in the ECOFIN Council (Single Market Review, Single Euro Payments 
Area, exit strategies for the financial sector) and the European Council (exit 
strategies), the Competitiveness Council (such as on contribution to the EU2020 
agenda, industrial policy or single market), the Transport, Telecommunications and 
Energy Council (Internal Energy Market legislative package, energy/climate 
package). 
542.  The Commission informs the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) 
and the Committee of the Regions about major policy initiatives, and participates in 
debates that may be held in the respective Committee on those initiatives. During 
2009, the EESC published reports on the Annual Competition Report 2007, and the 
White Paper on damages actions. DG Competition services have also attended 
working group meetings, and had bilateral meetings with EESC rapporteurs on a 
number of other subjects including SMEs adapting to global market changes, 
shipbuilding and State aid.  
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ANNEX: State aid - Overview of national measures adopted as a response to the 
financial/economic crisis (2008 & 2009) 
Brussels, January 2010 
STATE AID:  OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL MEASURES ADOPTED AS A RESPONSE TO THE 
FINANCIAL/ECONOMIC CRISIS 
(See table attached in annex) 
This information is compiled from a range of sources and is provided for information only. 
The European Commission cannot confirm the completeness or accuracy of the information. EN  128     EN 
COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE COMMISSION TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO MEMBER STATES 
Communication from the Commission — The application of State aid rules to measures 
taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, 13 
October 2008 (see IP/08/1495) 
Communication from the Commission — The recapitalisation of financial institutions in 
the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against 
undue distortions of competition, 5 December 2008 (see IP/08/1901) 
Communication from the Commission on the Treatment of Impaired Assets in the 
Community Banking Sector, 25 February 2009 (see IP/09/322) 
Communication from the Commission - Temporary framework for State aid measures to 
support access to finance in the current financial and economic crisis, adopted on 17 
December 2008 (see IP/08/1993), as amended on 25 February 2009. 
Communication from the Commission - The return to viability and the assessment of 
restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules, 
23 July 2009 (see IP/09/1180) 
STATE AID CASES - SITUATION AS OF 8 JANUARY 2010 
Decisions adopted by the Commission in 2008/2009/2010
432 
  Member State  Type of measure / Beneficiary 
 
Type of Decision  Date of adoption 
  Austria  N557/2008 - Aid scheme for the 
Austrian financial sector (guarantees, 
recapitalisation & other) 
 
N352/2009 - Prolongation 
 
N663/2009 - Second prolongation 











30 June 2009 
 
17 December 2009 
  Austria  N214/2008 - Recapitalisation of Hypo 
Tirol 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/928 
17 June 2009 
  Austria  N 640/2009 - BAWAG - capital injection Decision not to 22  December  2009 
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and asset guarantee  raise  objections 
IP/09/1989 
  Austria  C 16/2009 + N698/2009 – Emergency 
aid to Hypo Group Alpe Adria 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/1998 
23 December 2009 
 Belgium/France/ 
Luxembourg 
NN45-49-50/2008 - Guarantee on 













30 October 2009 
 Belgium/France/ 
Luxembourg 
C9/2009 - Guarantee in favour of Dexia 
on certain assets in FSA 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/399 




N574/2008 - Measures in favour of 
Fortis 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/08/1746 
19 November 2008 
 Belgium/Luxembourg/
Netherlands 
NN42-46-53A/2008 - Restructuring aid 
to Fortis Bank and Fortis Bank 
Luxembourg 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/08/1884 
03 December 2008 
 Belgium/Luxembourg N255/2009 and N274/2009 - Additional 
aid measures in favour of Fortis Bank 
and Fortis Bank Luxembourg 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/743 
12 May 2009 
  Belgium  N602/2008 - Recapitalisation measure in 
favour of KBC 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/08/2033 
18 December 2008 
  Belgium  NN57/2008 - Capital Injection for Ethias 
Group 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/254 
12 February 2009 
  Belgium  C18/2009 - Recapitalisation and asset 
relief for KBC Group 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/1063 
30 June 2009 
  Belgium  C18/2009 - Asset relief and restructuring 






18 November 2009 
  Cyprus  N511/2009 - Cypriot scheme to support 
credit institutions (guarantee) 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/1569 
22 October 2009 
  Denmark  NN36/2008 - Rescue aid to Roskilde 
Bank 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
(IP/08/1222) 
31 July 2008 
 
  Denmark  NN39/2008 - Liquidation aid to Roskilde 
bank 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
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IP/08/1633 
  Denmark  NN51/2008 - Guarantee scheme for 
banks in Denmark 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/08/1483 
10 October 2008 
  Denmark  N31a/2009 - Recapitalisation scheme 
and amendment of the guarantee scheme 
 
NN46/2009 - Prolongation 
 
N628/2009 – Second prolongation 







3 February 2009 
 
 
17 August 2009 
 
17 December 2009 
  Denmark  NN23/2009 - Rescue aid for Fionia Bank  Decision  not  to 
raise objections 
IP/09/819 
20 May 2009 
  Finland  N567/2008 - Finnish guarantee scheme 
 
 




N239/2009 - Prolongation and 
modification 
 
N674/2009 – Second prolongation and 
modification 



















30 April 2009 
 
 
17 December 2009 
  Finland  NN2/2009 - Guarantee for Kaupthing 
Bank Finland 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/82 
21 January 2009 
  Finland  N329/2009 - Capital injection scheme  Decision  not  to 
raise objections 
IP/09/1303 
11 September 2009 
  France  N548/2008 - Financial support measures 
to the banking industry in France 
(Refinancing) 
 
N251/2009 - Extension of the scheme 




Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/750 
30 October 2008 
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  France  N613/2008 - Financial support measures 
to the banking industry in France 
(Recapitalisation) 
 
N29/2009 - Amendment to the Decision 
 
N164/2009 - Amendment to the Decision 











28 January 2009 
 
23 March 2009 
  France  N249/2009 - Capital injection for Caisse 
d'Epargne and Banque Populaire 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/722 
8 May 2009 







4 June 2008 





21 October 2008 
 Germany 
 
NN44/2008 - Rescue aid to Hypo Real 
Estate Holding 
 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/08/1453 
2 October 2008 
  Germany  N512/2008 - Aid scheme for financial 
institutions in Germany (guarantees, 
recapitalisations & other) 
 
N625/2008 - Amendment to the Decision 
 
 
N330/2009 – Prolongation 
 
N665/2009 – Second prolongation 







EXME09 / 22.06  
 
MEX/09/1217 
27 October 2008 
 
 
12 December 2008 
 
 
22 June 2009 
 
17 December 2009 
  Germany  N615/2008 - Guarantee and 
recapitalisation for Bayern LB  
 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/08/2034 
18 December 2008 
  Germany  N655/2008 - Guarantee for  NordLB  Decision not to 
raise objections 












10 September 2009 
  Germany  N639/2008 - Guarantee for IKB  Decision  not  to 
raise objections 
IP/08/2055 
22 December 2008 
  Germany  N17/2009 - Guarantee for SdB – 
Sicherungseinrichtungsgesellschaft 
deutscher Banken mbH 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/114 
22 January 2009 
  Germany  N244/2009 - Commerzbank capital 
injection 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/711 
7 May 2009 







12 May 2009 
  Germany  N531/2009 - Temporary additional aid to 
West LB 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/1434 
7 October 2009 
  Germany  N264/2009 - Recapitalisation of HSH 
Nordbank 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/854 
29 May 2009 
  Germany  C17/2009 - Recapitalisation and asset 
relief for LBBW (Landesbank Baden 
Württemberg) 
 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/1058 
30 June 2009 
  Germany  N314/2009 - German asset relief  scheme Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/1216 
31 July 2009 
  Germany  N400/2009 - Additional aid (guarantees) 
for IKB 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/1235 
17 August 2009 
  Germany  Export credit scheme  Decision  not  to 
raise objections 
IP/09/1319 
15 September 2009 
 Germany  C17/2009 - Landesbank Baden 
Württemberg "LBBW" - restructuring 
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  Germany  N694/2009 – State guarantees for Hypo 
Real Estate 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/1985 
21 December 2009 
  Germany  N555/2009 – Rescue aid for WestLB; in-
depth investigation into bad bank 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/1996 
22 December 2009 
  Greece  N560/2008 - Aid scheme to the banking 
industry in Greece (guarantees, 
recapitalisation & other) 
 
Prolongation and modification 





19 November 2008 
 
 
18 September 2009 
  Hungary  N664/2008 - Financial support measures 
to Hungarian financial industry in form 
of recapitalisation and guarantee scheme 
 
N355/2009 - Prolongation and 
modification 
 
N662/2009 – Second prolongation 








12 February 2009 
 
 
3 September 2009 
 
 
17 December 2009 




N603/2009 - Prolongation 




Decision not to 
raise objections 
MEX 09/1124 
13 July 2009 
 
 
24 November 2009 
  Ireland  NN48/2008 - Guarantee scheme for 
banks in Ireland 
 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/08/1497 
13 October 2008 
  Ireland  N9/2009 - Recapitalisation of Anglo 
Irish Bank 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/50 
14 January 2009 
  Ireland  N356/2009 - Recapitalisation of Anglo 
Irish Bank 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/1045 
26 June 2009 
  Ireland  N61/2009 - Change of ownership of 
Anglo Irish Bank 
 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/271 
17 February 2009 EN  134     EN 
  Ireland  N149/2009 - Recapitalisation of Bank of 
Ireland 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/483 
26 March 2009 
  Ireland  N241/2009 - Recapitalisation of Allied 
Irish Bank 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/744 
12 May 2009 
  Ireland  N349/2009 - revised Irish guarantee 
scheme for financial institutions 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/1787 
20 November 2009 




N328/2009 - Prolongation 









16 June 2009 
  Italy  N648/2008 - Recapitalisation scheme 
 
 
N97/2009 - Amendment 
 
N 466/2009 - Prolongation 







23 December 2008 
 
 
20 February 2009 
 
6 October 2009 
  Latvia  NN68/2008 - Public support measures to 
Parex Banka  
 
NN3/2009 - Amendment to the Decision 
 
N189/2009 - Amendment to the Decision 







24 November 2008 
 
 
11 February 2009 
 
11 May 2009 




N326/2009 – Prolongation 
 
N664/2009 – Second prolongation 











30 June 2009 
 
17 December 2009 
  Latvia  NN60/2009 - Capital injection for 
Mortgage Bank of Latvia  
Decision not to 
raise objections 
19 November 2009 EN  135     EN 
IP/09/1742 
  Luxembourg  N344/2009&N380/2009 - Restructuring 
aid for Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/1107 
9 July 2009 
  Netherlands  N524/2008 - Guarantee scheme for 
Dutch financial institutions 
 
 
N379/2009 - Prolongation and 
modification 
 
N669/2009 – Second prolongation 












7 July 2009 
 
 
17 December 2009 
 Netherlands 
 
N528/2008 - Measure in favour of ING  Decision  not  to 
raise objections 
IP/08/1699 
13 November 2008 
  Netherlands  N569/2008 - Measure in favour of 
Aegon 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/08/1822 
27 November 2008 
 Netherlands  N611/2008  - SNS Reaal/New capital 
injection by Dutch authorities 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/08/1951 
10 December 2008 
  Netherlands  C10/2009 - ING Illiquid asset facility  Decision  not  to 
raise objections 
IP/09/514 
31 March 2009 
  Netherlands  C10/2009 - ING restructuring plan and 






18 November 2009 
  Poland  N208/2009 - Polish support scheme for 
financial institutions (guarantee and 
liquidity support) 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/1360 
25 September 2009 
  Poland  N302/2009 – Polish bank recapitalisation 
scheme 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/1979 
21 December 2009 
 Portugal 
 
NN60/2008 - Guarantee scheme for 
credit institutions in Portugal 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/08/1601 
29 October 2008 
  Portugal  NN71/2008 - State guarantee for Banco 
Privado Português 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/400 
13 March 2009 
  Portugal  N556/2008 - Bank recapitalisation 
scheme 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
20 May 2009 EN  136     EN 
IP/09/818 
  Slovakia  N392/2009 - Slovak bank support 
scheme 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/1889 
8 December 2009 




N331/2009 - Prolongation 
 
N651/2009 – Second prolongation 











22 June 2009 
 
17 December 2009 




N510/2009 – Prolongation 









19 October 2009 
  Spain  NN54a/2008 - Fund for the Acquisition 






N337/2009 - Prolongation 




Decision not to 
raise objections 
 










7 August 2009 
 
  Spain  NN54b/2008 - Spanish guarantee scheme 






N588/2009 - Second prolongation 
 




Decision not to 
raise objections 
MEX09 / 0625  
 







25 June 2009 
 
 
1 December 2009 
  Sweden  N533/2008 - Support measures for the 
banking industry in Sweden
Decision not to 
raise objections 
29 October 2008
 EN  137     EN 
 
 
N26/2009 - Amendment to the decision 
 
N154/2009 - Amendment and 
prolongation 
 











28 January 2009 
 
28 April 2009 
 
 
26 October 2009 
  Sweden  NN64/2008 - Emergency rescue 
measures regarding Carnegie Investment 
Bank 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/08/1977 
15 December 2008 




N436/2009 - Prolongation 




Decision not to 
raise objections 
MEX09 / 0805 




5 August 2009 
 United  Kingdom 
 
NN41/2008 - Rescue aid to Bradford and 
Bingley 
 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/08/1437 
1 October 2008 
  United Kingdom  N507/2008 - Aid scheme to the banking 
industry in the UK (guarantees, 
recapitalisation & other) 
 
N650/2008 - Amendment to the Decision 
 
 





N537/2009 – Prolongation 
 
N677/2009 - Prolongation 



















23 December 2008 
 
 





13 October 2009 
 
17 December 2009 EN  138     EN 
  United Kingdom  N111/2009 - Working capital guarantee 
scheme 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/471 
24 March 2009 














27 October 2009 







28 October 2009 
  United  Kingdom  N428/2009 - Restructuring plan of 
Lloyds Banking Group 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/1728 
18 November 2009 
  United Kingdom  N422/2009 and N621/2009 - Royal Bank 
of Scotland, impaired asset relief 
measure and restructuring plan 
Decision not to 
raise objections 
IP/09/1915 
14 December 2009 
 
Cases currently under formal investigation procedure (in-depth investigation under the 
EC Treaty’s rules on state aid) 
  Country  Type of measure / Beneficiary 
 
Date of decision 
regarding the 








  Germany  C15/2009 - Aid package for Hypo 
Real Estate (restructuring) 
 
Extension and temporary approval 
of capital injections 








  Germany,  Austria  C16/2009 - Aid package for 
Bayern LB and its Austrian 









23 December 2009 
Case under 
assessment 
 EN  139     EN 
IP/09/1998 
 Germany  C29/2009 - Aid package for HSH 
Nordbank AG 




 Germany  C32/2009 - Support measures for 
German savings bank Sparkasse 
KölnBonn 




  Germany  C43/2009 – WestLB: in-depth 
investigation into bad bank 




  Latvia  C26/2009 - Aid package for JSC 
Parex Banka 




 Netherlands  C11/B/2008 - State measures in 
favour of Fortis Bank Nederland 
(FBN) and the activities of ABN 
Amro 




 Portugal  C33/2009  -  State guarantee for 
Banco Privado Português 
10 November 2009 
IP/09/1691 
Case under 
assessment 
 